Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller
| Decision Date | 14 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1196,98-1196 |
| Parties | CITIZENS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHOICE, a Michigan Non-Profit Corporation; Michigan Handicapped Voters' Rights Association, a Michigan Non-Profit Corporation; Ruby M. Turner; Victor L. Marsh; Matthew McNeely; and Evelyn Spence, Plaintiffs--Appellants, v. Candice S. MILLER, Secretary of State of Michigan, Defendant-Appellee, Taxpayers United for Term Limitations; Allan Schmid; and Patrick Anderson, Intervenors-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Robert A. Sedler (argued and briefed), Otto J. Hetzel (briefed), Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Katherine C. Galvin (briefed), Office of the Attorney General of Michigan, Lansing, MI, Daniel C. Brubaker (briefed), Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, Grand Rapids, MI, for Appellees.
Michael A. Zagaroli (argued), Daniel C. Brubaker (briefed), Mika, Meyers, Beckett & Jones, Grand Rapids, MI, for Intervenors-Appellees.
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
A Michigan constitutional amendment imposes lifetime term limits on state legislators. The plaintiffs, four voters and two public interest groups, claim that the amendment violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. They sued Michigan's Secretary of State to enjoin enforcement of the amendment. The district court upheld the law and granted summary judgment for Michigan. We AFFIRM.
The parties stipulated to the facts. For many years, Michigan legislators had been winning reelection consistently. Incumbent legislators who sought reelection would retain their seats over ninety-two percent of the time. In 1992, a large majority of Michigan voters, 58.8 percent, approved a constitutional amendment to impose term limits on many state and federal officials, including state legislators, state executives, and federal congressmen. It added the following language, in pertinent part, to Michigan's constitution:
No person shall be elected to the office of state representative more than three times. No person shall be elected to the office of state senate more than two times.... This limitation on the number of times a person shall be elected to office shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after January 1, 1993.
This section shall be self-executing. Legislation may be enacted to facilitate operation of this section, but no law shall limit or restrict the application of this section. If any part of this section is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining parts of this section shall not be affected but will remain in full force and effect.
MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 54. Section 54 imposes "lifetime" term limits as opposed to "consecutive" term limits. Lifetime term limits forever bar officials from serving more than a set number of terms, whereas consecutive term limits allow them to serve an indefinite number of terms so long as they periodically leave office. Section 54 will impact state representatives beginning with the 1998 primary elections. It will prevent 65 out of Michigan's 110 representatives from seeking reelection.
The plaintiffs are four individual voters and two non-profit corporations, the Citizens for Legislative Choice and the Michigan Handicapped Voters' Rights Association. The two corporate plaintiffs, as their names suggest, seek to promote voting choices generally. The individual plaintiffs seek to vote for representatives subject to the term limits. They reside in the districts of two state representatives, Mary Lou Parks and Ilona Varga, who are prohibited from running for reelection by § 54. Both representatives state that they would seek reelection if possible. The plaintiffs voted for them in the prior election and assert that they would do so again. They also voted against the amendment, as did a majority of the voters in their districts. The defendant in this case is, in effect, the State of Michigan. Intervening on Michigan's behalf are the Taxpayers United for Term Limitations, another non-profit corporation, and two of its representatives.
The plaintiffs contend that § 54 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to vote for their preferred legislative candidates. They do not challenge the provisions that affect state executive officers, and both sides agree that the congressional term limits are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment holding § 54 unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction requiring Michigan to place all the excluded candidates on the ballot.
The plaintiffs claim that this court has federal question jurisdiction because § 54 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They rest jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 2201. Michigan's counsel concedes that federal jurisdiction exists. Despite this agreement, a federal court has a responsibility to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 1689, 48 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976). We may exercise federal question jurisdiction over this case only if it presents a substantial federal question. Id.
There is authority that, in general, a state's decision to limit the terms of its elected officials raises no substantial federal question. State ex rel Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607, appeal dismissed, Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 1689, 48 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976). In Maloney, the State of West Virginia imposed consecutive term limits on its governor. A gubernatorial candidate sued to enforce the limits, and the incumbent governor responded by challenging their constitutionality. The governor argued that term limits violated section one of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws to voters who wished to reelect him to a third consecutive term.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia upheld the term limits. Maloney, 223 S.E.2d at 612-13. It found that West Virginia's interests outweighed any incidental burden on the franchise. Id. The governor then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a one-sentence opinion, the Court held that "[t]he appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question." Moore, 425 U.S. at 946, 96 S.Ct. 1689. The Moore Court dismissed the appeal "on the ground that limits on the terms of state officeholders do not even raise a substantial federal question under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 925, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) (Thomas, J., joined by three other justices, dissenting on another issue).
Although a summary dismissal, Moore binds all lower courts until subsequent Supreme Court decisions suggest otherwise. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, 97 S.Ct. 2238, 53 L.Ed.2d 199 (1977). The "precedential value of a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question extends beyond the facts of the particular case to all similar cases." Wright v. Lane County Dist. Ct., 647 F.2d 940, 941 (9th Cir.1981). Cf. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) ( . Therefore, Moore may affect jurisdiction in a case involving lifetime term limits on state legislators.
One other circuit has considered this jurisdictional analysis. Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc panel) ("Bates II "), vacating 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.1997) (original panel) ("Bates I "), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1302, 140 L.Ed.2d 468 (1998). In Bates II, California imposed lifetime term limits on state legislators. Three judges addressed Moore. Judge O'Scannlain expressed "grave doubt" about the existence of federal jurisdiction, while Judges Reinhardt and Fletcher attempted to distinguish Moore. Compare Bates II, 131 F.3d at 847-48 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) with id. at 869 n. 7 (Fletcher, J., dissenting in part) and Bates I, 127 F.3d at 851 n. 13 (Reinhardt, J.).
Despite doubts, we will not decide the propriety of jurisdiction. Michigan's counsel chose not to contest jurisdiction in the district court or in this court. Therefore, neither side has advised this court of their views on Moore. In addition, we need not decide the jurisdictional issue; because we uphold § 54 on the merits, our decision will have the same practical effect as if we decided this case on jurisdictional grounds, namely, to let § 54 stand. Therefore, setting aside the jurisdictional question, we turn to the other issues.
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show, among other elements, the existence of an actual case or controversy. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 45 F.3d 126, 127 (6th Cir.1995). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An actual controversy exists where a plaintiff has "sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of [a law]." Miyazawa, 45 F.3d at 127 (citation omitted). The injury "must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the district court correctly found that all plaintiffs established standing. Michigan, however, contends that the potential injury is not immediate. It argues that if lifetime term limits are struck down, they could be replaced with a valid alternative, consecutive term limits. Consecutive term limits, like lifetime term limits, would prevent the term-limited representatives from running in this election, although they would allow those representatives to run in future elections....
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