City of Agoura Hills v. Local Agency Formation Com.

• Citation: 198 Cal.App.3d 480,243 Cal.Rptr. 740
• Decision Date: 10 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. B022489,B022489
• Parties: CITY OF AGOURA HILLS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 740

243 Cal.Rptr. 740

198 Cal.App.3d 480

CITY OF AGOURA HILLS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION OF COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent and Appellant.

No. B022489.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 10, 1988.

Gregory W. Stepanicich, City Atty., City of Agoura Hills, Richards, Watson & Gershon, and Rochelle Browne, Los Angeles, for petitioner and appellant.

DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel, and Jonathan B. Crane, Sr. Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent and appellant.

Diane M. Griffiths, Robert E. Leidigh, Kathryn E. Donovan, John G. McLean, Lilly Spitz, and Margarita Altamirano for the Fair Political Practices Com'n, State of Cal., as amicus curiae on behalf of respondent and appellant.

BAKER ^*, Associate Justice.

A dispute between a city and county agency regarding plans for the city's boundaries brings this case to court. The dispute focuses on the implementation of legislation enacted to discourage "urban sprawl" and to encourage the "orderly formation and development" of local governments in each county.

Petitioner and appellant City of Agoura Hills ("City") is a municipal corporation located in the County of Los Angeles ("county"). Respondent and appellant Local Agency Formation Commission of the County of Los Angeles ("LAFCO") is a countywide agency charged with responsibilities under the Cortese-Knox Local Government Reorganization Act of 1985 (Gov.Code, § 56000 et seq.). ¹

The appeals filed by both parties in this case pertain to the adoption by LAFCO for the City of a "sphere of influence," which is defined as "a plan for the probable ultimate physical boundaries and service area of a local agency." (§ 56076.) The City objects that LAFCO refused to adopt the sphere it sought; instead, LAFCO adopted a considerably smaller sphere, virtually co-extensive with the City's existing boundaries with the exception of one additional tract area. On the City's motion, the trial court granted a judgment for peremptory writ of mandate commanding LAFCO to set aside this sphere of influence. The basis of the judgment was the court's ruling that LAFCO's written findings were "legally inadequate." LAFCO appealed from this judgment. The City also appealed from portions of the judgment. We find that LAFCO's written findings were legally adequate and therefore reverse the judgment.

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND DISPOSITION

The appeals challenge various rulings made by the trial court, first in granting an interlocutory judgment for peremptory writ of mandate and then in granting a judgment for peremptory writ of mandate, both setting aside LAFCO's sphere adoption. The issues litigated below and now raised on appeal include:

1. Do the applicable statutes require, as the City alleges, that the sphere of influence adopted for the City extend beyond its existing boundaries and is LAFCO's decision therefore invalid?

2. Is LAFCO's decision supported by substantial evidence in the record?

3. Were LAFCO's findings, "the written statement of its determinations," adequate under section 56425?

4. Does the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Public Resources code section 21000 et seq., apply to the sphere of influence proceedings in this case? If so, was the City barred from bringing a claim by the 180-day statute of limitations set forth in the Act?

5. Does Government Code section 84308 of the Political Reform Act apply to the sphere of influence proceedings? If the Act applies, is the second decision made without the "disqualified" commissioners still invalid, as the City alleges, because it was not the product of "an entirely new proceeding"?

We agree that LAFCO's written statement of its determinations was not good and we do not recommend the statement as a model. Although not exemplary, LAFCO's written statement is adequate under section 56425, especially in view of the provisions of section 56107 and the facts and circumstances of this case presented in the record on appeal. Since the final judgment setting aside LAFCO's decision was based solely on the trial court's erroneous finding that the written statement was not adequate, we reverse the judgment.

We conclude that the record upholds the trial court's finding that substantial evidence exists to support the sphere decision and that there was no prejudicial abuse of discretion by LAFCO. The applicable statutes do not require LAFCO to adopt a sphere extending beyond city boundaries.

We also find that CEQA is not applicable to LAFCO's proceedings in this case. The record supports the trial court's determination that the sphere adoption here is not a "project" subject to CEQA; the adoption could not possibly have a significant effect on the environment. In view of this ruling, the 180-day statute of limitations issue does not need to be addressed.

