City of Annapolis v. Howard

• Decision Date: 18 December 1894
• Parties: MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. HOWARD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

30 A. 910

80 Md. 244

MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. HOWARD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 18, 1894

Appeal from circuit court, Anne Arundel county.

Petition by William Howard against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Annapolis for a writ of habeas corpus. From an order discharging petitioner from custody the city appeals. Dismissed.

Argued before ROBINSON, C.J., and BRYAN, McSHERRY, FOWLER, PAGE BOYD, and ROBERTS, JJ.

E. S Riley, for appellants.

Jas. W Owens, for appellee.

ROBERTS J.

The appeal in this case is taken from an order passed by the Honorable James Revell, one of the associate judges of the Fifth judicial circuit of the state of Maryland, discharging the appellee from the custody of the sheriff of Anne Arundel county. It appears from the record that the petitioner was in the custody of the sheriff of said county under a warrant of commitment issued by a justice of the peace of said county on a judgment convicting him of violating an ordinance of the city of Annapolis requiring all persons who bring their own growth of products to the city for sale during market hours to take out a license therefor. In this state of case the appellee applied for the writ of habeas corpus. The only question before us is whether an appeal lies from an order of this character. The appellants, in their brief, admit that up to the present Maryland has neither allowed writs of error nor appeals from orders on habeas corpus, except under the acts of 1872 and 1884; but it is contended that since the passage of the act of 1892 (chapter 506) a different practice ought to prevail, and appeals in habeas corpus cases be allowed. An examination of the provisions of that act will not justify any such conclusion. Section 77 of the act reads "The parties to criminal proceedings shall be entitled to bills of exceptions, in the same manner as in civil proceedings, and appeals from judgments in criminal cases may be taken in the same manner as in civil cases," etc. The appellants' contention can only be made effective by construing the order passed by the learned judge in this case as a judgment in a criminal case from which an appeal would lie in the same manner as in civil cases. To do this would require us to reverse a long line of decisions in this court, which have not in a single instance been departed from. As illustrating the view which has been so long sanctioned by this court, and which we think fully justifies reasserting, notwithstanding the supposed growth of a different doctrine in other states, we call attention to the views of this court as stated in Bell v. State, 4 Gill. 301. In that case the court had under consideration the sixth section of the act of 1785 (chapter 87), which is now found in the Code (article 5, § 2), slightly modified, but not materially changed, and reads as follows: "From any judgment or determination of any court of law in any civil suit...