CIR v. Killian

Decision Date14 March 1963
Docket NumberNo. 19386.,19386.
Citation314 F.2d 852
PartiesCOMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. Maurice L. KILLIAN, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., John B. Jones, Jr., Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Melva M. Graney, David O. Walters, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Crane C. Hauser, Chief Counsel, John M. Morawski, Atty., I. R. S., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Lucius A. Buck, Horace R. Drew, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla., Maurice L. Killian, Orlando, Fla., for respondent.

Before JONES and BELL, Circuit Judges and CARSWELL, District Judge.

CARSWELL, District Judge.

The sole issue for review here is whether $12,500 received by the taxpayer in connection with an agreement of sale and dissolution of a partnership engaged in the insurance business should be taxed as capital gain or as ordinary income.

Upon a full record, the Tax Court entered its findings and concluded that what was sold in this instance was a capital asset under Title 26 United States Code § 1221.

Although there is considerable tug-of-war between the parties here on the proper terminology to be placed on the facts and the resulting application of law, the facts themselves are rather singularly simple and entirely uncontradictory.

For many years Killian was engaged in the insurance business in Ohio. In 1947 he formed a partnership with two of his agents Ryan and Fry, under a contract which provided that Ryan and Fry pay him a stipulated sum each year for ten years. At the end of this period Ryan and Fry would own the partnership and Killian would withdraw. This same 1947 agreement also expressly provided, however, that Killian was not transferring to the partnership "any of his personal business," which specifically included "that business carried on the books of The M. L. Killian Agency as of the 1st day of January, 1948, wherein it is shown that Maurice L. Killian personally was the writing agent of said business. * * *"

Killian's personal business involved principally fire and casualty insurance with a small amount of accident and health insurance and some life insurance. He kept certain records which he called "dailies," and which were so viewed by the Tax Court, but which the Commissioner calls "expirations." Here we enter the eye of the storm and turn to the record itself, for it is the nature and attribute of these particular records as found by the Tax Court which determined the case for the taxpayer before that court. The record fully supports the finding of the Tax Court that:

"* * * This information consisted of such things as the beginning and expiration dates of the policy, the type of insurance and the coverage. The dailies were used to provide information for renewals and servicing the policies. In writing fire and casualty insurance, as contrasted with life insurance, the producing agent is normally paid a commission only when the policy is sold or when renewed."

In 1954, some four years before Killian's interest in the partnership was to end, he and his partners entered into an agreement for the sale of this personal property. The 1954 agreement also provided for the sale by Killian of all of his "rights and interests in said partnership" for a total aggregate sum of $36,500, it being understood and agreed that the sum of $24,000 was included as balance due from Ryan and Fry to Killian on the 1947 agreement.

There has never been any issue about the taxable nature of the $24,000. It is the additional $12,500 which is the sole subject matter under review. Killian reported this amount as long term capital gain on his 1954 return.

The Commissioner urged before the Tax Court, and again here, that the $12,500 was not gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, contending that this amount was received for anticipated future renewal commissions and/or as a separate item for the covenant not to compete contained in the agreement of 1954.

Under our proscribed standard of review here1 we cannot say that the Tax Court was clearly erroneous in rejecting these contentions and holding for the taxpayer.

There is competent evidence to support that court's findings, and its conclusion is in accord with legal precedent. First, Ryan and Fry certified that Killian was "not paid any money for any part of the agreement except the $12,500.00 for his customer list and the exclusive right to write such customer's insurance in the future. No anticipated renewal commissions were involved on policies outstanding at the time of the sale but only the right to write future insurance."

The Commissioner says that at this point the Tax Court simply erred in accepting this in view of a stated provision in the 1954 agreement that Killian would not engage in the insurance business in the area for at least 5 years.

The Tax Court's finding that Killian received no part of the amount paid as consideration for the covenant not to compete is supported not only by Killian's testimony and that of Ryan and Fry, but also by other persuasive evidence which clarifies the actual understanding of the parties at the time the agreement was made. All of the discussions between Killian and his partners leading to the 1954 agreement were precipitated by the fully disclosed fact that Killian was leaving Ohio for permanent residence in Florida due to his poor health and upon his physician's advice. Killian not only said he planned to leave Ohio, he actually did, and he has maintained his residence in Florida throughout the ensuing years. We cannot say that there is no competent showing which would require this court to reject as clearly erroneous the Tax Court's view that there really was no reason for Ryan and Fry to pay valuable consideration to Killian to stay out of the business area in Ohio.

In Kenney v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1161, the Court said: "The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that neither Edwards nor Educators placed any independent value on the covenant...

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56 cases
  • U.S. v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc.
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
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    ...of good will (defined by one court as the "expectation that the old customers will resort to the old place", see Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.1963) (internal quotations and citation omitted))--are even more dire than if the district court had appointed a receiver to r......
  • Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 72-2881.
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    • July 27, 1973
    ..."The nature of goodwill . . . is the expectancy that `the old customers will resort to the old place.\' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (C.A.5, 1963); Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 307 F.2d 897, 901 (C.A.5, 1962); Karan v. Commi......
  • AmSouth Bancorporation and Subsidiaries v. US
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    • February 25, 1988
    ...renewals they purchased from the insurance dailies, subscription lists, and expirations involved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Killian, 5th Cir.1963, 314 F.2d 852. There the Court held that the dailies, subscription lists, and expirations common to a fire, casualty, and automobile ......
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    ...been repeatedly characterized in the case law as "the expectancy that old customers will resort to the old place," Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.1963), and as "the expectancy of continued patronage, for whatever reason," Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir.......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Personal goodwill: alive and well?
    • United States
    • The Tax Adviser Vol. 40 No. 4, April 2009
    • April 1, 2009
    ...Pub. Co., 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129; Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 444 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1971); Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963); Nelson Weaver Realty Co., 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962); Karan, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963).) Tax Court precedent establish......

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