Finally, we conclude that LAFCO and the Fair Political Practices Commission ("FPPC") as amicus curiae correctly assert that a sphere of influence proceeding does not confer "an entitlement for use"; thus, Government Code section 84308 is not applicable to this case. ²

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ³

A. Creation of LAFCOs and Their Duties.

In 1963, the Legislature established a LAFCO in each county to discourage "urban sprawl" and encourage the "orderly formation and development" of local governments in each county. (See Knox-Nisbet Act, former Gov.Code §§ 54774 and 54774.5; Cortese-Knox Act, Gov.Code §§ 56300, 56301 and 56425.) One of LAFCO's important functions is the adoption for each city of a "sphere of influence." (§§ 56425 and 56426, formerly §§ 54774, 54774.1, 54774.2 of the Knox-Nisbet Act.) Another one of LAFCO's important duties is to approve or disapprove annexation proposals submitted by cities within the county. (See Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 268, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017; Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 648, 668-669, 124 Cal.Rptr. 635.)

The creation, composition, purposes, powers and duties of LAFCOs are fully set forth in the aforementioned legislation. Section 56326 provides that in Los Angeles County, the commission shall consist of seven members, representing the county and the cities in the county. ⁴ Section 56334 provides that the term of office of each member shall be four years.

B. The Sphere of Influence Adopted on January 9, 1985.

On November 14, 1984 and January 9, 1985, LAFCO held a public hearing concerning the sphere of influence for the City. The commission took testimony at the hearing, considered correspondence from residents and interested parties, and reviewed staff recommendations and reports. At the January 9, 1985 meeting, LAFCO voted on the sphere and adopted determinations set forth in the minutes of the meeting. The vote was unanimous. The sphere consisted of the City's existing boundaries plus a development identified as Tract Map 34827.

C. Interlocutory Judgment Proceedings.

On July 16, 1985, the City filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate seeking a writ ordering LAFCO to set aside its decision. The City cited grounds now raised on appeal, including LAFCO's violation of Government Code section 84308; LAFCO's failure to comply with CEQA; LAFCO's failure to comply with the statutory mandate of the Knox-Nisbet Act by limiting the City's sphere and by failing to prepare adequate written findings. The City also claimed that LAFCO's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

With respect to their contention that LAFCO violated section 84308, the City alleged that Commissioners Michael D. Antonovich and Hal Bernson had improperly participated in the sphere proceedings because each had accepted campaign contributions in excess of $250 from interested developers. ⁵

LAFCO filed an answer in opposition to the City's petition and a motion for a judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate. The motions were then heard by Superior Court Judge Irving Shimer on December 4, 1985. The entire administrative record was admitted into evidence. Judge Shimer limited his ruling to the Political Reform Act issue and granted the City's petition and set aside the sphere decision based on his finding that section 84308 was applicable and that LAFCO had failed to comply.

The judge made it abundantly clear that an entirely new proceeding was unnecessary. He advised: "I think the city's case is very, very, very weak and I don't propose to reopen this for a new hearing because I don't think that is necessary. [p] I don't have any indication in the record that Berson [sic ] or Antonovich participated other than Antonovich saying hello to Whizzin and voting at the end. If I'm right in that regard, then I'm prepared to have the commission presently constituted review the record with or without a new hearing as it elects alone, and proceed to a decision and vote if it so choses [sic ] without any disqualified persons participating." The judge added, "I don't see the need for new hearings in view of the volume and testimony of the volumes submitted." Although the judge declined to rule on any issue other than the applicability of section 84308, in response to the City's specific inquiry about the "existence of substantial evidence," the judge repeated, "I said your case is very, very, very weak."

In an interlocutory judgment filed on December 18, 1985, Judge Shimer ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue setting aside the sphere of influence adopted on January 9, 1985. The court ordered that LAFCO adopt a sphere for the City within 75 days and "disqualify from participation in said adoption those officers or members of respondent who may have accepted a contribution of $250.00 or more from a participant in the adoption proceedings within the meaning [of] Government Code Section 84308." The judge further ordered that LAFCO was "[t]o base said adoption upon documents and testimony...