City Council, City of Reading v. Eppihimer

Decision Date17 November 2003
Citation835 A.2d 883
PartiesCITY COUNCIL of the CITY OF READING v. Joseph D. EPPIHIMER, Mayor for the City of Reading, Jeffrey White, Managing Director for the City of Reading and David Cituk, City Auditor for the City of Reading, Appeal of Joseph D. Eppihimer, Mayor for the City of Reading and Jeffrey White, Managing Director for the City of Reading.
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Leonard A. Busby, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Andrew N. Howe, Reading, for appellee.

BEFORE: PELLEGRINI, Judge, and COHN, Judge, and FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Judge COHN.

Joseph D. Eppihimer, Mayor of the City of Reading (Mayor), and Jeffrey White, Managing Director of the City of Reading (Managing Director),1 appeal the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County that granted the Complaint in Declaratory Judgment filed by the City Council of the City of Reading. The trial court held, inter alia, that City Council has the authority to create and fill the two newly created positions of City Council Chief of Staff and City Council Legislative Coordinator. Appellants claim that, in reaching this conclusion, the trial court violated explicit provisions of the Reading City Charter (Charter), Administrative Code and Personnel Code, deviated from the City's merit selection process and precluded the orderly and consistent administration of employment practices for City government.

On the November 2, 1993 ballot, the citizens of Reading voted to implement a Home Rule Charter with a "Strong Mayor-Council Form of Government with a Managing Director" in order to "make the government of the City of Reading more responsive to the needs of the citizens of Reading...." (Report and Recommended Home Rule Charter for The City of Reading, July 1993, page VI.) The Charter took effect on the first Monday in January 1996. The City, subsequently, enacted an Administrative Code and a Personnel Code, pursuant to Charter Sections 601 and 703.

The Charter specifically authorizes City Council to hire a "City Clerk" who is an exempt employee,2 and subject only to the authority of City Council. City Council decided to create two new staff positions, which are not specified in the Charter: Chief of Staff and Legislative Coordinator.3 Therefore, City Council included funding for these two new positions in the 2002 Fiscal Year Budget Ordinance and also amended the 2002 Full Time Position Ordinance to refer to the new positions. The Mayor vetoed both ordinances when City Council submitted them for his approval. City Council overrode the Mayor's vetoes.4 It then filed an Amended Complaint in equity with the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County alleging that the Mayor and Managing Director unlawfully refused to recognize the two new positions created by City Council. City Council sought declaratory relief that, inter alia, Council validly created the two positions; the Mayor and Managing Director were to take any and all actions necessary to effect the subsequent creation and staffing of such positions; City Council validly hired Linda Kelleher to fill the Chief of Staff position; and, relevant portions of the 2001 and 2002 Amended Full Time Employee Position Ordinances were valid and binding upon the Mayor and Managing Director. The trial court entered an order granting City Council's Request for Declaratory Judgment. The judge held that City Council properly created and funded the two positions pursuant to its budgetary authority under Section 221 and Article IX of the Charter. Appellants do not challenge this portion of the trial court's holding on appeal. However, the judge also held that the doctrine of separation of powers dictates the conclusion that, in the home rule form of governance in existence in the City of Reading, City Council has the authority to hire and fire with regard to these two staff positions. Appellants disagree, and it is this portion of the holding that is the subject of their appeal.

We are presented with the following issues for our review: (1) whether the Mayor and Managing Director alone possess administrative and executive authority over Reading's merit personnel system; (2) whether the Charter authorizes City Council to appoint ONLY the City Clerk; (3) whether the employment authority of the Mayor and Managing Director is confined to the "Administrative Service" or "Administrative Branch"; and (4) whether the separation of powers doctrine requires that City Council have the power to hire and fire for these two positions.5

The issues must be addressed in the context of the City's Home Rule Charter, as it is the controlling document in this case. The Charter was enacted pursuant to the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (HRC & OPL), 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 2901-3171. Section 2961 of the HRC & OPL sets forth the powers granted to a municipality that has chosen to adopt a home rule charter, explaining that it "may exercise any powers and perform any function not denied by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its home rule charter." 53 Pa.C.S. § 2961. See also Pa. Const., art. IX, § 2; Charter § 102 (incorporates this provision of the HRC & OPL). Therefore, a presumption exists that the exercise of power is valid if no restriction exists in the Constitution, the charter itself, or the acts of the Legislature. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 v. City of Pittsburgh, 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 83, 644 A.2d 246, 249 (1994),petition for allowance of appeal denied, 544 Pa. 637, 675 A.2d 1253 (1996). However, regardless of this expanded autonomy, home rule municipalities must act according to the parameters set by the legislature in the HRC & OPL.6County of Delaware v. Township of Middletown, 511 Pa. 66, 511 A.2d 811 (1986).

