City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSULLIVAN; WRIGHT
CitationCity of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.Rptr. 15, 8 Cal.3d 723, 505 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1973)
Decision Date26 January 1973
Parties, 505 P.2d 207 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; Roy L. BURNS, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 30048. In Bank

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., John A. Daly and Jack L. Wells, Asst. City Attys., and John B. Rice, Deputy City Atty., for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Milton L. Most, Hollywood, and Stanley Sapiro, Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Petitioner, the City of Los Angeles (City) seeks a writ of prohibition restraining respondent superior court from taking further action in a mandamus proceeding pending therein.

The facts in brief are as follows. On January 4, 1971, real party in interest Roy L. Burns (Burns), a police officer of the City, was discharged from the police department after a hearing before a board of rights as provided by section 202 1 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles. On March 21, 1972, Burns commenced against the City and Edward M. Davis, its chief of police, the underlying special proceeding for a writ of mandate commanding them to reinstate him in the position from which he had been discharged.

The City and the chief of police moved for a summary judgment on the ground that Burns had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in that prior to seeking judicial relief, he had not filed a demand for reinstatement or a claim for compensation as required by section 112 1/2 of the charter. Burns opposed the motion. He did not deny that he had failed to comply with section 112 1/2 but contended that the section did not bar his action for the following reasons: (1) that section 112 1/2 does not apply to police officers under any circumstances; (2) that if it is deemed to have Some application to police officers, then it applies to officers who Resign from the department, and not to officers who are Discharged from the department after a board of rights hearing as provided in section 202; and (3) that in any event the City and the chief of police were estopped to assert Burns' noncompliance with section 112 1/2 as a bar since they had led him to believe that section 202 set forth 'the whole of his rights' and 'constituted the sole method of seeking a rehearing after discharge by the Police Department.' 2 The trial court denied the motion. The City thereupon filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition.

As we said in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1959) 51 Cal.2d 423, 429, 333 P.2d 745, 748: 'The writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to arrest the proceedings of a court when there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and when the proceedings of the court are without or in excess of its jurisdiction. (Citation.) The absence of another adequate remedy was determined by this court when we granted an alternative writ. (Citations.)' (See also City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 236, 240, 1 Cal.Rptr. 158, 347 P.2d 294.) The ultimate question which we face is whether in view of Burns' undisputed noncompliance with section 112 1/2, respondent superior court will act in excess of its jurisdiction by proceeding with the mandamus action now pending before it.

We consider first the contention made by Burns that section 112 1/2 does not apply to police officers under any circumstances. He states that since subdivision (b) of section 112 expressly excludes police officers from the application of the provisions in subdivision (a) of section 112, it also, by implication, excludes them from the application of section 112 1/2. It is urged that not only is the procedure for removal, suspension, or discharge of police officers distinct from the termination of other civil service employees, but that the procedure for a rehearing is wholly separate. In addition, Burns argues, there is no logical reason to require that a demand for reinstatement be filed with the board of civil service commissioners under section 112 1/2 when a policeman's right of reinstatement is Not determined by the Commissioners but by a Board of rights under section 202.

At the outset we note that section 112 and 112 1/2 are found in article IX of the charter entitled 'Civil Service'; section 202 is found in article XIX of the charter entitled 'Police Department.' Subdivision (a) of section 112, applicable to all civil service employees except firemen and policemen, provides in pertinent part: 'Any board or officer having the power of appointment of officers, members and employees in any department of the government of the city shall have the power to remove, discharge or suspend any officer, member or employee of such department . . ..' Generally speaking such action is subject to review and final disposition by the board of civil service commissioners which 'shall proceed to investigate the grounds for such removal, discharge or suspension.' Subdivision (b) 3 of the same section expressly excludes police officers from the procedure for removal, discharge or suspension stated in subdivision (a). Instead, the procedure for termination or suspension of police officers is established by section 202. 4

Section 112 1/2 provides in part: 'Whenever it is claimed by any person that he has been unlawfully suspended, laid off or discharged, and that such layoff, suspension or discharge is ineffective for any reason, any claim for compensation must be made and a demand for reinstatement must be presented in writing within ninety days following the date on which it is claimed that such person was first illegally, wrongfully or invalidly laid off, suspended or discharged. Such demand for reinstatement must be filed with the Board of Civil Service Commissioners and such claim for compensation for such allegedly wrongful, illegal or erroneous discharge must be filed with the City Clerk. Failure to file such demand for reinstatement within the time herein specified Shall be a bar to any action to compel such reinstatement and proof of filing such a demand for reinstatement must be completed and proved a condition precedent to the maintenance of any action for reinstatement.' (Italics added.)

