City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing
Decision Date | 24 October 1958 |
Citation | 330 P.2d 802,51 Cal.2d 127 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HO SING and Ho Lum Shee, Defendants and Respondents. S. F. 19977. |
Dion R. Holm, City Atty., and George E. Baglin, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for appellant.
Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon and Frank E. Farrella, San Francisco, for respondents.
This is an appeal by the City and County of San Francisco, a municipal corporation, from a judgment after defendants', Ho Sing and Ho Lum Shee, demurrer to its complaint had been sustained without leave to amend.
Mr. and Mrs. Ho purchased a building in San Francisco.Their predecessors in title had installed a sidewalk skylight in front of the building.This skylight was over a basement which was maintained by defendants Ho.During the course of defendants' possession of the building, the sidewalk skylight developed a crack two inches wide and 18 inches long.On August 24, 1952, one Mrs. Wagner tripped because of said crack and fell, breaking her hip.Mr. and Mrs. Wagner sued both the City and County of San Francisco and Mr. and Mrs. Ho for damages resulting therefrom (Wagner v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 423562) and recovered a final judgment against plaintiff city and defendants Ho in a total amount of $15,000 plus interest and costs.Plaintiff city paid Mrs. Wagner the sum of $5,000 plus $102.03 costs.Defendants paid Mrs. Wagner the sum of $10,000.
Plaintiff, in bringing this action, seeks to compel defendants to indemnify it in the sum of $5,258.87 ($5,000 plus costs and interest at 7%).As heretofore noted, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend.
The only question involved is one of first impression in this state and may be stated as follows: Where an adjoining property owner for the exclusive benefit of his own property places in a public street or sidewalk some artificial structure and a city is compelled to pay compensation in damages to a member of the public injured thereby may the city recover the amount so paid from the property owner by way of indemnity?
This question was specifically left open in Peters v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 419, 430, 260 P.2d 55, 62, where we said: 'We are not presented with the problem whether the city might have a right over against the Duques in the event it pays the judgment and the jury returns a verdict against the property owners on a new trial, and nothing we say here should be taken as indicating our views on that matter.'Both sides argue, however, that from certain statements made in the Peters case, there is, or is not, a right over against the property owner in the case at bar.
In the Peters casethe plaintiff brought suit against both the city and the Duques, as property owners, for damages sustained by her from a fall occasioned by a ramp or slope extending from a building maintained by the Duques and which extended across the sidewalk and caused a depression therein.The jury found for the plaintiff against the city but against the plaintiff with respect to the Duques' liability.On appeal, we affirmed the judgment against the city and reversed that portion which exonerated defendant Duque from liability.
We held that: (1)'The rule is that an abutting landowner may be held liable for the dangerous condition of portions of the public sidewalk which have been altered or constructed for the benefit of his property and which serve a use independent of and apart from the ordinary and accustomed use for which sidewalks are designed'; (2)'The duty to maintain portions of a sidewalk which have been altered for the benefit of the property runs with the land, and a property owner cannot avoid liability on the ground that the condition was created by or at the request of his predecessors in title'; (3)'The city is under a duty to keep sidewalks in safe condition, it is directly liable to pedestrians for failing to correct a dangerous condition of which it had notice, and it is not relieved of its responsibility in this regard merely because the condition was created or maintained by a property owner who might also be liable to pedestrians for injuries resulting therefrom'; and (4)'With regard to persons who are injured by such a condition, the city and the landowner are joint or concurrent tort-feasors; each is directly liable for his own wrong and each may be held liable for the entire damage suffered.'Emphasis added;Peters v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal.2d 419, 423, 427, 429, 260 P.2d 55, 61, and cases there cited.
From the emphasized portion (4) set forth above, defendants argue that since the abutting property owner and the city are joint, or concurrent, tortfeasors, the long established rule in this state against contribution between joint tortfeasors applies.The city, on the other hand, argues that this is not a question of contribution but of indemnity.We said in the Peters case that 41 Cal.2d 419, 430, 431, 260 P.2d 55, 61.The city contends that when an abutting landowner makes an unusual use of the public streets for his own private benefit it is with the permission, either express or implied, of the municipality; tht such permission carries with it an implied condition that the landowner will exercise due care for the safety of the public and that it will hold the city harmless for any damages occasioned by the lack of due care.In other words, indemnity, as distinguished from contribution, exists because of some special relationship existing between the two tortfeasors and the entire loss is shifted to the one bound to indemnify.Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., § 46, p. 249.In Runyon v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.App. 383, 389, 180 P. 837, 840, it was held: The City's Argument:
It is the position of the city that in the absence of conflict with the constitutional or statutory law of this state, the common law prevails (Civ.Code, § 22.2;Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 355, 289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137) and that the common law is consistent throughout the United States that indemnity is allowed in such a situation as we have here.
The city cites many cases from out-of-state courts in which indemnity has been allowed.The theories relied on by such courts have differed as has been heretofore noted by us in the Peters case.We said there: .'41 Cal.2d 419, 430, 260 P.2d 55, 62.
In Washington Gas. Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316, 325, 327, 328, 16 S.Ct. 564, 40 L.Ed. 712, the district had given the gas company permission, for which it was paid a dollar, to open the sidewalk to install a gas box which contained a cock in the service pipe.The box had an iron cover which when locked in place was flush with the surface of the sidewalk.After the installation of the box, the district caused the sidewalk to be widened so that the box was approximately in the center thereof.The gas box was left open by the company and a pedestrian fell...
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Campbell v. United States
...emplacements of this type are appurtenances for the benefit of the possessor and controller of adjoining land."). Moreover, since the abutting owner's duty to maintain the alteration under this theory runs with the land, see
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 129-30 (1958), extending that duty past the termination of the special benefit would saddle successor owners with hidden liabilities, without a corresponding benefit that would put them on notice of their duty to maintain.... - Mitchelson v. Sunset Marquis Hotel
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