Cipriani v. Lycoming County Housing Authority
| Decision Date | 14 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:CV-99-980.,4:CV-99-980. |
| Citation | 177 F.Supp.2d 303 |
| Parties | Nicholas R. CIPRIANI, Plaintiff, v. LYCOMING COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY; Janice Pepperman, Individually and as Community Counsel of the Lycoming County Housing Authority; and Elizabeth Montgomery, Individually and as Deputy Executive Director of the Lycoming County Housing Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Katherine M. Allen, Janine C. Gismondi, McQuaide, Blasko, Schwartz, Fleming & Faulkner, Inc., State College, KS, for plaintiff.
Joseph F. Orso, III, John R. Bonner, Casale & Bonner, P.C., Williamsport, KS, for defendants.
BACKGROUND:
On June 14, 1999, plaintiff Nicholas R. Cipriani filed a complaint against defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1421 et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 951 et seq., the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, 71 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 741.1 et seq., and the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), P.L. 99-272, Title X. Cipriani also set forth a supplemental claim for defamation under state common law.
On September 22, 2000, the court granted, in part, defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to Counts II and V of plaintiff's complaint involving the substantive due process claim and claims under the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act. An Amended Complaint was filed by plaintiff November 7, 2000, limited to six counts. (Although restated as Count IV in the Amended Complaint, the court understands that plaintiff withdrew his Civil Service Act claim).
Counts I (First Amendment) and V (defamation) of the Amended Complaint were tried before a jury beginning December 5, 2000. On December 15, 2000, at the close of plaintiff's case, defendants made an oral motion for judgment as a matter of law based on FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The court denied the motion.
On December 18, 2000, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and against all three defendants as to Count I, and against defendant Pepperman only as to Count V. The jury awarded plaintiff $875,000.00 in damages with respect to Count I, and $25,000.00 in damages with respect to Count V.
Counts II (procedural due process), III (Whistleblower Law) and VI (COBRA) were decided by the court. By order dated February 1, 2001, the court ruled in favor of plaintiff and against defendants as to Count II, with no damage award. The court also ruled in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Lycoming County Housing Authority ("Housing Authority") as to Count VI, with no damage award, and in favor of defendants as to Count III.
On February 12, 2001, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), or in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a).1
On May 31, 2001, plaintiff moved for entry of judgment. The court granted plaintiff's motion, and on June 22, 2001, entered judgment consistent with the jury verdict and rulings of the court.
On June 29, 2001, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the court's holding in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law.
Now before the court are both defendants' motion pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 50 and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, as well as all supporting and opposing briefs.
For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiff's motion will be denied.
DISCUSSION:
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against a party when "a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). The standard for considering defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law was set forth by the Third Circuit in Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993):
Such a motion should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability. In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain liability, the court may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury's version. Although judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, a scintilla of evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability. The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir.1998); McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir.1995).
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a) provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues [] in an action in which there has been a trial by jury ...." "Under this rule, a court, in the exercise of discretion, may grant a new trial if, inter alia, the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or if substantial errors occurred in the admission or exclusion of evidence or in the charge to the jury." Kidd v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement, No. Civ.A. 97-CV-5577, 2001 WL 1159770, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug.21, 2001)(citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 61 S.Ct. 189, 85 L.Ed. 147 (1940)). "Nevertheless, new trials because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience." Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir.1991) (emphasis added)(citing EEOC v. Delaware Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir.1989)). See also Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir.1993).
Generally, a court will sustain a jury verdict "if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party, there is a reasonable basis to uphold the verdict; courts will examine the record for evidence that could reasonably have led to the jury's verdict." Kidd, 2001 WL 1159770, at *1 (citing Nissim v. McNeil Consumer Products Co., 957 F.Supp. 600, 602-04 (E.D.Pa.1997), aff'd, without opinion, 135 F.3d 765 (3d Cir.1997)). See also Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir.1989). Indeed, "[a] trial judge must be extremely reluctant to interfere with the time-honored power of the jury, in the exercise of its collective judgment, to assess the damages sustained by the plaintiff." Wontor v. Neenan, No. 92-1588, slip op. at 7 (M.D.Pa. June 28, 1996). (internal quotation and citations omitted). Moreover,
[t]he court does not have the prerogative `to substitute its own judgment as to the amount of damages for that of the jury. Thus, regardless of whether the trial judge agrees or disagrees with the jury's verdict, the verdict must be upheld so long as it is supported by a `minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably [decline to] afford relief.'
Id. at 7-8 (quoting New Market Inv. Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 774 F.Supp. 909, 917 (E.D.Pa.1991))(further citation omitted).
"A party moving for a new trial on the basis of an improper jury instruction must have made an appropriate and timely objection prior to the start of jury deliberations." Kidd, 2001 WL 1159770, at *2 (citing Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., Inc., 74 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir.1996); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 810 (7th Cir.1980)).
II. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Only facts relevant to the motions now before the court are recited herein.2 The evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as the nonmovant.
In 1994, plaintiff became the Director of the Operations Department at the Housing Authority, a job in which he supervised approximately ten employees.
Prior to November 1998, plaintiff's immediate supervisor had been Janice Pepperman (Pepperman), the Executive Director of the Housing Authority. Sometime in November of 1998, Pepperman announced that she was resigning her position as Executive Director to take a newly created position of Community Counsel for the Housing Authority. Shortly thereafter, Elizabeth Montgomery (Montgomery) was promoted from her position as Deputy Executive Director to Executive Director of the Housing Authority.
Throughout the course of his employment, plaintiff had raised several complaints concerning Montgomery, who had begun employment at the Housing Authority in 1995. The two complaints at issue involve (1) Montgomery's failure to disclose her relationship to Dean Severson (Severson), her brother-in-law, prior to his being hired for a position in the Operations Department; and (2) Montgomery's solicitation of $250.00 from Turnkey Construction, Inc. ("Turnkey Construction") for her son's hockey team.
In the spring of 1996, plaintiff was in the process of interviewing applicants for an opening in the Operations Department. Although Montgomery was aware that Severson applied for the position, she did not inform plaintiff that Severson was her brother-in-law. After plaintiff offered the job to Severson and he accepted, Montgomery told plaintiff of her relationship to Severson. After Severson was hired, but before his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Deluca v. City of Hazelton
... ... Phillips v ... County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting ... Cipriani v ... Lycoming County Hous ... Auth ., 177 F.Supp.2d 303, 327 ... established by a "decision maker possessing final authority," a custom arises from a "course of conduct ... so ... ...
-
Damiano v. Scranton Sch. Dist.
... ... that she would no longer have any administrative authority at Northeast Intermediate School and that her future ... County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (brackets ... See Cipriani v. Lycoming County Housing Authority, 177 F.Supp.2d 303, ... ...
-
Pa. Prof'l Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Wolf
... ... Act, however, is an appropriate exercise of state authority over a private entity charged with carrying out a critical ... Cumberland County , 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This evidence must be ... Pa. Dec. 18, 2007) (Conner, J.) (quoting Cipriani v. Lycoming Cty. Hous. Auth. , 177 F. Supp. 2d 303, 323-24 ... ...
-
Whitfield v. Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist.
... ... as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and held the position of ... , 6 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1961) and collecting substantial authority in further support). After surveying Supreme Court ... Green v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 887 (3d Cir.1997)). The integrity ... about protecting one's legal rights ... Cipriani v. Lycoming County Housing Authority, 177 F.Supp.2d 303, ... ...