Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Constr. v. Conn. Siting Council, No. 33362.

• Decision Date: 11 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 33362.
• Citation: 139 Conn.App. 565,57 A.3d 765
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITIZENS AGAINST OVERHEAD POWER LINE CONSTRUCTION et al. v. CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL.

139 Conn.App. 565

57 A.3d 765

CITIZENS AGAINST OVERHEAD POWER LINE CONSTRUCTION et al.

v.CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL.

No. 33362.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 2012.

Decided Dec. 11, 2012.

Matthew C. McGrath, for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.).

Robert L. Marconi, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellee (named defendant).

Anthony M. Fitzgerald, with whom, on the brief, was Kurtis Z. Piantek, New Haven, for the appellee (defendant Connecticut Light and Power Company).

Victoria P. Hackett, staff attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Elin Swanson Katz, consumer counsel, for the appellee (defendant office of consumer counsel).

ROBINSON, ESPINOSA and BISHOP, Js.

ESPINOSA, J.

The plaintiffs Citizens Against Overhead Power Line Construction (association) and Richard M. Legere ¹ appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants, the Connecticut Siting Council (siting council), the office of consumer counsel (consumer counsel) and the Connecticut Light & Power Company (power company). The plaintiffs claim that the court improperly determined that they lacked standing to bring the present action. The defendants claim that we need not reach the issue of standing because the plaintiffs failed to appeal to the Superior Court from a final decision by the siting council. We agree with the defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to our consideration of this appeal. On October 20, 2008, the power company applied to the siting council for certificates of environmental and public need for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Connecticut portion of the power company's Connecticut Valley Electric Transmission Reliability Projects (state project). The state project consisted of two component projects, the Greater Springfield Reliability Project (Springfield project) and the Manchester to Meekville Junction Circuit Separation Project (Manchester project). The siting council considered both aspects of the state project together under docket number 370A.

The power company designed the state project to cure deficiencies in existing electricity transmission lines in north-central Connecticut and the greater Springfield area. The siting council observed that the state project spanned both areas because the transmission systems of the two areas were interconnected. The siting council explained: “From the point of view of transmission, Greater Springfield and the adjacent portion of north-central Connecticut are effectively the same load area. Since key transmission lines in the system serving Greater Springfield terminate at substations in Connecticut, the resolution of Springfield area problems necessarily involves improvement to parts of Connecticut's electric grid as well. At the same time, the need to resolve these Springfield area problems offers an opportunity to reinforce the reliability of electric supply within north-central Connecticut, and improve the power transfer capacity between Massachusetts and Connecticut.”

During the proceedings, the siting council granted party status to both the consumer counsel and the association. The association is an unincorporated group of individuals, including Legere, who own property in towns affected by the Springfield project portion of the state project.

On March 16, 2010, the siting council issued its decision on the power company's application. The siting council, as a matter of procedure, generally issues a decision in three separate but related documents: (1) its findings of fact setting forth the background information underlying the application, (2) an opinion detailing the siting council's consideration of the application, and (3) a decision and order summarizing the action of the siting council on the application. In this case, the siting council issued one set of findings of fact but a separate opinion and decision and order for the Springfield project and the Manchester project. All documents were labeled with docket number 370A. The siting council granted the power company's application with respect to the Springfield project, but it denied without prejudice the application with respect to the Manchester project.

On April 7, 2010, the power company petitioned the siting council for reconsideration, which the siting council granted. In connection with the petition for reconsideration, the siting council heard additional testimony concerning the Manchester project. On July 20, 2010, the siting council issued its findings of fact, opinion and decision and order on the petition for reconsideration and granted the power company's application with respect to the Manchester project. The findings of fact, opinion and decision and order following reconsideration were issued under the docket number 370A–MR. The siting council's decision and order listed the association as a party to the proceedings on the petition for reconsideration.

On May 7, 2010, the plaintiffs filed the operative complaint in the Superior Court, appealing the March 16, 2010 decision of the siting council. The power company filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, among other things, that (1) the plaintiffs did not take their appeal from a final decision of the siting council and (2) the plaintiffs were not statutorily or classically aggrieved by the decision of the siting council.

On November 22, 2010, the court issued an order providing that “[t]he motion to dismiss is denied on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction (‘not from a final decision’) but as to the issue of aggrievement the matter is set down for an evidentiary hearing....” In an articulation issued January 21, 2011, the court stated: “The question here is not whether the plaintiffs were permitted to wait until a new ruling was issued by the siting council on [the power company's] granted motion to reconsider; indeed, the plaintiffs were allowed to wait. See Public Acts 2006, No. 06–32; General Statutes § 4–183. Rather, the question is whether the court retains jurisdiction over this present May 7, 2010 appeal despite the fact that it was filed before the agency issued its opinion on reconsideration.

“Public Act 06–32 amended § 4–183(c) in order to confer subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal if taken within forty-five days of a reconsidered decision. Specifically, it allows for an appeal (1) [w]ithin forty-five days after mailing of the final decision under section 4–180 ... or (2) within forty-five days after the agency denies a petition for reconsideration of the final decision ... or (3) within forty-five days after mailing of the final decision made after reconsideration.... The purpose of Public Act 06–32 was to correct the situation where an appeal on certain discrete issues, not reconsidered by an agency, would often be considered untimely if filed concurrently with the appeal of the reconsideration. The purpose was not to penalize an appellant who filed an appeal before reconsideration was completed by the agency.

“The appeal at issue in this case only concerns Suffield and associated towns, not the subject of [the power company's] motion to reconsider. Thus, the consideration of the appeal is not affected by the [siting council's] July 20 reconsideration decision.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)

The court heard oral argument and received evidence on the question of whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the decision of the siting council. In a memorandum of decision issued March 24, 2011, the court stated that the plaintiffs had not been aggrieved by the decision of the siting council and, therefore, lacked standing to bring the present action. Accordingly, the court granted the motion to dismiss as to all parties. The plaintiffs filed the present appeal on April 13, 2011.

On appeal, the defendants renew their claim that the plaintiffs failed to appeal from a final decision of the siting council. The defendants assert that, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4–181a (a)(4)² and 4–183,³ the siting council's July 20, 2010 decision was the only final decision from which the plaintiffs properly could bring an appeal. We agree.

Whether the siting council's March 16, 2010 decision is a final decision from which the plaintiffs may appeal hinges on the operation of §§ 4–181a (a)(4) and 4–183(c)(1). Accordingly, this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is plenary. “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brouillard v. Connecticut Siting Council, 133 Conn.App. 851, 855, 38 A.3d 174, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 923, 41 A.3d 662 (2012). General Statutes § 1–2z provides: “The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”

We conclude that, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous text of both §§ 4–181a (a)(4) and 4–183(c), the only decision from which the plaintiffs properly could have appealed was the siting council's July 20, 2010 decision. In reaching this determination, we first consider the text of § 4–181a (a)(4), which provides in relevant part that “an agency decision made after reconsideration pursuant to this subsection shall become the final decision in the contested case in lieu of the original final decision for purposes of any appeal under...