Cisneros v. EP Wrap-It Insulation, LLC
| Decision Date | 17 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-500 GBW/GJF |
| Parties | DANIEL CISNEROS and ALBERT ESTRADA, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. EP WRAP-IT INSULATION, LLC, CYNTHIA LUCERO, and ABRAM LUCERO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Original Answer and Defenses to First Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief. Doc. 13. Having considered the motion and briefing (docs. 14, 16), the Court DENIES the motion for the reasons stated below.
Plaintiffs have been employed by Defendant EP Wrap-It Insulation, LLC ("EP Wrap-It") to work on public works projects in New Mexico. Doc. 10 at ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that they have regularly worked more than forty hours per week, for which they are required to receive overtime compensation under federal and state wage laws. Id. at ¶¶ 32-35. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief on July 15, 2019, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 ("FLSA"), New Mexico's Minimum Wage Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-4-19 to -30 ("MWA"), and Public Works Minimum Wage Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4-10 to -17 ("PWMWA"). See generally id.
Defendants filed a combined answer and motion to dismiss on September 9, 2019, seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and under Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue. As an alternative to dismissal for improper venue, Defendants seek a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) to the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division. See generally doc. 13. Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants' motion on September 23, 2019 (doc. 14), to which Defendants filed a reply on September 30, 2019 (doc. 16).1
The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Garman v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 983 (10th Cir 2010) (citation omitted). Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). The first is a facial attack on the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The second goes beyond the allegations to challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. Id. at 1003. In the case of a facial attack, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. at 1002. In a factual attack, the court may go beyond the pleadings without thereby converting the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1003. However, if resolution of the jurisdictional question is "intertwined" with the merits of the claim, then the motion must be converted to a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion. Id.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must "assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs." Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 723 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009)). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion,the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). This standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it does require more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Additionally, the court need not accept the truth of any legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Rather, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). The complaint must only be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555.
A Rule 12(b)(3) motion will be granted if venue is improper under the rules applicable to the case. On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the Court "must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff." Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1261 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352, at 324 (2004)). Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is permitted to examine affidavits of the defendant which controvert the plaintiff's factual allegations. Id. at 1260.
If venue is proper, a party may nonetheless request transfer "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The movant "bears the burden of establishing that the existing forum is inconvenient." Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991). "Unless the balance is strongly in favor of the movant the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Scheidt v. Klein, 956 F.2d 963, 965 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting William A. Smith Contracting Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 467 F.2d 662, 664 (10th Cir. 1972)) (alteration removed). Additional factors for deciding a venue transfer request include:
the accessibility of witnesses and other sources of proof, including the availability of compulsory process to insure attendance of witnesses; the cost of making the necessary proof; questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained; relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; difficulties that may arise from congested dockets; the possibility of the existence of questions arising in the area of conflict of laws; the advantage of having a local court determine questions of local law; and [] all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy, expeditious and economical.
Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d at 1516).
Defendants assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) based on "Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, and the lack of ripeness of each of their asserted claims." Doc. 13 at 3. Defendants use the concepts of ripenessand exhaustion interchangeably to indicate that Plaintiffs are required to wait for the U.S. Department of Labor and/or "any such authorized agency of the State of New Mexico" to investigate their claims before pursuing this action. Id. at 2-3. Defendants reiterate this argument as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id. at 3. Whether treated under the standard of 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court finds Defendants' contentions meritless for the following reasons.
The purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to avoid "premature adjudication" of "abstract disagreements." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Courts look to "both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id. at 149. To assess the fitness of the issues, courts ask "whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events." New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3532 at 112). Hardship to the parties depends on whether they face a "direct and immediate dilemma." United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1327 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs allege that they have not been compensated for overtime work as required by state and federal wage laws. This is not an abstract disagreement over an uncertain future event. The factual allegations giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims have already happened, rendering them fit for judicial decision. Additionally, Plaintiffs'unpaid overtime compensation constitutes a direct and immediate dilemma related to their financial interests. This case is fully ripe for judicial decision.
Turning to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the key consideration is legislative intent. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 502 n.4 (1982). Where a statute provides that administrative remedies are exclusive, exhaustion clearly applies. Id. In the absence of an explicit statutory exhaustion requirement, the courts must "focus on the role Congress has assigned to the relevant federal agency, and tailor the exhaustion rule to fit the particular administrative scheme." Id.
The parties argue primarily over Plaintiffs' FLSA claims. In their motion, Defendants cite no authority for their proposition that Plaintiffs are required to pursue administrative remedies before filing suit. See doc. 13 at 1-3. In their response (doc. 14 at 3), Plaintiffs cite to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides a private right of action for violations of the FLSA; Washington Cty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 175 n.14 (1981),2 which notes that the FLSA has "no requirement of filing administrative complaints and awaiting administrative conciliation efforts"; and Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981), which states, "No exhaustion requirement or other procedural barriers are set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to or created by the statute." In reply, Defendants cite a single case from the District ofKansas, in which a retaliation claim...
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