City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 13 January 1959
• Citation: 51 Cal.2d 423,333 P.2d 745
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents, Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (a Corporation), et al., Real Parties in Interest. L. A. 25113.

Page 745

333 P.2d 745

51 Cal.2d 423

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents, Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc. (a Corporation), et al., Real Parties in Interest.

L. A. 25113.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Jan. 13, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 11, 1959.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., and Weldon L. Weber, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for petitioners.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Wm. E. Lamoreaux, Asst. County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

Joe Crider, Jr., O'Melveny & Myers and Pierce Works, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc.

Julius Ruben, in pro. per., and Phill Silver, Hollywood, for Real Parties in Interest Ruben and Kirshbaum.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

By this proceeding in prohibition the city of Los Angeles seeks to restrain the superior court from enforcing a preliminary injunction or taking further action in a taxpayer's suit to enjoin certification of the result of a referendum election.

The city council adopted an ordinance authorizing execution of a contract between the city and the Brooklyn National League Baseball Club, Inc., which provided, among other things, for the exchange of certain properties and for the ball club to erect a stadium and procure the transfer from Brooklyn to Los Angeles of the franchise of the major league baseball club known as the 'Dodgers.' Following the filing of a referendary petition, the city council voted to place the ordinance on the ballot for approval or disapproval by the voters, and at the ensuing election a majority of the voters favored adoption of the ordinance. Thereafter respondent superior court granted a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction restraining the city council from declaring the result of the election.

Two prior actions were filed by some of the real parties in interest. One was brought to secure a declaration that the ordinance and contract were invalid and to enjoin any proceedings thereunder (Ruben v. City of Los Angeles, L.A. Superior Court No. 687210); in the other similar relief was sought together with mandamus and prohibition (Kirshbaum v. Housing Authority, L.A. Superior Court No. 699077). Judgments were rendered enjoining the execution of the contract, and appeals therefrom are now pending in this court. In a third action filed by Kirshbaum against the city, a preliminary injunction was issued enjoining certification of the result of the referendum election. (Kirshbaum v. City of Los Angeles, L.A. Superior Court No. 703023.) This proceeding was then brought by the city to prohibit the superior court from enforcing the preliminary injunction or from taking further steps in the third action.

The writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings of a court when there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and when the proceedings of the court are without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1102, 1103. The absence of another adequate remedy was determined by this court when we granted an alternative writ. Cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 342, 316 P.2d 960; Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 574, 582, 283 P.2d 704. To permit the issuance of prohibition it is not necessary that there be a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in the fundamental sense but only that there be a want or excess of the power of the court as defined by statute or by rules developed and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis. Tide Water Associated Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.2d 815, 821, 279 P.2d 35; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 287 et seq., 109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715.

Subdivision 7 of section 3423 of the Civil Code and the second subdivision 7 of section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide that an injunction cannot be granted to 'prevent a legislative act by a municipal corporation.' Subdivision 4 of section 3423 of the Civil Code and the second subdivision 4 of section 526 of the Code of Civil Procedure similarly provide that an injunction cannot be granted to 'prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.' The basis for these statutory provisions is to be found in the doctrine of separation of powers of government into three independent departments. See Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 682, 154 P. 845; Glide v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 21, 24 et seq., 81 P. 225.

A court acts in excess of its jurisdiction if it attempts to enjoin the enactment or enforcement of a valid public statute or ordinance. Financial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.2d 395, 402, 289 P.2d 233; Santa Clara County v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.2d 552, 557-559, 203 P.2d 1; Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal. 672, 676, 681-682, 154 P. 845; Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 241, 92 P. 353; Glide v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 21, 23 et seq., 81 P. 225; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.App.2d 346, 352 et seq., 77 P.2d 491; State Board of Equalization v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.App.2d 374, 378, 42 P.2d 1076; cf. Moore v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.2d 421, 424, 57 P.2d 1314. Although prohibition should not issue where the propriety of the trial court's action depends upon questions of fact (Brock v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 682, 687 et seq., 81 P.2d 931; Agricultural Prorate Comm. v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.2d 550, 586-587, 55 P.2d 495), none of the persons attacking the contract has pointed to any evidence which would present a substantial question of fact upon a material issue. It follows that prohibition will lie to test the validity of the ordinance.

The contract, as set forth in Ordinance No. 110,204, provides that the city will convey to the ball club 185 acres, more or less, of land presently owned by it in Chavez Ravine and will use its best efforts to acquire at a reasonable cost and convey additional land to make a total of about 300 acres, reserving, among other things, an oil drilling site not to exceed five acres, the location of the site to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. Title to 40 acres of the 300, to be designated by the ball club, is to be retained by the city for 20 years to assure performance by the ball club of its obligations to provide and maintain certain recreational facilities during that period, after which title is to be conveyed to the club.

The city is to employ its best efforts to have eliminated or modified a deed provision restricting the use of certain property acquired by the city from the Los Angeles Housing Authority, provided that if the city is unable to have the restriction altered to permit the use contemplated by the ball club, the contract shall be of no further effect. Upon conveyance of the property to the club, existing public streets therein no longer needed for street purposes will be vacated, and the city, upon demand of the ball club, is to commerce proceedings to vacate such streets and deliver title to the club. Prior to passage of title to any of the 300 acres, the city is to spend up to but not to exceed $2,000,000, in the manner to be designated by the ball club, to place such property in a proper condition to convey to the ball club. The city also is to perform certain acts with respect to construction of additional streets, rezoning the property, and obtaining funds from the county for access roads.

The ball club agrees to construct on the Chavez Ravine property, at its expense, a modern baseball stadium seating at least 50,000 people. It will move to Los Angeles 'the present Brooklyn National League franchise and ball team known as the 'Dodgers." Further, the club will convey to the city the land and improvements known as Wrigley Field, reserving the right to use of the field until the stadium is completed, conditioned upon payment of a rental to be mutually agreed upon.

Recreational facilities costing not over $500,000 are to be constructed by the ball club on the 40-acre portion of the Chavez Ravine property referred to above, such facilities to be mutually agreed upon prior to conveyance of the property. The club is to maintain the recreational facilities on the 40-acre parcel at an annual cost of $60,000, and in the event the maintenance does not amount to that much in any year, the club is to pay the city the difference between $60,000 and the actual cost. The ball club is under no obligation to furnish personnel for the operation of the recreational facilities, and, with certain exceptions, the city is to have control of them.

In addition, the agreement contains a number of recitals of fact and declarations of policy to the general effect that the contract will be beneficial to the city and that the property which the city now owns and is to convey to the ball club is no longer required for the use of the city.

The city reserves all mineral rights in the Chavez Ravine property, and it is to acquire all mineral rights in Wrigley Field. The agreement directs that one-half of the receipts from the mineral rights is to be placed by the city in a special trust fund and expended solely for the purpose of providing and maintaining recreational facilities to promote the youth program of the ball club, the location and type of facilities to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. The ball club has given formal notice to the city that the club has waived and relinquished all rights conferred upon it under these provisions and has assigned to the city all such rights. The provisions being solely for the benefit of the club, it could properly waive them, and there is no longer any reason to treat them as parts of the contract.

The benefits to be received by the city are apparent, and the adequacy of the consideration, which involves the comparative values of the promises of the parties, is a matter which, in...