Cioffi v. Ingram
| Decision Date | 11 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:20-CV-177-FL,4:20-CV-177-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | AMY JO CIOFFI, Plaintiff, v. RONNIE T. INGRAM, Lenoir County Sheriff, and DAWN STROUD, Lenoir County Superior Court Clerk, Defendants. |
This matter is before the court on motions to dismiss filed by defendant Ronnie T. Ingram ("Ingram") (DE 23) and defendant Dawn Stroud ("Stroud") (DE 32). The issues raised have been briefed fully, and in this posture, are ripe for ruling. For the following reasons, defendant Ingram's motion is denied, and defendant Stroud's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff commenced this action pro se on September 21, 2020, and filed the operative amended complaint on September 25, 2020, asserting claims for violations of her Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
On November 6, 2020, defendant Ingram filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata. Plaintiff responded in opposition on November 16, 2020, and defendant Ingram replied in support on November 24, 2020. Plaintiff filed surreply on November 30, 2020,1 and that same day, defendant Ingram filed a corrected reply.2
Defendant Stroud filed the instant motion to dismiss on December 21, 2020, seeking dismissal of plaintiff's claims on the basis of lack of standing, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, sovereign immunity, and for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff responded in opposition on December 28, 2020, relying upon 1) a copy of her medical records and 2) various forms, documents, and correspondence.
The facts alleged in plaintiff's amended complaint may be summarized as follows. On February 21, 2016, Lenoir Memorial Hospital admitted plaintiff on a voluntary basis for alcohol use. (Am. Compl. (DE 5) at 5). Four days later, Dr. Gridley petitioned for a Magistrate Custody Order, which was granted without plaintiff's knowledge. (Id.). The following day, Dr. Gridley determined that plaintiff was competent, a physician rescinded the Magistrate Custody Order, and plaintiff was released from Lenoir Memorial Hospital. (Id.).
On September 6, 2017, plaintiff voluntarily sought treatment for pneumonia symptoms at Lenoir Memorial Hospital. (Id.). Without plaintiff's knowledge, Dr. Keku petitioned for, and was granted, a Magistrate Custody Order. (Id.). At an unspecified time, a physician rescinded the Magistrate Custody Order, and plaintiff left the hospital on her own free will. (Id.).
In early October 2019, plaintiff applied for a handgun permit with the Lenoir County Sheriff's Office. (Id.). On or about October 31, 2019, plaintiff received a letter from the Lenoir County Sheriff's Office, advising that her handgun permit was denied pursuant to North Carolina GeneralStatute § 14-404(c)(4), which prohibits issuance of a handgun permit to anyone who has been "adjudicated mentally incompetent or has been committed to any mental institution." (Id.).
Upon receipt of the letter, plaintiff went to the Lenoir County Sheriff's Office to inquire about the denial of her handgun permit because she had never been "adjudicated mental defective." (Id.). Plaintiff talked to Major Ryan Dawson ("Major Dawson"), who claimed that plaintiff was "In the Book" and sent her to the Lenoir County Clerk of Court's office. (Id.). At the Lenoir County Clerk of Court's office, plaintiff requested documentation that she was "In the Book", and she was given a copy of the rescinded Magistrate Custody Order associated with her February 2016 hospital stay. (Id.).
On November 5, 2019, plaintiff appealed the denial of her handgun permit in Lenoir County Superior Court. (Id.). Superior Court Judge Imelda Pate ("Judge Pate") held a hearing on December 18, 2019, at which hearing Major Dawson testified that his investigation hinged upon an inquiry into the Lenoir County Clerk of Court's records. (Id. at 6). Following hearing, Judge Pate held that plaintiff was "ineligible as a matter of law to purchase a pistol as a result of having been adjudicated mentally defective or having been involuntarily committed to a mental institution pursuant to the provisions of NCGS 14-404(c)(4)." (Id.).
However, plaintiff alleges that she has never been "adjudicated" as mentally defective by a district court judge, as required by North Carolina General Statute § 122(c). (Id.). Two days later, plaintiff sent Judge Pate a certified letter stating that she had (Id.). Plaintiff did not receive a response to her letter. (Id.).
In early 2020, plaintiff inquired as to whether she had been entered into National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS") as "adjudicated mental defective." (Id.). On March5, 2020, the United States Department of Justice responded to plaintiff's inquiry, informing her that she had a NICS entry, and the Lenoir County Sheriff's Department was "the controlling legal authority." (Id. at 7). When plaintiff confronted Major Dawson about the information she received form the United States Department of Justice, Major Dawson allegedly told plaintiff that "I don't answer to the [Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI")]; Judge Pate and I decided you shouldn't have a gun." (Id.).
Thereafter, plaintiff wrote a second letter to the FBI stating that Major Dawson allegedly failed to produce any record that plaintiff had been "adjudicated mental defective." (Id.). The United States Department of Justice responded, stating that the Lenoir County Superior Court, rather than the FBI, maintained the "prohibiting record", which was created on October 30, 2019. (Id.). Plaintiff returned to the Lenoir County Clerk of Court's office and requested the prohibiting record. (Id.). In response, plaintiff was handed the two rescinded Magistrate Custody Orders associated with her February 2016 and September 2017 hospital stays. (Id.).
Accordingly, plaintiff alleges that defendant Ingram and/or defendant Stroud "unlawfully entered a determination of 'adjudicated as a mental defective or been involuntarily committed to a mental institution' into the Federal NICS Database without a Determination by a District Court Judge; denying Due Process and in violation of procedures enumerated in NCGS 122C." (Id. at 4). Plaintiff also alleges this NICS entry violates her Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id.).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Such motion may either 1) assert the complaint fails to state facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction may be based, or 2) attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart fromthe complaint. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Where a defendant raises a "facial challenge[] to standing that do[es] not dispute the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint," the court accepts " the facts of the complaint as true as [the court] would in context of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge." Kenny v. Wilson, 885 F.3d 280, 287 (4th Cir. 2018).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating whether a claim is stated, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
Defendant Ingram argues plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, in light of the prior action plaintiff commenced in Lenoir County Superior Court, appealing the denial of the handgun permit. When considering whether to give preclusive effect to a North Carolina state court judgment, this court must apply North Carolina law. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) () (internal quotations omitted); Davenport v. N. Carolina Dep't. of Transp., 3 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1993)("[F]ederal courts asked in a § 1983 action to give res judicata effect (in any of the doctrine's aspects) to a state court judgment are bound under the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to apply the law of the rendering state to determine whether and to what extent the state court judgment should have preclusive effect in the federal court.").
Under North Carolina law, "a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies." Whitacre P'ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 14 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). "[T]he doctrine prevents the relitigation of all matters . . . that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action.'" Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89, 107 (2019) (citations and quotations omitted). Providing guidance on what "matters" are barred by res judicata, the North Carolina Supreme Court has explained that "while it is true that a judgment is conclusive as to all issues raised by the pleadings, . . . the...
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