Ciravola v. Vannoy
Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-10837 SECTION: "I"(3) |
Parties | WARREN CIRAVOLA v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN |
Court | United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana) |
Petitioner, Warren Ciravola, a Louisiana state prisoner, filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the application be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
On July 10, 2014, petitioner was convicted of aggravated incest and aggravated rape under Louisiana law.1 On August 13, 2014, he was sentenced as follows: on the aggravated incest conviction, to a term of fifty years imprisonment, with the first twenty-five years of that sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; and on the aggravated rape conviction, to a term of life imprisonment, with the entire term of that sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. It was ordered that those sentences be served consecutively.2 On August 5, 2015, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences,3 and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ application on September 6, 2017.4
On February 7, 2018, petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court.5 That application was denied on March 22, 2018.6 His related writ applications were then likewise denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on June 4, 2018,7 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on May 20, 2019.8
On May 28, 2019, petitioner filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief.9 The state filed a response conceding that the application is timely and that petitioner's remedies in the state courts are exhausted; however, the state nevertheless argued that petitioner's claims should be denied.10 Petitioner filed a reply to the state's response.11
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for pure questions of fact, pure questions of law, and mixed questions of both. The amendments modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); accord Langley v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 2019) ( ).
As to pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to be correct and a federal court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) () .
As to pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision on the merits of such a claim unless that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Courts have held that the "'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses [of § 2254(d)(1)] have independent meaning." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
Regarding the "contrary to" clause, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [United States] Supreme Court's cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [United States] Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [United States] Supreme Court precedent.
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) ( ).
Regarding the "unreasonable application" clause, the United States Supreme Court has held: "[A] state-court decision is an unreasonable application of our clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies that rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014). However, a federal habeas court must be mindful that "an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694; accord Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) ; Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (). Therefore:
"[T]he [AEDPA's] relitigation bar forecloses relief unless the prisoner can show the state court was so wrong that the error was well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. In other words, the unreasonable-application exception asks whether it is beyond the realm of possibility that a fairminded jurist could agree with the state court.
Langley, 926 F.3d at 156 (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Under AEDPA's relitigation bar, the very existence of reasonable disagreement forecloses relief." Id. at 170.
In summary, "AEDPA prevents defendants - and federal courts - from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has expressly warned that although "some federal judges find [28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] too confining," it is nevertheless clear that "all federal judges must obey" the law and apply the strictly deferential standards of review mandated therein. Woodall, 572 U.S. at 417.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:
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