Ciravola v. Vannoy

Decision Date04 February 2020
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 19-10837 SECTION: "I"(3)
PartiesWARREN CIRAVOLA v. DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN
CourtUnited States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Louisiana)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Warren Ciravola, a Louisiana state prisoner, filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the application be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

On July 10, 2014, petitioner was convicted of aggravated incest and aggravated rape under Louisiana law.1 On August 13, 2014, he was sentenced as follows: on the aggravated incest conviction, to a term of fifty years imprisonment, with the first twenty-five years of that sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence; and on the aggravated rape conviction, to a term of life imprisonment, with the entire term of that sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. It was ordered that those sentences be served consecutively.2 On August 5, 2015, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences,3 and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ application on September 6, 2017.4

On February 7, 2018, petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court.5 That application was denied on March 22, 2018.6 His related writ applications were then likewise denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on June 4, 2018,7 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on May 20, 2019.8

On May 28, 2019, petitioner filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief.9 The state filed a response conceding that the application is timely and that petitioner's remedies in the state courts are exhausted; however, the state nevertheless argued that petitioner's claims should be denied.10 Petitioner filed a reply to the state's response.11

I. Standards of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for pure questions of fact, pure questions of law, and mixed questions of both. The amendments modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); accord Langley v. Prince, 926 F.3d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that the AEDPA imposes a "relitigation bar" on claims adjudicated on the merits by the state court).

As to pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to be correct and a federal court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.").

As to pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision on the merits of such a claim unless that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Courts have held that the "'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses [of § 2254(d)(1)] have independent meaning." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.

Regarding the "contrary to" clause, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [United States] Supreme Court's cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [United States] Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [United States] Supreme Court precedent.

Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) (footnotes, internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).

Regarding the "unreasonable application" clause, the United States Supreme Court has held: "[A] state-court decision is an unreasonable application of our clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies that rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014). However, a federal habeas court must be mindful that "an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694; accord Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) ("Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." (quotation marks omitted)); Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) ("Importantly, 'unreasonable' is not the same as 'erroneous' or 'incorrect'; an incorrect application of the law by a state court will nonetheless be affirmed if it is not simultaneously unreasonable."). Therefore:

"[T]he [AEDPA's] relitigation bar forecloses relief unless the prisoner can show the state court was so wrong that the error was well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement. In other words, the unreasonable-application exception asks whether it is beyond the realm of possibility that a fairminded jurist could agree with the state court.

Langley, 926 F.3d at 156 (citations and quotation marks omitted). "Under AEDPA's relitigation bar, the very existence of reasonable disagreement forecloses relief." Id. at 170.

In summary, "AEDPA prevents defendants - and federal courts - from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has expressly warned that although "some federal judges find [28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] too confining," it is nevertheless clear that "all federal judges must obey" the law and apply the strictly deferential standards of review mandated therein. Woodall, 572 U.S. at 417.

II. Facts

On direct appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:

In January 2013, C.B., the twelve-year-old victim, was injured during physical education class.[FN 3] Her mother picked her up from school and brought her to the emergency room, where they learned that she was seven to eight months pregnant. The following day, Pauline Bankston, the principal at the victim's school, spoke with the victim, and the victim stated that her baby was due in March 2013, that she hoped it was born on the defendant's birthday, and that she was going to name her baby after the defendant, her father. A few weeks later, Bankston received a report from a paraprofessional at the school that R.C., one of the victim's classmates, disclosed that she saw the victim and the defendant at a parade. According to R.C., the victim stated that the defendant was the father of the baby. Bankston reported this information to the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") and the Washington Parish Rape Crisis Center.
[FN 3] Initials are being used to protect the identity of the minor victim and other minors involved. See La. R.S. 46:1844W.
The following month, DCFS investigator Felicia Hillhouse was notified that the victim missed an appointment with her doctor, was not stating the identity of her unborn child's father, and lived in a home that was inadequate care [sic] for a baby. Based on that information, on February 14, 2013, Hillhouse reported to the victim's school and learned that the victim had started the parish school board's homebound program. Hillhouse and Michelle Green, also with DCFS, then drove to the victim's home where she lived with her mother and the defendant. The two investigators arrived between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m., and the defendant answered the door approximately two minutes after Hillhouse initially knocked. He exited onto the steps of the home and told Hillhouse that she could not enter because he was in the process of cleaning. Hillhouse testified that the defendant was wearing an almost knee-length dark blue terrycloth robe and had an erection. As the defendant sat on the steps to speak with Hillhouse, he continually pulled his robe closed and crossed his legs. Hillhouse saw the victim peek outside of the window and asked the defendant who she was. The defendant stated that she was his daughter. When asked where his wife was, the defendant stated that she was at work. Hillhouse and the defendant talked on the porch for ten or fifteen minutes, and although she asked to enter the home four times, the defendant refused.
While talking outside, Hillhouse and the defendant discussed the victim's pregnancy. The defendant stated that the victim was never around other men, so he did not know the identity of the unborn child's father. He stated that he planned to let the police handle the situation and that the offender should be incarcerated.
Hillhouse assured the defendant that whoever fathered the child would be incarcerated and opined that other criminals do not "take kindly" to inmates who have hurt or molested a child. According to Hillhouse, when she made that statement, the defendant's facial expression "dropped," and he
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