Not only does section 112 1/2 require, by its terms, the filing of a demand for reinstatement with the board of civil service commissioners as a condition precedent to judicial action, but it has also been construed to provide a basis for a rehearing. In Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 716, 722, 160 P.2d 816 819, involving a discharged employee of the City's department of water and power, this court said that '(r)ead as a whole it (section 112 1/2) is concerned with fixing a time limit and formalities necessary as a basis for court action, presupposing that the procedure before the board has been followed. The demand may be somewhat analogous to the requirement of a petition for a rehearing addressed to the board. The board is given an additional opportunity to pass upon the issue before resort is had to the courts.' (See also Tennant v. Civil Service Com. (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 489, 496, 175 P.2d 568.)

Similarly, section 202, subdivision (16) provides for a rehearing in any case of removal of a police officer after a board of rights hearing under section 202. Subdivision (16) states in part, 'At any time within three (3) years after any case of removal as hereinabove provided, the officer or employee so removed may file his request with the Chief of Police to be reheard or to be heard on the cause of his removal . . .. If good reason or cause appears therefor, the Chief of Police must, without unnecessary delay, cause a Board of Rights to be constituted . . . for the purpose of hearing and deciding upon the matter.'

In summary, a police officer is removed by a board of rights convened under section 202. A rehearing is provided by subdivision (16) of the same section. Other civil service employees (except firemen) are removed by the board of civil service commissioners under section 112, subdivision (a) of the charter. A rehearing is provided by section 112 1/2.

However, even though the procedure for removal of a police officer may be wholly distinct from similar action taken against civil service employees generally, it does not necessarily follow that section 112 1/2 is entirely inapplicable to police officers with respect to its requirement for filing a demand for reinstatement prior to seeking judicial relief.

In Moreno v. Cairns (1942) 20 Cal.2d 531, 127 P.2d 914, this court considered the question whether section 112 1/2 is a bar to judicial action by a fireman 5 employed by the City of Los Angeles. There, a fireman who sought reinstatement of his position alleging that he had resigned under 'duress,' failed to file a demand for reinstatement as required by section 112 1/2. We held that the allegation of an involuntary resignation was 'tantamount to an unlawful discharge within the meaning of section 112 1/2 of the city charter,' (20 Cal.2d at p. 535, 127 P.2d at p. 917) and that the failure of the fireman to comply with section 112 1/2 was a bar to judicial action.

Thus, Moreno illustrates that section 112 1/2, while applicable to the general class of civil service employees mentioned in subdivision (a) of section 112, is also applicable to Some employees--namely members of the police and fire departments who are excluded from the application of section 112 (see § 112, subd. (b); see fn. 5, Ante). Cases following the decision of this court in Moreno have also held that section 112 1/2 is applicable to police officers claiming a coerced resignation. (See, e.g., McLeod v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 693, 64 Cal.Rptr. 394; City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Heckl) (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 73, 54 Cal.Rptr. 442; Varela v. Bd. of Police Comm. (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 816, 238 P.2d 62; and Temple v. Horrall (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d...

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6 cases
  • Schifando v. City of Los Angeles
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 29, 2002
    ...(Heckl) (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 73, 75-76, 54 Cal.Rptr. 442, disapproved on another ground in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Burns) (1973) 8 Cal.3d 723, 732, 106 Cal.Rptr. 15, 505 P.2d 207; see Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 86, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d Allowing the administra......
  • Duffy v. State Bd. of Equalization
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 1984
    ...and ruled on, the purpose of administrative review of these contentions was satisfied. 3 (See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 723, 731, 106 Cal.Rptr. 15, 505 P.2d 207.) However as we point out in part IV, post, plaintiff's failure to cooperate with the Board bars other......
  • Board of Police Commissioners v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 20, 1985
    ...v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 73, 75-76, 54 Cal.Rptr. 442, disapproved on other grounds City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 723, 732, 106 Cal.Rptr. 15, 505 P.2d 207; Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 835, 841, 116 Cal.Rptr.......
  • Schifando v. City of La.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 26, 2002
    ...of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Heckl) (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 73, 75-76, disapproved on another ground in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Burns) (1973) 8 Cal.3d 723, 732; see Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, Allowing the administrative agency or organization an opportunity to red......
  • Get Started for Free