Cirino-Rodriguez v. William George Agency for Children Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | 5:11-CV-1219 (LEK/ATB) |
| Parties | VICTOR LUIS CIRINO-RODRIGUEZ, as administrator of the Estate of Alexis Cirino-Rodriguez, Plaintiff, v. THE WILLIAM GEORGE AGENCY FOR CHILDREN SERVICES, INC; JEFFREY DAILEY; KURT PHILLIPS; MICHAEL HATCH; JASON PAGE; TYLER DECOURSEY; AMBER OURSLER; JUSTIN DOE; NATHAN ADAMS; NICHOLAS WHITT; ASHLEY DAVENPORT; and RON TRUMINO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
On October 10, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Court. Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint"). Plaintiff raised several causes of action related to the death of Alexis Cirino-Rodriguez ("Decedent") against Defendants Jeffrey Dailey, several John Does, and The William George Agency for Children Services Inc. ("The Agency") including: (1) excessive use of force, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, failure to intervene, and failure to train and supervise in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of the Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 ("DDABRA"); and (3) prima facie tort. Id. ¶¶ 22-62. On October 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding Defendants Kurt Phillips, Michael Hatch, Jason Page, Tyler Decoursey, Amber Oursler, Justin Doe, Nathan Adams, Nicholas Whitt, Ashley Davenport, and Ron Trumino. Dkt. No. 7 ("Amended Complaint") ¶¶ 1, 34-74.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' December 20, 2011 Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 27 ("Motion"). On February 20, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to Defendants' Motion. Dkt. No. 33 ("Response"). On March 2, 2011, Defendants filed a Reply in opposition to Plaintiff's Response. Dkt. No. 12 ("Reply").
For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendants' Motion with respect to Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 except the failure to intervene claim against Defendant Whitt. The Court also grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion with respect to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, and grants Defendants' Motion with respect to Plaintiff's cause of action under DDABRA.
Decedent was a mentally disabled man with an I.Q. of 50, who became a ward of New York State pursuant to New York State Social Services Law § 395 after his parents' rights were terminated. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 19, 21. At the time of his death on October 13, 2010, Decedent resided at the Agency. Id. ¶ 18. The Agency is a non-profit corporation located in Freeville, New York and authorized to care for children in state custody pursuant to § 395. Id. ¶¶ 6, 19. Plaintiff Victor Luis Cirino-Rodriguez ("Plaintiff") was appointed administrator of the estate of Decedent by the Onondaga County Surrogate's Court on October 6, 2011 and subsequently filed the Amended Complaint. Id. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff alleges that on October 13, 2010, Decedent was restrained on multiple separate occasions by several employees of the Agency. Id. ¶¶ 20-25. On one occasion, Decedent was allegedly restrained for over forty minutes by Defendants Page, Phillips, Doe, Decoursey and Oursler after Decedent was belittled for mopping improperly. Id. ¶ 21.
Following this restraint, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was calm and went to his room. Id. ¶ 22. Nevertheless, Decedent was allegedly berated for not cleaning his room and Defendant Pagecontinued to confront Decedent until Decedent threw water at him. Id. According to Plaintiff, this instigated another restraint by Defendant Page in which Defendants Phillips, Decoursey, Davenport, Oursler, Adams, and Hatch also participated - resulting, at one point, in as many as five individuals on top of Decedent restraining him on the floor. Id. At the end of this restraint, Defendant Adams was allegedly in the primary position restraining Decedent's torso including his back and neck. Id. Plaintiff claims this restraint lasted at least fifteen minutes. Id. Defendants who participated in this restraint allegedly recognized that Decedent was in distress yet failed to relent from the restraint. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to provide Decedent with emergency medical treatment including CPR upon recognizing that Decedent was in distress and at risk of serious harm. Id. Defendants allegedly did not dial 911 and that Decedent failed to receive medical treatment for five minutes before a nurse arrived. At which point, Decedent's fingers had already turned blue. Id. Decedent was then transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead due to positional/restraint asphyxiation from chest and neck compression after receiving multiple injuries to the head and neck. Id. ¶¶ 20, 23, 25.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants who participated in the restraints of Decedent did not notify nursing staff or a supervisor of this activity. Id. ¶ 24. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that if Defendants did indeed notify Defendant Whitt, their supervisor and the Administrator on duty, that Defendant Whitt subsequently failed to supervise or intervene. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that the Agency did not have any appropriate written policies for the type of restraint1 used on Decedent nor did Defendants Dailey and Trumino implement an appropriate training regimen for proper restrainttechniques or emergency medical care. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 60, 61. Plaintiff further alleges that in their failure to train, Defendants acted with "deliberate indifference." Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiff also alleges Defendants' excessive use of force, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and failure to intervene were motivated by malice. Id. ¶¶ 37, 45, 54, 67.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must "accept all [factual] allegations in the amended complaint as true and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to" the non-moving party. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). "Documents that are attached to the amended complaint or incorporated in it by reference are deemed part of the pleading and may be considered." Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, "an amended complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility standard "is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility exists "when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Additionally, the "tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in an amended complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish a cause of action for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws" of the United States. German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)) (footnote omitted). The plaintiff must therefore demonstrate that as a result of the defendant's actions under the color of state law, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights or his constitutional rights or privileges. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998). To be acting under color of state law, a defendant in a § 1983 action must have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); see also Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) ().
In their Response, Defendants claim they are not "state actors" and therefore may not be held liable under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 (1982) (). In Perez v. Sugarman, the Second Circuit held that a private child care agency was a state actor under the 'public function' theory and by virtue of the "the degree to which the State [had] insinuated itself into the actions of the [agency]" due to the "comprehensive statutory regulatory scheme of the New York Social Services Law." Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
While Perez has yet to be overruled directly, there has been speculation that it is no longer good law. See Phelan ex rel. Phelan v. Torres, 843 F. Supp. 2d 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).2 This issue as to whether a private entity is a state actor is now determined by the "close nexus" test:
When analyzing allegations of state action, we begin by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. . . In order to satisfy the state action requirement where the defendant is a private entity, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct must be fairly attributable to the state. . . . Conduct that is ostensibly private can be fairly attributed to the state only if there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. . . . State action may properly be found where the state exercises coercive power over, is entwined in [the] management or control of, or provides significant encouragement,...
To continue reading
Request your trial