City of Airway Heights v. Schroeder

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROSELLINI; WEAVER
• Citation: City of Airway Heights v. Schroeder, 335 P.2d 578, 53 Wn.2d 625 (Wash. 1959)
• Decision Date: 19 February 1959
• Docket Number: No. 34767
• Parties: CITY OF AIRWAY HEIGHTS, Appellant, v. Delbert R. SCHROEDER, Respondent.

Page 625

53 Wn.2d 625

335 P.2d 578

CITY OF AIRWAY HEIGHTS, Appellant, v. Delbert R. SCHROEDER, Respondent.

No. 34767.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Feb. 19, 1959.

John J. Schiffner, Spokane, for appellant.

Paine, Lowe, Coffin & Herman, Spokane, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

The defendant was arrested while driving on primary state highway No. 2 within the limits of the town of Airway Heights and was charged with speeding, in violation of ordinance No. 10 of that town. He was found guilty in justice court, but on appeal to the superior court of Spokane county, his challenge to the validity of the ordinance was sustained, and the case was dismissed. We are asked, on this appeal, to reverse that ruling.

RCW chapter 47.24 deals with the designation of city streets as state highways, their construction, maintenance and administration. RCW (Sup.1957) 47.24.020 provides inter alia:

'(11) Cities and towns shall regulate and enforce all traffic and parking restrictions on such streets, but all regulations adopted shall be subject to the approval of the state highway commission before becoming effective. Traffic control and parking regulations heretofore adopted by a city or town not identical with state laws shall become null and void unless approved by the state highway commission within one year after March 21, 1949;

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'(13) The state highway commission shall install, operate, maintain and control at state expense all traffic control signals, signs and traffic control devices for the purpose of regulating both pedestrian and motor vehicular traffic on, entering upon, or leaving state highways in cities and towns having a population of fifteen thousand or less according to the latest federal census: Provided, That such cities and towns may submit to the state highway commission a plan for traffic control signals, signs and traffic control devices desired by them, indicating the location, nature of installation, or type thereof, or a proposed amendment to such an existing plan or installation, and the state highway commission shall consult with the cities or towns concerning the same prior to installing such signals, signs, or devices. * * *'

The town of Airway Heights has a population of approximately seven hundred people. Primary highway 2 was established prior to the incorporation of the town. It is now designated, within the city limits, as 14th avenue. The town is situated approximately ten miles from the city of Spokane, two miles from the Fairchild Air Force Base, and five miles from a nike missile base.

The town council, believing the traffic and rate of speed on the highway to be excessive, passed an ordinance setting a speed limit of thirty-five miles an hour and submitted this ordinance to the highway commission. The commission advised the council that before an ordinance altering the speed limit could be approved, an engineering survey would have to be made, and offered its assistance if desired in making the survey. According to the evidence, a satisfactory survey was never completed, and the ordinance was not approved. However, the town authorities erected traffic control signs along 14th avenue, advising motorists that the speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour. The defendant was arrested while traveling at a speed of from fifty-five to sixty miles per hour on this portion of the highway.

Both parties assume that the established speed limit prior to the enactment of the ordinance was sixty miles per hour, although RCW 46.48.020 provides for a maximum speed of twenty-five miles per hour in incorporated cities and towns, except where otherwise provided. This section applies to the operation of vehicles on primary highways within incorporated cities and towns. Wood v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 45 Wash.2d 601, 277 P.2d 345, 283 P.2d 688. The assumption made by the parties, and by the town council, was most probably occasioned by the fact that the only speed markers on the highway indicated a speed limit of sixty miles per hour. Whether the ordinance increased or decreased the speed limit is not significant in determining whether the council had the power to enact it. It is agreed, and the highway commission recognized, that the ordinance constituted an alteration of the existing speed limit.

The local...