In addition, this Court has held that general rules of statutory construction are applicable in interpreting provisions of a home rule charter. Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 168, 531 A.2d 42, 44 (1987) (citing Cottone v. Kulis, 74 Pa.Cmwlth. 522, 460 A.2d 880 (1983)), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 518 Pa. 622, 541 A.2d 748 (1988). We must interpret statutes to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature and, if possible, give effect to all of its provisions. Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Further, if the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, a court may not ignore the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Ramich v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Schatz Electric, Inc.), 564 Pa. 656, 770 A.2d 318 (2001). This Court must presume that the drafters of the charter did not intend a result which is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable. Cottone, 460 A.2d at 882.

(I) Merit Personnel System

Appellants first contend that the Mayor and Managing Director alone possess administrative and executive authority over Reading's merit personnel system, which is mandated by the Charter. Defined in Section 702, the merit personnel system requires that personnel decisions for all non-exempt career service employees7 be made solely on the basis of merit and qualifications. City Council agrees that, because neither the City Council Chief of Staff position nor the City Council Legislative Coordinator position is listed in the Charter as being exempt, both are considered non-exempt career service positions and are, thus, subject to the City's merit personnel system. (City Council Brief at 9.) Any appointment, promotion, transfer, demotion, suspension, dismissal or disciplinary action concerning any employee must be carried out in accordance with this system. The Charter mandates that, unless otherwise provided, the Mayor shall administer the City's merit personnel system for non-exempt career service personnel. (Charter § 308(m).) By implication, any decisions made by the Mayor relevant to employment of such personnel are to be made solely on the basis of merit and qualifications.

The Mayor carries out his responsibility for employment of personnel through the Managing Director, who is the chief administrative officer of the City. Section 406(b) states that the Managing Director shall "[d]irect and supervise the administration of all departments, offices, and agencies of the City, except as otherwise provided by this Charter or by law." Human Resources is one of six departments in the administrative service8 of the City reporting to the Managing Director.9 (Administrative Code § 8.01.) The Director of Human Resources is appointed by the Mayor and responsible to the Managing Director. (Charter § 705; Administrative Code § 8.48.) Section 8.47 of the Administrative Code states, in pertinent part, that the Department of Human Resources "shall be responsible for the administration of the City personnel system" of which the merit personnel system is a part. See Charter § 705. Thus, while they may not be directly involved on a day-to-day basis, the Mayor and the Managing Director are ultimately responsible for carrying out the City's merit personnel system through appointment and supervisory responsibilities.

City Council argues, to the contrary, that it, nonetheless, has the authority to hire and fire these new employees. First, City Council asserts that the Court's decision in League of Women Voters of Greater Pittsburgh v. Allegheny County, 819 A.2d 155 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), is "extremely persuasive on this issue" and, under that holding, City Council would have hiring and firing authority because the new employees will work in confidential positions only for City Council, whose members are elected. (City Council Brief at 15.)

In League of Women Voters, certain elected county Officers in Allegheny County (the Register of Wills, the Prothonotary, the Sheriff, the Recorder of Deeds and the Coroner) argued that the merit personnel system, which was prepared and administered by the county manager pursuant to the county...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Arneson v. Wolf
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • June 10, 2015
    ...that time, typically operated under a rubric where the executive and legislative branches were combined. See City Council of the City of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883, 893 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (noting “the many forms of local government in which the legislative and executive functions are ......
  • PENNSYLVANIA INDEPENDENT WASTE v. Township
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • March 21, 2005
    ...by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether the trial court abused its discretion. City Council of the City of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883 14. In the interest of clarity, we consolidate the claims raised by the Township in this appeal. 15. Act of June 24......
  • Mukerji v. Board
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • January 18, 2008
    ...Mayor and Managing Director exclusive authority to suspend and terminate employment, the trial court relied upon City Council of the City of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). In Eppihimer, this court considered whether City Council has authority under the Charter to hire ......
  • Yentzer v. Hopewell Twp., 1522 C.D. 2012
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • April 9, 2013
    ...evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether the trial court abused its discretion." City Council of the City of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883, 886 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 6. We do note that it appears unlikely that the family exemption would ever actually apply, given th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT