City and County of Denver v. Bacon

• Decision Date: 06 July 1908
• Citation: 44 Colo. 166,96 P. 974
• Parties: CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER v. BACON.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

96 P. 974

44 Colo. 166

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER v. BACON.

Supreme Court of Colorado

July 6, 1908

Appeal from District Court, City and County of Denver; Samuel L Carpenter, Judge.

Action by Mary R. Bacon against the city and county of Denver. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Henry A. Lindsley, Charles R. Brock, and F. W Sanborn, for appellant.

Wells &amp Chiles, Robert A. Long, and R. T. McNeal, for appellee.

CAMPBELL J.

Mrs Bacon, appellee here, recovered a judgment against the city and county of Denver, appellant, as compensation for personal injuries which she sustained as the result of a fall while she was walking along one of defendant's sidewalks in the city of Denver.

1. By section 9 of article 9 of the charter of the city then in force (Laws 1893, p. 233, c. 78), one who claims damages for injury received upon a street or sidewalk is required within 30 days after receiving such injuries to give the mayor or city council notice in writing thereof, stating fully in the notice, among other things, how the injury occurred. The plaintiff within the time gave a notice, but defendant says it was insufficient, in that it did not state how the injury occurred. This is the only defect pointed out. The cause of the injury was thus stated: 'Because of the torn up and impassable condition of the sidewalk, and without any lights or warning of impending danger.' The defendant says that this is nothing more than a bare statement of a conclusion and a general ground upon which a municipality is liable for injuries upon its streets. The objection is not tenable. The notice gives as the cause of the injury the negligence of defendant in permitting one of its sidewalks to be torn up and rendered impassable without indicating, by lights or some warning, the impending danger due to this defective condition. The notice is clearly sufficient under the previous rulings of our Court of Appeals in three cases: Denver v. Barron, 6 Colo.App. 72, 39 P. 989; Stoors v. City of Denver, 19 Colo.App. 159, 73 P. 1094; City of Denver v. Bradbury, 19 Colo.App. 441, 75 P. 1077. The object of this statute requiring notice, as stated by our Court of Appeals, is to advise the officials of the city of the fact of the injury and of the claim made by the person injured, in order that the city may investigate and determine for itself before suit brought the justness of the claim and the circumstances attending the accident while they are fresh. From this notice the city was not misled, and might easily determine how the accident happened.

2. Another objection is that there was a fatal variance between the...