City of Altamont v. Finkle, 48627

Decision Date10 June 1978
Docket NumberNo. 48627,48627
Citation579 P.2d 712,224 Kan. 221
PartiesCITY OF ALTAMONT, Kansas, Appellee, v. Kenneth L. FINKLE, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A complaint or information under which a defendant is charged with a criminal offense must charge an offense under the statute with enough clarity and detail to inform the defendant of the criminal act with which he is charged.

2. A complaint, even though phrased in the words of the statute and not attacked on a constitutional basis, may still be void if it does not advise the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him.

3. A complaint, in the form of a citation issued for an alleged violation of a city traffic ordinance, which charged the defendant with an unlawful "exhibition of speed" and nothing more is void as it fails to adequately inform the defendant of the charges against him.

Charles F. Forsyth, Erie, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

John F. Amos, Oswego, was on the brief for appellee.

HOLMES, Justice:

This is an appeal by defendant-appellant, Kenneth L. Finkle, from a conviction by the court of a violation of Section 37 of Ordinance No. 248, of the City of Altamont. Ordinance No. 248 is the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities prepared by The League of Kansas Municipalities.

Section 37 reads:

"Sec. 37. Racing on Highways; 'Drag Race' and 'Racing' Defined. (a) No person shall drive any vehicle in any race, speed competition or contest, drag race or acceleration contest, test of physical endurance, exhibition of speed or acceleration, or for the purpose of making a record, and no person shall in any manner participate in any such race, competition, contest, test or exhibition.

"(b) For the purpose of this section, the term drag race means the operation of two (2) or more vehicles from a point side by side at accelerating speeds in a competitive attempt to out-distance each other, or the operation of one (1) or more vehicles over a common selected course from the same point to the same point, for the purpose of comparing the relative speeds or power of acceleration of such vehicle or vehicles within a certain distance or time limit.

"(c) For the purpose of this section, the term racing means the use of one (1) or more vehicles in an attempt to outgain, out-distance or prevent another vehicle from passing, to arrive at a given destination ahead of another vehicle or vehicles, or to test the physical stamina or endurance of drivers over long distance driving routes."

This section of the ordinance is similar to K.S.A. 8-1565(a ), (b ) and (c ).

Defendant was charged, by citation, on a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint with driving his automobile in an unlawful "exhibition of speed." Defendant, at all stages of the proceedings in both the Municipal Court and District Court, contended the citation failed to charge a crime under the ordinance. While defendant does not question the constitutionality of the ordinance itself, he does contend that an allegation of "exhibition of speed" fails to state a crime and is so vague and indefinite that a person charged in such terms could not be expected to understand the nature and elements of the alleged violation.

We agree.

In the instant case there was no evidence of racing or drag racing as defined in the statute. There was no evidence of any race, competition, contest or test. The only evidence was the testimony of a city police officer. The officer testified that while off-duty he observed the defendant drive his automobile from a parked position at the curb, spin his tires, throw some gravel and turn the corner at a speed of 10 to 15 miles per hour. The officer described this activity as a "jackrabbit start." During cross-examination the officer answered questions as follows:

"Q. All right. Now, do you of your own knowledge know what comprises exhibition of speed? What does that mean?

"A. Squealing your tires, fishtailing the rear end of your car, jackrabbit starts.

"Q. Is there some provision in the City of Altamont against that?

"A. Well, under the Ordinance 248 which the City adopted of the State Statute.

"Q. That ordinance defines drag racing; is that correct?

"A. Defines drag racing, racing, racing on highways; drag racing, racing defined. But it also covers exhibition of speed or acceleration.

"Q. Does that involve two cars?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Or long distance endurance driving?

"A. It don't state this not in here.

"Q. That's in your opinion?

"A. In my opinion, yes.

"Q. So in your opinion, if someone squeals his tires, he can be charged with exhibition of acceleration?

"A. Yes, sir. I would think it would be highly possible to take off from a corner, curb or from a stop sign without having to spin your tires."

The question of the sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint or information has been before this court numerous times in a variety of situations.

In State v. Williams, 196 Kan. 274, 411 P.2d 591 (1966), the court said:

"It is elementary that an information under which a defendant is charged with a criminal offense must be legally sufficient, in that it must charge an offense under the statute with enough clarity and detail to inform the defendant of the criminal act with which he is charged. . . ." (at page 285, 411 P.2d at page 600.)

The test to be applied to a criminal statute or ordinance when attacked as being vague and indefinite was recently repeated in State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1, 563 P.2d 408 (1977):

". . . The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice. If a statute conveys this warning it is not void for vagueness. Conversely, a statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so...

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20 cases
  • State v. Crane, 71905
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • June 7, 1996
    ...must be stated with enough clarity and detail to inform a defendant of the criminal act with which he is charged. City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 579 P.2d 712 (1978). The failure to so inform the defendant denies the defendant procedural due process and violates his right to be in......
  • State v. Weniger
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • September 13, 1984
    ...sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by common understanding and practice". City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 223, 579 P.2d 712 (1978), as cited in City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 226 Kan. 383 at 393, 598 P.2d .... '.... Even the terms of a pena......
  • State v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • March 31, 1979
    ...test to be applied to a criminal statute when attacked as being vague and indefinite was recently repeated in City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 223, 579 P.2d 712 (1978): " '. . . The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and......
  • State v. Huffman
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • June 14, 1980
    ...P.2d 232, "unjustifiable physical pain"; State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. at 4, 563 P.2d 408, "endangering of life"; and City of Altamont v. Finkle, 224 Kan. 221, 579 P.2d 712 (1978), "exhibition of speed or acceleration." The examples of vague language in the Kansas cases cited by the appellee are......
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