Cissna v. State of Tennessee
| Decision Date | 10 November 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 20,20 |
| Citation | 38 S.Ct. 306,62 L.Ed. 720,246 U.S. 289 |
| Parties | CISSNA v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Caruthers Ewing, of Memphis, Tenn., for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. John P. Bullington, of Memphis, Tenn., and Frank M. Thompson, of Chattanooga, Tenn., for the State of Tennessee.
The state of Tennessee sued Cissna and others in a court of equity of that state, setting up ownership by the state of that portion of the dry lands formerly a part of the bed of the Mississippi river which lay between low-water mark on the Tennessee side and the middle of the river as it flowed prior to the change in the channel made in the year 1876 by the opening of the Centennial Cut-Off; alleging that the defendant Cissna claiming ownership, but having none, and the Muncie Pulp Company acting under him, were cutting and removing timber from a particularly described portion of those lands; and praying for an injunction against further acts of trespass and against the removal of the timber cut, and a recovery of the value of the timber. Cissna pleaded in abatement that the land described in the bill, except a small portion to which he disclaimed title, was in the state of Arkansas and not in the state of Tennessee, and hence that the court had no jurisdiction over the controversy. His codefendant having raised a similar issue, the cause came on to be heard before a chancellor, who sustained the pleas to the jurisdiction and ordered that the bill be dismissed. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, disregarding the form of the pleadings, treated the action as brought to recover the land as well as to stay waste in cutting and removing timber; and deeming that the question of jurisdiction which depended upon the location of the boundary line between Tennessee and Arkansas and the question of the right of the former state to recover the land were practically the same question, considered them together. The facts bearing upon the location of the boundary, recited in the opinion of the court, were substantially the same as those upon which this court passed in the boundary suit of Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 158, 38 Sup. Ct. 301, 62 L. Ed. ——, No. 4, Original, recently decided. The state court held, contrary to the rule laid down by this court in Iowa v. Illinois, 147 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. 239, 37 L. Ed. 55, and still adhered to, that the boundary line did not follow the middle of the channel of commerce, but was fixed and defined as 'a line along the middle of the main channel of the river equidistant from the visible and permanent banks confining its waters.' The court found that the change made in the channel in the year 1876 at Centennial Cut-Off was an avulsion, and declared that 'the limits of Tennessee and Arkansas, their respective rights in the abandoned channel, and those of individuals who owned lands lying and abutting upon it, all remained as they were before the formation of the new channel.' But, not carrying this into effect, it concluded that at the place where the lands sued for are situate the correct boundary between the states was midway between the banks of the river as they existed in the year 1823 as shown by the Humphreys Map, notwithstanding the fact that between that date and the time of the cut-off the river had gradually encroached upon the Tennessee shore, to a large extent in the aggregate; the court holding that the effect of the avulsion was to press back the line between the two states so as to restore to Tennessee what it held before the erosions upon its banks. And since it appeared that complainant had sued only for the land lying on the hither side of the middle of the channel as it was in 1876, and therefore could not recover to the middle of the channel of 1823, the court, on remanding the cause for a hearing upon the answers of defendants, ordered that the bill might be amended so as to make the proper averments to enable the state to recover under the principles laid down n its opinion. State v. Pulp Co., 119 Tenn. 47, 104 S. W. 437.
The cause was remanded, the pleadings were amended, and the suit remained pending in the trial court, when the state of Arkansas filed its bill in this court against the state of Tennessee to settle the boundary line between these states along that part of the former bed of the Mississippi river which was left dry as a result of the avulsion of 1876, including the portion in dispute in the present case; this being the same action above mentioned as No. 4, Original. The pendency of that action was brought by Cissna to the attention of the trial court in the present case, and made the basis of an application for a stay of proceedings until the boundary line between the states should have been fixed and located by this court. This application was overruled and the cause proceeded, with the result that the chancellor made a decree against Cissna on the merits in conformity with the opinion of the Supreme Court, subject however to an accounting with respect to the amount and value of the timber cut and removed during the pendency of the suit. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court this decree was affirmed, with modifications not necessary to be mentioned, that court ordered that a writ of possession be issued to place the complainant state in possession of the tract of land in controversy, and retained the case for an accounting respecting the value of the timber. By way or objection to the entry of a decree pursuant to the accounting that followed, Cissna again called the attention of the court to the boundary suit pending in this court, and prayed for a stay of proceedings in the suit against him upon the ground that any determination by that court not in accordance with the determination of this court would be void. This objection was overruled, a final judgment or decree went against him for upwards of $110,000, and the case was brought here by writ of error under section 237, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), before the amendment of September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. 726, c. 448, § 2 [Comp. St. 1916, § 1214]).
It was first argued at the October term, 1916, when, for reasons stated in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan
...27 S.Ct. 655, 666, 667-68, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907) (apportioning waters of interstate stream). See also Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 296, 38 S.Ct. 306, 309, 62 L.Ed. 720 (1918); Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381, 14 L.Ed. 189 (1852) (resolving interstate boundary conflict). When such dispu......
-
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt
...2061, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981). Thus, no State can apply its own law to interstate disputes over borders, Cissna v. Tennessee , 246 U.S. 289, 295, 38 S.Ct. 306, 62 L.Ed. 720 (1918), water rights, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. , 304 U.S. 92, 110, 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. ......
-
Omaha Indian Tribe, Treaty of 1854 with U.S. v. Wilson
...common law is applicable even where only a single state is involved in a controversy with a private party, see Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 38 S.Ct. 306, 62 L.Ed. 720 (1918), or where only private parties are involved, see Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.......
-
Hinderlider v. La Plata River Cherry Creek Ditch Co
...Government, supra note 7, at 120-21. See, also, Ely, supra note 7, at 381-88; Dodd, supra note 7, at 574-78. 12 Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295, 38 S.Ct. 306, 62 L.Ed. 720; Compare Rust Land & Lumber Co. v. Jackson, 250 U.S. 71, 76, 39 S.Ct. 424, 63 L.Ed. 850. In Howard v. Ingersoll,......