Circle 21 Cattle Co. v. Casler
| Decision Date | 15 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 0385,0385 |
| Parties | CIRCLE 21 CATTLE COMPANY, LLC v. LAURANCE D. CASLER |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Dorchester County
UNREPORTED
Kehoe, Shaw Geter, Zic, JJ.
Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
This appeal derives from a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and to Quiet Title filed in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County by appellee, Laurance D. Casler, against appellant, Circle 21 Cattle Company, LLC. The court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, and following the entry of judgment, appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Request for Hearing, which the court denied. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider arguing, inter alia, a final judgment had not been entered. The court denied the motion and appellant noted an appeal. In an unreported opinion, we determined a final judgment had not been entered and remanded the case for further proceedings. Circle 21 Cattle Co., LLC v. Casler, No. 0171, SEPT. TERM, 2019, 2020 WL 2552786, , cert. denied sub nom. Casler v. Circle 21 Cattle Co., 470 Md. 211 (2020). On May 26, 2020, the circuit court entered a final judgment and appellant timely filed this appeal. The following questions are presented for our review:
For reasons discussed below, we affirm.
Appellant and appellee own adjacent parcels of land on Bailey Store Road near Federalsburg, Maryland. Appellee's parcel is known as Countryside Mobile Park and hasten trailers on its lot. Appellant's parcel consists of 25 acres of unimproved farmland. Both parcels were previously owned by Harvey Lee Toomey, Jr. and his wife, Michelle Renee Toomey ("the Toomeys"). In 1984, the Toomeys purchased the mobile park parcel from Hilmar Thor Helgason and Christine Spear Helgason ("the Helgasons"). The Toomeys acquired another portion of land from Ralph W. Griffin in 1986. In 2013, Mr. Toomey transferred the parcel of land now owned by appellant to Mrs. Toomey by way of a Quit Claim deed. Mrs. Toomey's parcel of land was transferred to Ian Toomey on September 23, 2013, and recorded in accordance with a life estate deed.
Appellee obtained and recorded a fee simple title to his land in 2003. Appellant acquired title to his portion of the land by way of a fee simple deed from Ian Toomey on March 6, 2018. That same month, appellant erected a fence along an access road that eliminated appellee's access to several residential trailers on his land that were leased to other individuals.
On June 5, 2018, appellee filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and to Quiet Title, requesting the court to "determine the rights of the parties" and determine that he held a prescriptive easement over the disputed land. Appellee alleged that his possession had been "actual, exclusive, hostile under the claim of ownership or title, notorious, open, and uninterrupted for a period of time approaching forty (40) years." Troy Alexander, an individual who is not an attorney barred in Maryland, filed a response on behalf of appellantand appellee filed a motion to strike the answer.1 Appellant then retained counsel, who filed an answer on September 25, 2018.2
On September 6, 2018, the circuit court granted appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Order, the court found that appellant had "failed to respond to [appellee's] Motion for Summary Judgment" and that appellant "failed to respond with an affidavit . . . controverting any facts contained within the [appellee's] affidavit." The court held, "[t]here is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the [appellee] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court declared that appellee had a prescriptive easement over the access road and ordered appellant to remove "all parts of the fence that...adversely affects the Plaintiff's methods of ingress, egress and regress to and from all and any portions of the premises that are commonly known as Countryside Trailer Park."
Subsequent to the court's order, appellant filed a Motion to Alter or Amend, which was denied on October 25, 2018. In its order, the court stated, "granting summary judgment was not based upon evidence offered in the form of the Affidavit and nothing in the Order's language indicated that the Affidavit was a basis for the judgment." The court held that appellant's first answer was stricken because it "violated Maryland Rule 2-131,Section 14-607 of the Real Property Article, and Section 10-206 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, constituting the unauthorized practice of law." The second answer was stricken, the court stated:
[The second answer] was not timely filed, did not establish any genuine issue of fact material to the outcome of the proceeding, and was not verified as required by Section 14-607 Real Property Article. In other words, the [appellant's] Answers and Response to Motion for Summary Judgment failed to comply with the mandates of Rule 2-501. More importantly, none of the questions raised by the [appellant] in the Motion to Alter or Amend controvert any factual allegations made by the [appellee].
The court concluded "[t]he [appellee] has met the requisite burden and the [c]ourt is unpersuaded by the arguments the [appellant] has advanced to the contrary."
"On review of an order granting summary judgment, our analysis 'begins with the determination [of] whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists; only in the absence of such a dispute will we review questions of law.'" D'Aoust v. Diamond, 424 Md. 549, 574 (2012) (quoting Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 546 (2010)). "An appellate court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construes any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the well-pled facts against the moving party." Flores v. Maryland-Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 220 Md. App. 391, 399 (2014). When there is no dispute in material facts, "we determine whether the trial court granted summary judgment correctly as a matter of law." Id. "Our examination is limited to the same record and legal reasoning that the trial court analyzed to grant the motion for summary judgment." O'Brien v. Bank of Am., N.A., 214 Md. App. 51, 59 (2013). For summary judgment to be granted the following must occur:
First, the movant must clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. A fact is 'material' if it somehow affects the outcome of the case. And second, the movant must demonstrate that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the movant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show "that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact by proffering facts which would be admissible in evidence."
Boucher Inv., L.P. v. Annapolis-W. Ltd. P'ship, 141 Md. App. 1, 9-10 (2001) (cleaned up).
Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment because appellee did not file a valid affidavit and because the affidavit and motion together "documented a dispute over a material fact." Appellee counters that the court properly granted the Motion for Summary Judgment as there was no dispute as to the material facts.
Maryland Rule 2-501(a) governs motions for summary judgment which provides:
Under Maryland Rule 1-304:
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