Cipolla v. Shaposka
| Decision Date | 02 July 1970 |
| Citation | 439 Pa. 563,267 A.2d 854 |
| Parties | Michael F. CIPOLLA, a minor, by his Parents and Guardians, John Cipolla and Anna Cipolla, and John Cipolla and Anna Cipolla, in Their own right, Appellants, v. John SHAPOSKA, Jr. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Charles C. Keeler, Chester, for appellants.
Harry J. Bradley, Media, for appellee.
Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered against Michael Cipolla and his parents and natural guardians, appellants, in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1035, 12 P.S. Appendix. The record indicates that Michael Cipolla and John Shaposka, Jr., appellee, are former schoolmates at the Brown Technical School in Wilmington, Delaware. On January 24, 1966 after classes had ended for the day, appellee was driving Michael to appellants' home in Pennsylvania when the automobile in which they were riding became involved in a collision in Delaware in which Michael was injured. Shaposka is a Delaware resident as is his father in whose name the car was registered in Delaware.
The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the legal effect of the guesthost relationship should be determined by Delaware or Pennsylvania law. If Delaware law applies appellants will be barred from recovering since Delaware's Guest Statute, Del.Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6101(a), prohibits a guest from recovering for his host's negligence. The statute does permit recovery for intentional or wilful or wanton misconduct, but appellants argue only that appellee was guilty of ordinary negligence. Pennsylvania has no guest statute, and if its law applies, appellants will be able to recover if they can prove appellee was negligent. The court below concluded that Delaware law applied and granted appellee's motion for summary judgment.
Under our decisions in Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966), McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966), and Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), we must determine whether Delaware or Pennsylvania has the greater interest in the application of its law to the question now before us. At the outset it might be noted that this case is much more difficult than either Kuchinic or McSwain for both of those cases presented a false conflict; that is, an analysis of the policies behind the competing laws indicated that in each case the application of one state's law (in Kuchinic, Georgia; in McSwain, Colorado) would not further those policies, Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 29--30 (1965); Kuchinic, supra 422 Pa. at 624 n. 4, 222 A.2d 897. The fact that Cipolla is a resident of Pennsylvania which has adopted a plaintiff-protecting rule and Shaposka is a resident of Delaware which has adopted a defendant-protecting rule takes this case out of that category and requires us to undertake a deeper analysis than was necessary in those cases. [1]
In determining which state has the greater interest in the application of its law, one method is to see what contacts each state has with the accident, the contacts being relevant only if they relate to the 'policies and interest underlying the particular issue before the court.' Griffith, supra 416 Pa. at 21, 203 A. at 805. When doing this it must be remembered that a mere counting of contacts is not what is involved. The weight of a particular state's contacts must be measured on a qualitative rather than quantitative scale. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 524, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969).
As it is Pennsylvania's policy that its guests should be permitted to recover for injuries caused by their hosts' negligence and as appellants are Pennsylvania residents, Pennsylvania is a concerned jurisdiction and has a contact relevant to the issue before us. This is the only relevant contact with Pennsylvania, however. As it is Delaware's policy that its hosts should not be required to compensate their guests for their (the hosts) negligence and as appellee is a Delaware resident, Delaware is a concerned jurisdiction and has a contact relevant to the issue before us. The fact that the automobile involved in the accident is registered and housed in Delaware gives that state another contact for it appears that insurance rates will depend on the state in which the automobile is housed rather than the domicile of the owner or driver. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process--The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 Yale L.J. 554, 574 (1961). Thus, it appears that Delaware's contacts are qualitatively greater than Pennsylvania's and that it has the greater interest in having its law applied to the issue before us. [2]
Also, it seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his home state law when he is acting within that state. [3]
Inhabitants of a state should not be put in jeopardy of liability exceeding that created by their state's laws just because a visitor from a state offering higher protection decides to visit there. This is, of course, a highly territorial approach, but 'departures from the territorial view of torts ought not to be lightly undertaken.' Gordon v. Parker, 83 F.Supp. 40, 42 (D.Mass.1949). 'To withdraw * * * actions and affairs from the reach of domestic law because the persons (or at least one of the persons) participating in them are not domestic to the state causes a wrench away from customary attitudes towards law that may lead the disadvantaged party to 'regard the distinction as involving a personal discrimination against him rather than as a step toward comity between states. " Cavers, supra at 135. The very use of the term true conflict implies that there is no one correct answer, but as a general approach a territorial view seems perferable to a personal view.
These approaches to the solution of this true conflict lead to the conclusion that and both qualitatively and quantitatively greater than Pennsylvania's.
Judgment affirmed.
I believe the issues in this case should be determined and decided by lex loci delicti--see my dissenting Opinion in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796. However, if this test be not applied, it is clear that the Majority Opinion is correct when it affirms the judgment, because Delaware's contacts were more important and both qualitatively and quantitatively greater than Pennsylvania's.
I agree with the majority that the instant case presents us with a true conflict. I cannot agree, however, that the conflict is properly resolved by the application of Delaware law, and hence I must respectfully dissent.
To reach its result the majority advances two separate theories: 1) 'Delaware's contacts are qualitatively greater than Pennsylvania's and * * * it has the greater interest in having its law applied.' 2) A 'territorial view' of torts is desirable, and 'it seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely on his home state's law when he is actin within that state.' I will discuss the two theories in turn.
The first theory is an attempt to apply the law as set forth in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964), to the facts of this case. In Griffith we stated that conflicts of law would thereafter be resolved by applying the law of the predominantly concerned jurisdiction, with the strength of jurisdictional concern being measured by the relevant contacts each jurisdiction had with the underlying transaction. As the majority correctly notes, however, a 'contact' is relevant only if it relates to the 'policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.' Griffith, 416 Pa. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805.
My disagreement with the majority comes in the majority's assertion that there is more than one policy underlying the issue before the court, the Delaware guest statute. Naturally, it is always difficult to read the legislative mind, and courts have discovered a host of reasons for guest statutes. It has been suggested, for example, that guest statutes were designed to prevent collusive suits between guest and host; [1] and that they were intended to grant injured parties in other cars priority over the 'ungrateful guest' in the assets of the negligent driver. [2] The majority suggests the guest statutes are designed to lower insurance rates, and that the place where the automobile is housed is therefore a relevant contact, because this is how insurance rates are determined. [3]
I do not believe, however, that Delaware passed its guest statute for the purpose of lowering the insurance rates of those who house their automobiles in Delaware. I reach this conclusion for several reasons. For one, even assuming that the barring of guest-host suits does result in lower costs to insurance companies, it is far from clear whether the benefits would inure to Delaware residents [4] or merely aid...
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