City of Los Angeles v. Gage
| Citation | 274 P.2d 34,127 Cal.App.2d 442 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 16 September 1954 |
| Parties | The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. A. I. GAGE and A. I. Gage Plumbing Supply Company, Inc., a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 19998. |
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Alan G. Campbell, Asst. City Attys., Alfred E. Rogers, Deputy City Atty., for appellant.
Clyde P. Harrell, Jr., Tarzana, for respondents.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the provisions of a zoning ordinance which require that certain nonconforming existing uses shall be discontinued within five years after its passage, as they apply to defendants' property.
Plaintiff brought this suit for an injunction to to command defendants to discontinue their use of certain property for the conduct of a plumbing business and to remove various materials therefrom, and to restrain them from using the property for any purpose not permitted by the comprehensive zoning plan provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. The cause was submitted to the trial court on admissions in the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. Defendants will be referred to as 'Gage.'
In 1930 Gage acquired adjoining lots 220 and 221 located on Cochran Avenue in Los Angeles. He constructed a two-family residential building on lot 221 and rented the upper half solely for residential purposes. He established a wholesale and retail plumbing supply business on the property. He used a room in the lower half of the residential building on lot 221 as the office for the conduct of the business, and the rest of the lower half for residential purposes for himself and his family; he used a garage on lot 221 for the storage of plumbing supplies and materials; and he constructed and used racks, bins, and stalls for the storage of such supplies and materials on lot 220. Later Gage incorporated defendant company. The realty and the assets of the plumbing business were transferred to the company. The case is presented as though the property had been owned continuously from 1930 to date by the same defendant. The use of lots 220 and 221 begun in 1930, has been substantially the same at all times since.
In 1930 the two lots and other property facing on Cochran Avenue in their vicinity were classified in 'C' zone by the zoning ordinance then in effect. Under this classification the use to which Gage put the property was permitted. Shortly after Gage acquired lots 220 and 221, they were classified in 'C-3' zone and the use to which he put the property was expressly permitted. In 1936 the city council of the city passed Ordinance 77,000 which contained a comprehensive zoning plan for the city. Ordinance 77,000 re-enacted the prior ordinances with respect to the use of lots 220 and 221. In 1941 the city council passed Ordinance 85,015 by the terms of which the use of a residential building for the conduct of an office in connection with the plumbing supply business was permitted. Ordinance 85,015 prohibited the open storage of materials in zone 'C-3' but permitted such uses as had been established to continue as nonconforming uses. The use to which lots 220 and 221 was put by defendants was a nonconforming use that might be continued. In 1946 the city council passed Ordinance 90,500. This ordinance reclassified lots 220 and 221 and other property fronting on Cochran Avenue in their vicinity from zone 'C-3' to zone 'R-4' (Multiple dwelling zone). Use of lots 220 and 221 for the conduct of a plumbing business was not permitted in zone 'R-4.' At the time Ordinance 90,500 was passed, and at all times since, the Los Angeles Municipal Code (§ 12.23 B & C) provided: '(a) The nonconforming use of a conforming building or structure may be continued, except that in the 'R' Zones any nonconforming commercial or industrial use of a residential building or residential accessory building shall be discontinued within five (5) years from June 1, 1946, or five (5) years from the date the use becomes nonconforming, whichever date is later. * * *
'(a) The nonconforming use of land shall be discontinued within five (5) years from June 1, 1946, or within five (5) years from the date the use became nonconforming, in each of the following cases: (1) where no buildings are employed in connection with such use; (2) where the only buildings employed are accessory or incidental to such use; (3) where such use is maintained in connection with a conforming building.'
Prior to the passage of Ordinance 90,500, about 50% of the city had been zoned. It was the first ordinance which 'attempted to zone the entire corporate limits of the city.' Prior to its passage, several thousand exceptions and variances, were granted from restrictive provisions of prior ordinances, some of which permitted commercial use of property zoned for residential use, 'and in some cases permitted the use of land for particular purposes like or similar to use of subject property which otherwise would have been prohibited.' Under Ordinance 90,500, the uses permitted by these exceptions and variances that did not carry a time limit may be continued indefinitely.
The business conducted by Gage on the property has produced a gross revenue varying between $125,000 and $350,000 a year. If he is required to abandon the use of the property for his business, he will be put to the following expenses:
The noise and disturbance caused by the loading and unloading of supplies, trucking, and the going and coming of workmen in connection with the operation of a plumbing business with an open storage yard is greater than the noise and disturbance that is normal in a district used solely for residential purposes.
The court found: the business conducted by Gage has a substantial value; he could not, either prior to June 1, 1951, or at any time thereafter or in the future, remove the business without substantial loss or expense; the value of Gage's property has not been increased or stabilized by the passage of Ordinance 90,500, nor will observance or enforcement of the ordinance increase the value of the property; the use of the property for the purpose that it has been used continuously since 1930 will not adversely and detrimentally effect the use or value of other property in the neighborhood thereof; the use to which the property has been put by Gage has not been unsanitary, unsightly, noisy, or otherwise incompatible with the legal uses of adjoining property; Gage has not, nor will he in the future, operate to disturb the peace and quiet of the residents of the neighborhood as long as the property is operated substantially as it was operated at the date of the filing of the complaint; the use to which the property has been put does not interfere with the lawful and reasonable use of the streets and alleys in the vicinity by the residents in the neighborhood or others entitled thereto.
The court concluded: Gage became vested with the right to use the property for the purpose that it was used; insofar as the Los Angeles Municipal Code purports to require the abandonment of the use of the building on lot 221 as an office for the plumbing and plumbing supply business or the use of lot 220 for the open storage of plumbing supplies in the manner that it has been and is being used by Gage, it is void and of no legal effect; Ordinance 90,500 is void insofar as it affects Gage's use of the property in that ir deprives him of a vested right to use the property for the purpose it has been used continuously since 1930 and deprives him of property without due process of law. Judgment was that plaintiff take nothing. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff contends that the mandatory discontinuance of a nonconforming use after a fixed period is a reasonable exercise of the police power, and that on the agreed facts the Los Angeles ordinance is a valid exercise of such power as applied to Gage's property. Gage does not question the validity of the ordinance as a whole, but he contends it may not be constitutionally applied to require the removal of his existing business. He asserts that under Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14, the decision of the trial court was correct.
When a cause is submitted to a trial court on an agreed statement of facts without any other evidence, findings of fact are unnecessary; the only question before the trial court is the law applicable to the agreed facts; and on review any findings of fact may be disregarded. Crawford v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 335, 253 P. 726. However, where the stipulation sets forth evidentiary material only, it is proper for the trial court to make findings of the ultimate facts. Taylor v. George, 34 Cal.2d 552, 556, 212 P.2d 505. In the present case the agreed facts consist of admissions in the answer and the stipulation of facts comprising evidentiary material only, including a number of exhibits which are photographs of defendants' property and property in its vicinity and a map showing the uses made of all of the property within 500 feet in all directions from lots 220 and 221. If the findings are supported by any substantial evidence the judgment may not be disturbed. However, if only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the agreed facts and that conclusion is that Ordinance 90,500 is a valid...
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