City of Alcoa v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers Local Union 760, A.F.L.-C.I.O.

• Decision Date: 06 December 1957
• Citation: 7 McCanless 12,308 S.W.2d 476,203 Tenn. 12
• Parties: CITY OF ALCOA, a Municipal Corporation of Blount County, Tennessee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION 760, A.F.L.-C.I.O., et al. 7 McCanless 12, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 476

308 S.W.2d 476

CITY OF ALCOA, a Municipal Corporation of Blount County Tennessee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL UNION 760, A.F.L.-C.I.O., et al.

7 McCanless 12, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Dec. 6, 1957.

Joe Van Derveer, Chattanooga, and Van Derveer & Parks, Chattanooga, of counsel, for appellants.

Joe C. Gamble, and Goddard & Gamble, Maryville, E. H. Rayson and R. R. Kramer, Kramer, Dye, McNabb & Greenwood, Knoxville, of counsel, for appellee.

BURNETT, Justice.

The question involved in this lawsuit is: Does a union and its members have a right to strike and picket a municipality for whom they work in an effort to compel the municipality to enter into a collective bargaining agreement? The Chancellor answered the question in the negative. An appeal has been seasonably perfected, briefs filed and arguments heard. We now have the matter for determination.

This suit was filed as a result of the members of the captioned union striking and picketing in an effort to compel the City of Alcoa, a municipal corporation, to recognize and bargain with it as the agent of certain of the municipality's employees.

The bill was filed against the union and certain of its representatives and members seeking to enjoin this picketing and patrolling an office of the municipality. This was the office of the electric distribution system which was city property and operated by the city and was at or near the places where the employees of the electric distribution system were performing maintenance work. The bill also sought to enjoin the union from coercing the City into recognizing the union as the bargaining agent for these electrical employees.

A temporary injunction was issued and an answer filed. Upon the hearing to dissolve the injunction the answer was amended and the cause was heard on bill and answer. After this hearing the Chancellor entered a permanent injunction in which it was:

'ordered that the defendants, their agent or representatives, may not by acts or otherwise cause, authorize, induce, or engage in a strike against the complainant and may not picket the premises of the complainant in any way. * * *

'It is further Ordered however that in the modification of the injunction the defendants may contact, talk to, negotiate, and bargain with the complainant.'

The City of Alcoa is a municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee. The defendants are the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 760, a labor organization, and certain of its representatives and certain employees of the City who are representative of the class of employees engaged in the strike.

The employees are the employees of the Blount Electric System, a department of the City of Alcoa and the instrumentality through which the City of Alcoa operates a retail electric distribution system. The electric system serves industrial, military and residential properties in the City of Alcoa and a large area surrounding, including the McGhee-Tyson Airport wherein airplanes from all over the country come and depart. In connection therewith the Federal Government, at the time of this writing, has a squadron of airplanes for the purpose of patrolling the area.

The physical properties of this electric system at one time belonged to a private corporation. During the time that these properties belonged to this private corporation there existed a collective bargaining agreement between this private corporation and a union. Subsequent to the acquiring of this system by the City of Alcoa there had been no bargaining agreement by the City or the electric system with any labor organization.

On June 17, 1957, the defendant union through its agents induced a number of the electric system's employees to engage in a strike. The purpose of this strike was to compel the recognition of the union as the bargaining agent of the employees, to compel the execution of a collective bargaining agreement, and to compel the reinstatement of a laid-off employee.

The strike was accompanied by picketing and patrolling at the office of the electric system and the pickets also followed employees of the system to their places of employment.

There are two contentions made, the first of which is that the court erred in taking jurisdiction of the matter because under the doctrine of pre-emption as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Garner v. Teamster's Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228, the Chancery Court did not have jurisdiction to determine the questions involved in this controversy; and that under the very recent cases of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 25, 1957, 77 S.Ct. 598, 353 U.S. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 601, and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc., v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., decided the same day and reported in 77 S.Ct. 604, 353 U.S. 20, 1 L.Ed.2d 613, the jurisdiction for the question here involved was with the National Labor Relations Board and not in the State court. It is the contention of the labor union and those likewise situated that the Chancery Court should have held as did the Chancery Court in Lodge Mfg. Co. v. Gilbert, 195 Tenn. 403, 260 S.W.2d 158, 156, when this Court said:

'This is strictly within the scope and purview of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley) [29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 141 et seq.]; nor has the court any authority to determine whether or not an employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice, or if any strike is lawful or unlawful.'

If the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 151 et seq. was applicable to the situation here of course corresponding rights and procedures under State law could not be invoked. Insofar as we can find or has been pointed out to us the doctrine of preemption has never been applied in a case where the dispute involves the employer and employee relations of a municipal corporation and municipal employees. The National Labor Relations Act was passed to regulate employer-employee relations of certain private employers and their employees and as we see it not in respect to the employer-employee relations of 'any State or political subdivision thereof.'

The Congress of the United States in enacting the National Labor Relations Act as amended, has excluded from the operation of this Act municipal corporations such as the City of Alcoa. In the Act the term 'employer' is defined in Section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (29 U.S.C.A Sec. 152(2):

'The term 'employer' * * * shall not include * * * any State or political subdivision * * *'.

And in Section 2(3) of said Act the term 'employee' is defined as follows (29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 152(3):

'The term 'employee' shall not include * * * any individual employed * * * by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.'

Since the Act expressly excludes political subdivisions we can hardly see how this doctrine of pre-emption under any stretch of the imagination or discretion of the labor board could here apply.

In Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 168 P.2d 741, 745, that Court in speaking of the propositions we are considering said:

'* * * Congress did not recognize the existence of the right of collective bargaining in public employment and did not consider it necessary to adopt a national policy which would extend into the field of public employment.'

Two cases have been cited to us in the brief of the appellees wherein the National Labor Relations Board has definitely recognized the absence of a statutory basis to direct an election by the employees where the employer involved is a municipality or other political subdivision of a State. These two cases are: In Matter of New Jersey Turnpike Authority, Case No. 4-RC-2245, decided April 16, 1954, 33 L.R.R.M. 1528, and Matter of City of Anchorage, Alaska, Case No. 19-RC-1300, decided August 17, 1953, 32 L.R.R.M. 1549. It seems in view of this fact if the union and those in the position that it takes herein were to file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (under the facts of this case) that Board would undoubtedly refuse the action as it did in the two instances above.

The National Labor Relations Act does not apply to the issues involved in the present controversy.

We now come to the question whether under the law in this State the union and its employees have a right to strike and picket a municipality or City in this State in an effort to compel the City or municipality to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. First, we in this State where the doctrine of pre-emption is not applicable have the right and duty to enjoin a strike and picketing if such picketing is unlawful and against public policy.

It is argued by the union that this is peaceful picketing and since it is peaceful picketing it cannot be enjoined. It is not the contention of the City that the picketing was violent but it was their position that the strike and picketing here is unlawful and that this being true that picketing may be enjoined because of the illegality of its purpose.

In the recent case of Pruitt v. Lambert, Tenn., 298 S.W.2d 795, 798, this Court said:

'It is established that the right is not unqualified and may be forfeited (1) where picketing is accompanied by violence under such circumstances as to be accompained by violence or mass picketing of such a nature as to justify prohibiting all picketing as in...