Citrano v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1976
• Citation: 368 A.2d 54,171 Conn. 248
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Christine CITRANO et al. v. BERKSHIRE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Page 54

368 A.2d 54

171 Conn. 248

Christine CITRANO et al. v. BERKSHIRE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

June 29, 1976.

William B. Rush, Bridgeport, with whom was Peter D. Clark, Bridgeport, for appellants (plaintiffs).

George L. Holmes, Jr., Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Edward F. Halloran, Hartford, for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment for the defendant, Berkshire Mutual Insurance Company, rendered following a trial to the court of an action for damages claimed to be due under the provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The judgment denied damages to the named plaintiff, Christine Citrano, for personal injuries, and to her father, Eugence C. Citrano, for and to her father, Eugene C. Citrano, for treatment for her. The parties stipulated to the essential facts and were at issue on whether the insurance policy in question, because of statutory mandate, provided coverage to the plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of an uninsured motorcycle.

The undisputed facts may be briefly summarized. On September 21, 1970, the named plaintiff, a high school sophomore, received serious injuries while riding as a passenger on a motorcycle which ran off the road and crashed when the operator, James R. Karoli, turned around to her and said, 'I like you.' The accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle operator and, at the time of the accident, he did not have any policy of insurance which was applicable to the injuries sustained by the named plaintiff. Her father and mother, however, at the time of the accident, carried insurance with the defendant which not only insured them as owners of their automobile but also insured their daughter as a resident of their household. That policy contained a provision for coverage against bodily injury caused by uninsured automobiles. ¹

In view of the specific language of coverage J as set out in the policy, limiting coverage to the use of an 'uninsured automobile,' the plaintiffs have expressly disavowed reliance upon the wording of the policy and 'therefore do not base their claims upon the language of the policy of insurance, but rather base their claims upon the legislative mandate contained in the Connecticut General Statutes.' More particularly, their reliance is placed on the provisions of § 38-175a of the General Statutes, ² which prescribes mininum provisions for inclusion in automobile liability policies, and § 38-175d, ³ which expressly provides that policies affording uninsured motorist coverage to which the provisions of § 38-175a through 38-175e, inclusive, apply 'shall be deemed to provide insurance under such coverage in accordance with . . . regulations' issued by the insurance commissioner.

In Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 278 A.2d 796, this court, on similar facts and in construing a similar policy, sustained the trial court's conclusion that a motorcycle was not an automobile as the term 'automobile' was used in the policy. But that decision is not decisive of the present case. In Marcolini, the policy in question had been issued in April, 1967, and ran for one year. While the policy was in force, the General Assembly adopted as No. 510 of the 1967 Public Acts, effective October 1, 1967, what is now General Statutes § 38-175a. Pursuant to that statute, the insurance commissioner adopted insurance regulations §§ 38-175a-1 through 38-175a-8 on December 19, 1967. What is now § 38-175c of the General Statutes was adopted by the 1969 General Assembly as No. 202 of the 1969 Public Acts. Although those statutes and regulations were in effect in 1971 when Marcolini was decided, their import was not considered in that opinion which noted (p. 285, 278 A.2d p. 799): 'We have no reason to discuss the relationship of the statute and the regulations to the policy considered here since they do not impose new restrictions on the enforcement of a past contract. See O'Connor v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 97 Conn. 8, 15, 115 A. 484.' Those statutory provisions, however, remained in effect during the life of the policy with which we are concerned in the present case and the decisive issue on the present appeal is whether §§ 38-175a, 38-175c and 38-175d require the plaintiffs' policy to be read as including coverage for damages caused by the operator of an uninsured motorcycle.

As we have noted, § 38-175a of the General Statute (see footnote 2) directs the insurance commissioner to adopt regulations with respect to the minimum provisions to be included in 'automobile liability' insurance policies and provides that those regulations 'shall make mandatory the inclusion of bodily injury liability . . . and uninsured motorists coverages.' That the plaintiffs wee at all material times insured by such an automobile liability policy is uncontested.

Shortly after the enactment in 1967 of what is now § 38-175a, the insurance commissioner issued regulations which specifically provided that motorcycles were included in the type of vehicle for which uninsured motorist coverage must be provided in any policy issued in Connecticut. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 38-175a-2(1)(A) (29 Conn.L.J., No. 30, p. 19, January 23, 1968). About four months after this regulation was issued, the commissioner revoked that regulation and substituted a regulation which excluded motorcycles. See § 38-175a-2(1)(A) (29 Conn.L.J., No. 48, p. 14, May 28, 1948). It was this regulation which was in effect during the time the present case arose. While the fact is of only academic interest so far as the present case is concerned, it is noted that the insurance commissioner again changed the regulations effective February 1, 1975, to provide that uninsured motorist protection must be available for injuries sustained as the result of the operation of an uninsured motorcycle. See § 38-175a-6(a) ⁴ (36 Conn.L.J., No. 37, pp. 19, 21, March 11, 1975). During this entire time during which, according to the regulations, motorcycles were first included in uninsured motorist coverage, then excluded, and now included, the relevant provisions of the statute which contains the legislative mandate regarding uninsured motorist coverage have remained unchanged.

Section 38-175c of the General Statutes ⁵ which was in effect when the policy in question was issued expressly provides that '(e)very such policy shall provide insurance in accordance with such regulations . . . for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . ..' (Emphasis supplied). It cannot be doubted that, pursuant to the provisions of § 38-175d (see footnote 3), such uninsured motorist coverage for protection against the operators of uninsured motor vehicles is deemed to be included in automobile liability policies. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Darrow, 161 Conn. 169, 178, 286 A.2d 288. It is true as this court noted in the Fidelity & Casualty case (p. 179, 286 A.2d p. 292) that '(w)ithin their scope the regulations of the insurance commissioner have the force of statutes.' As that case indicated (p. 181,286 A.2d p. 293), however, and as was stated more explicitly later, it is also true that '(w)hile the insurance commissioner is explicitly authorized by § 38-175a to issue regulations to effect the purposes of the statute, any regulations which exceed the authority granted to the Commissioner are void.' Berlinski v. Ovellette, 164 Conn. 482, 492 n.4, 325 A.2d 239, 245.

The precise decisive question, then, comes down to one of statutory interpretation and whether a 'motorcycle' is a 'motor vehicle' as that term is used in § 38-175c. At the time that statute was enacted, the term 'motor vehicle' had already been defined in § 14-1(26) of the General Statutes as 'any vehicle propelled or drawn by ony power other than muscular . . ..' Conversely, 'motorcycle' was defined as 'a motor vehicle having not more than three wheels . . ..' (Emphasis supplied.) General Statutes § 14-1(25). "There is a presumption that the legislature, in enacting a law, did so in view of existing relevant statutes and intended it to be read with them so as to make one consistent body of law." (Citations omitted.) Cicala v. Administrator, 161...