City of Annapolis v. Waterman
| Decision Date | 07 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 37,37 |
| Citation | 357 Md. 484,745 A.2d 1000 |
| Parties | CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. Mareen WATERMAN et ux. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Paul Garvey Goetzke, City Attorney, Annapolis; Jonathan P. Kagan (Rignal W. Baldwin, Jr., Brassel & Baldwin, P.A., on
brief), Annapolis, for petitioner/cross-respondent.
William M. Simmons, Annapolis, for respondents/cross-petitioners.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.
Appellant, the City of Annapolis (City), appeals from a decision of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which principally involves the City's subdivision approval process as it applies to the three-phase, twenty-year plus processing of a residential development proposed by appellees, Mareen D. Waterman and Marian Waterman. Appellees filed suit against the City alleging that certain conditions contained in the subdivision approval applicable to their property constituted an unconstitutional taking of that property. Appellees' complaint alleged in relevant part:
Appellant presents the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether the lower court erred in finding that conditions one and two of City of Annapolis Resolution No. R-47-95 constituted a "dedication" of a portion of appellees' property to the City as a public "mini-park."
II. Whether the lower court erred in failing to apply the "nonsegmentation" principle in its takings analysis by focusing only on proposed Lot 1 (the corner piece of the Parkway property) and not on the entire Parkway property.[1]
III. Whether the lower court erred in finding that conditions one and two of City of Annapolis Resolution No. R-47-95 constituted an unconstitutional taking despite the fact that appellees had not lost all economically viable use of their property.
IV. Whether the lower court erred in finding that conditions one and two of City of Annapolis Resolution No. R-47-95 failed to meet the Supreme Court's "rough proportionality test," and thus, constituted an unconstitutional taking.
V. Whether the lower court erred in awarding damages dating back to May 21, 1992 ... when the cause of action did not accrue until the passage of Resolution No. R-47-95 on December 11, 1995.
VI. Whether the lower court erred in calculating damages on the value of the entire Section III of the Parkway property (valued at $328,000), instead of on the value of Lot One (valued at $40,000) that was the only portion (a)ffected by conditions one and two of City of Annapolis Resolution No. R-47-95.
Appellees/Cross-Appellants pose several questions that appear to be counter arguments to appellant's questions, rather than separate questions. We shall treat them as arguments and address them, as necessary, in our discussion of the questions presented by appellant. Moreover, because we answer appellant's first three questions in the affirmative, and accordingly reverse the erroneous decision of the trial court, it is unnecessary to address appellant's remaining questions, or to address any of appellees' questions separately.
Appellees purchased a three-acre triangular tract of land in Annapolis in the mid-1970's for the purpose of developing it. They proposed to develop the land, called "Parkway," in three phases. The last phase was designated as "Lot 4" during the second phase of development. While seeking subdivision approval of the first phase, appellees agreed to provide, in the subsequent phases of the subdivision, at least 2,375 square feet of recreational space for the use of the first-phase residents. Thus, the parties agreed to defer creating the recreational space needed for the first-phase residents until a later date. The language of the 1976 resolution stated in pertinent part "[t]hat the developer agree[s] to provide 2375 square feet of recreational space in an appropriate location as part of the future development of his remaining adjacent land in addition to any recreational area required by that development." City of Annapolis Resolution R-20-76 (Apr. 12, 1976) (emphasis added). In other words, the recreational area now at issue was required as a condition for approval of phase one (or Section I) in 1976. In return for not being required to provide, at that time, recreational area within Section I for the use of Section I residents, appellees agreed to provide it in a future phase of development, in addition to providing recreational space for the needs of the residents of those future phases.
No timely challenge was made to the 1976 imposition of the future recreational area requirement. The parties to the agreement left the exact location of the agreed upon recreational space open for future approval. To some extent, the time of determining the specific location of the recreational space was dependent upon the development phase in which appellees chose to perform their part of the agreement. They put off creating the recreational space required for Section I until seeking subdivision approval for the last phase, Section III.
The 1976 agreement was incorporated as a condition into Resolution R-20-76 approving the first-phase subdivision. The following year, phase two was approved and developed. It did not contain the recreational space that appellees had agreed to provide for the first-phase residents. At that time, the remaining two contiguous triangular parcels were combined as Lot 4.
The third, and final, phase was submitted for subdivision approval in 1990. In this phase, appellees proposed to subdivide the final .87-acre parcel, Lot 4, of the development into five new lots. The five new lots were to be created from two contiguous triangular parcels that had been identified during the second phase of development as Lot 4. Four parcels of the final-phase subdivision were designated to be developed as eight duplex units. These four parcels were contained on one of the triangular parcels within Lot 4. The other triangular part of the original Lot 4 was redesignated on the proposed third-phase subdivision plat as new "Lot 1." The proposed new Lot 1 was located on the corner of Tyler Avenue and Hilltop Lane and consisted of 5,538 square feet. The proposed third-phase subdivision indicated that new Lot 1 would be used for a single-family residence.
The proposed third-phase subdivision also designated a 4,598 square foot "recreational easement" running behind and across the rear of the eight duplex units. It was appellees' contention that this proposed 4,598 square foot recreational area would satisfy the open space and recreational condition in the 1976 resolution that approved the first phase of the development.
The Department of Planning and Zoning (DPZ) recommended denial of appellees' third-phase subdivision request on the basis of alleged density and traffic problems. The Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission) agreed and recommended a reduction in the number of units, and also found that the third phase, as proposed, violated the recreational area condition incorporated in Resolution R-20-76, and further violated City subdivision regulations. Appellees appealed to the City Board of Appeals, which upheld the Commission's findings.
Appellees sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The circuit court, in that judicial review, reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals. The trial judge, Judge Bruce C. Williams, found:
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