City of Albany v. Spragins

• Decision Date: 18 March 1926
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 816
• Citation: 214 Ala. 449,108 So. 32
• Parties: CITY OF ALBANY v. SPRAGINS et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

108 So. 32

214 Ala. 449

CITY OF ALBANY v. SPRAGINS et al.

8 Div. 816

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 18, 1926

Extended Opinion, April 22, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan County; O. Kyle, Judge.

Bill in equity by R.E. Spragins and others against the City of Albany. From a decree for complainants, respondent appeals. Reversed and rendered.

G.O Chenault, of Albany, for appellant.

A.J Harris, of Decatur, for appellees.

GARDNER J.

The bill in this case was filed by appellees, joint owners of 28 lots in the city of Albany, seeking injunctive relief against the city from further proceedings in assessment against said lots on account of street-paving improvements. The application for temporary injunction was heard upon bill answer, and affidavits offered, resulting in an order granting the injunction, from which the city prosecutes this appeal. The bill was filed September 26, 1925, after notice by publication had been given that the preliminary assessment roll was complete and on file in the office of the city clerk, and October 18, 1925, set as the date of hearing any objections or defenses.

Our statutory system affords ample opportunity for the interposition of objections or defenses by the property owner in such character of proceedings, including appeals from adverse rulings to the higher judicial tribunals. Article 33, c. 43, Code of 1923.

It is conceded by counsel for complainants that the matters of irregularity or illegality were such as were proper to be presented and litigated in the manner provided by the statute. Garner v. City of Anniston, 59 So. 654, 178 Ala. 430; City of Birmingham v. Wills, 59 So. 173, 178 Ala. 198, Ann.Cas.1915B, 746; Day v. City of Montgomery, 93 So. 609, 207 Ala. 644.

If such a proceeding is void upon its face, common-law certiorari may be awarded to quash the same. N.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Town of Boaz (Ala.Sup.) 106 So. 192.

The equity of the bill rests, as insisted by complainants' counsel, and so held by the court below, upon the doctrine of the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, and this upon the theory that, as complainants own 28 lots, they will be compelled to defend as to each separately, though the facts and the law are the same as to each, with appeals separately taken in the event of adverse rulings; there being no provision for a consolidation of the causes. The equity here sought to be invoked belongs to the second class of the doctrine to prevent a multiplicity of suits as denominated by the author in 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 245, where the dispute is between two individuals, and a number of suits are instituted or about to be instituted successively or simultaneously, all depending upon the same legal questions and similar issues of fact. Such a suit in equity was originally called a "bill of peace," the grounds and purposes of which are quoted in section 248 of Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, supra, as follows:

"In many cases, the courts of ordinary jurisdiction admit, at least for a certain time, of repeated attempts to litigate the same question. To put an end to the oppression occasioned by the abuse of this privilege, the courts of equity have assumed a jurisdiction."

Actions of ejectment are given as illustrations of the abuse against which equity intervened by denying further litigation "after repeated trials and satisfactory determinations of the question." Speaking further to this particular phase of the equitable doctrine here considered, the author, in section 254, says:

"In the second branch of the same class the single defendant has brought a number of simultaneous actions at law against the plaintiff, all depending upon similar facts and circumstances, and involving the same legal questions, so that the decision of one would virtually be a decision of all the others. A court of equity may then interfere and restrain the prosecution of these actions, so that the determination of all the matters at issue between the two parties may be brought within the scope of one judicial proceeding and one decree, and a multiplicity of suits may thereby be prevented. It must be admitted that this exercise of the equitable jurisdiction is somewhat extraordinary, since the rights and interests involved are wholly legal, and the substantial relief given by the court is also purely legal. It may be assumed, therefore, that a court of equity will not exercise jurisdiction on this particular ground, unless its interference is clearly necessary to promote the ends of justice, and to shield the plaintiff from a litigation which is evidently vexatious. It should be carefully observed that a court of equity does not interfere in this class of cases to restrain absolutely and completely any and all trials and decisions of the questions presented by the pending actions at law; it only intervenes to prevent the repeated or numerous trials, and to bring the whole within the scope and effect of one judicial investigation and decision."

We know of no analogous case in our decisions to that here considered, but the general principles as above noted are fully recognized in Moses v. Mayor, etc., of Mobile, 52 Ala. 198. In Roanoke Guano Co. v. Saunders, 56 So. 198, 199, 173 Ala. 347, 349, 350 (35 L.R.A.[ N.S.] 491), is the following language here pertinent:

"It has been stated by this court that it has never undertaken to define the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a multiplicity of suits, nor even to lay down the general principles governing the several categories of cases in which that jurisdiction may be invoked, but this court has evinced an inclination toward confining this jurisdiction to a narrow field, in order to conserve and preserve the right of trial by jury. Turner v. Mobile, 33 So. 132, 135 Ala. 124 [73], and cases there cited. Bills of this character are called bills in the nature of bills of peace, to quiet the rights of parties and to put an end to further litigation."

This authority also recognizes that "multiplicity of suits does not mean multitude of suits." See, also, 10 R.C.L. p. 283.

Viewed in the light of the origin of this equitable doctrine and the principles recognized in the foregoing authorities, we are of the opinion complainants' case is not brought within its influence. From a practical standpoint, these proceedings may be considered suits instituted by the city, however, as only in consequence of the statute, and give no indication whatever of any vexatious litigation on the part of the city. Reduced to its last analysis, the equitable doctrine in the instant case must rest upon the multitude of suits occasioned merely and...