City of Atlanta v. Watson

• Citation: 267 Ga. 185,475 S.E.2d 896
• Decision Date: 23 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. S96G0600,S96G0600
• Parties: CITY OF ATLANTA v. WATSON.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Page 896

475 S.E.2d 896

267 Ga. 185

CITY OF ATLANTA v. WATSON.

No. S96G0600.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 23, 1996.

Reconsideration Denied Oct. 17, 1996.

Clifford E. Hardwick, IV, City Attorney, Charles George Hicks, Asst. City Attorney, City of Atlanta Department of Law, Atlanta, for appellant.

Richard N. Hubert, David P. Thatcher, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin, Atlanta, for appellees.

F. Kennedy Hall, Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, Macon, for Amicus Curiae.

SEARS, Justice.

We granted certiorari in this case in order to (1) determine whether the City of Atlanta violated the equal protection rights of owners of multi-family residences near Hartsfield International Airport, when as part of its Airport Noise Abatement Program, the City purchased only single-family residences from their owners, and (2) consider two evidentiary rulings made by the Court of Appeals. We find that under the circumstances of this case, the City's purchase of single-family residences to the exclusion of their multi-family counterparts bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest, and therefore did not violate the equal protection rights of the owners of multi-family residences. We also find that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding to the trial court the issue of whether a federal statute prohibiting the recovery of damages for airport noise (49 U.S.C. § 47506) is applicable to this matter. We also disagree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the trial court erred by excluding one of Appellees' exhibits pursuant to the Aviation Noise Abatement Act (49 App.U.S.C. § 2106). Therefore, we reverse.

The Appellant City of Atlanta ("the City") owns and operates Hartsfield International Airport ("Hartsfield"). The Appellees are the owners of non-owner occupied, multi-family residences located in the City of College Park, Georgia, in close proximity to Hartsfield. Approximately twenty-five years ago, the City opted to participate in a federal noise abatement program designed for airports that, like Hartsfield, receive federal funding. One of the stated goals of the noise abatement program is to reduce existing land uses that are incompatible with airport noise and to prevent the introduction of future incompatible land uses around airports. ¹ The noise abatement program also is concerned with identifying and developing alternative land uses that are compatible with airport noise levels. ²

In order to determine the extent to which existing land uses around Hartsfield were incompatible with noise generated by the airport, the City conducted a noise exposure study, which resulted in the development and implementation of a land use compatibility plan, known as the City's Aircraft Noise Exposure Maps & Noise Compatibility Program ("the Program"), intended to reduce incompatible land uses around Hartsfield. As part of the Program's initial phases, the City purchased single-family residences located near Hartsfield. The Program, in its initial phases, did not provide for the City's purchase of similarly situated multi-family residences, such as those owned by Appellees. When the City refused to purchase Appellees' properties, Appellees filed suit, claiming inverse condemnation, nuisance, equal protection violations and violations of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Before trial, the Appellees' section 1983 claims were dismissed by the trial court on the City's motion, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the City on the Appellees' equal protection claims. Thereafter, in April 1994, the claims of inverse condemnation and nuisance were tried before a jury. At the conclusion of Appellees' evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the City on the nuisance claim. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining inverse condemnation claim, a mistrial was declared. After a second trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the City. Appellees' subsequent motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City on Appellees' equal protection claim, and concluded that the City's decision initially to purchase only single-family residences as part of its Program did not bear a rational relationship to the legitimate purpose of reducing land uses around Hartsfield that are not compatible with the noise generated by the airport. ³ In so doing, the appellate court invalidated the distinction drawn by the City between single and multi-family residences by focusing almost exclusively on the City's argument that its study established that multi-family residences are less affected and more compatible with noise generated by the airport than are single-family homes. Rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the City had drawn an arbitrary distinction between two identical groups--both of which are residences located in the same vicinity to the airport--with no objective basis for doing so, and remanded the equal protection issue to the trial court. The Court of Appeals also remanded the issue of whether the trial court had correctly charged the jury on a federal statute (49 U.S.C. § 47506) without first determining whether it was applicable to the facts of this matter, and ruled that a different federal statute (49 App.U.S.C. § 2106) did not preclude admission of the Appellees' exhibit showing land uses compatible with airport noise.

1. The Georgia Constitution states that a paramount duty of government shall be to ensure the protection of persons and property, and that in discharging that duty, "[n]o person shall be denied equal protection of the laws." ⁴ The Georgia equal protection clause, which is construed to be consistent with its federal counterpart, requires that the State treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. ⁵ A successful equal protection challenge generally requires a showing that state action was undertaken with an unreasonable purpose or was arbitrary and capricious. ⁶ However, under our equal protection clause, State legislative classification "is permitted when the classification is based on rational distinctions and ... bears a direct and real relation to the [legitimate] object or purpose of the legislation." ⁷

If the State's classification operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or impedes the exercise of a fundamental right, it is tested under a standard of strict judicial scrutiny. ⁸ We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that because there is no showing that the classification in this appeal involves either a suspect class or the exercise of a fundamental right, we must examine it under the lesser "rational basis" test and determine only whether it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate purpose of government. ⁹ The rational basis test requires that the classification drawn by the legislation be reasonable and not arbitrary, and rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and rational relationship to the legislation's objective, so that all similarly situated persons are treated alike. ¹⁰

" ' "If [it is found that] the legislative purpose is legitimate and the classification drawn has some reasonable relation to furthering that purpose, the classification passes [constitutional] muster." ' " ¹¹ A classification will be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge so long as, "under any conceivable set of facts, [it] bears a rational relationship to a legitimate end of government not prohibited by the Constitution." ¹² In this regard, the party who challenges legislation on equal protection grounds bears the burden of establishing that " 'the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the government decisionmaker.' " ¹³

Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to this matter. As noted, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the City had violated the equal protection rights of owners of multi-family residences was based upon its rejection of the City's claim that its study showed that such residences are more compatible with airport noise than are single-family residences. Pretermitting the propriety of this conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals erred by ending its inquiry at this point, without examining the other justifications supported by the record in defense of the City's classification between single and multi-family residences. ¹⁴ As explained below, our review of the record as a whole shows that the City's initial purchase under the Program of only single-family homes was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purposes of reducing land usage incompatible with airport noise in a sound fiscal manner while simultaneously avoiding the virtual elimination of the City of College Park's residential basis. Furthermore, in light of the evidence of record concerning the occupancy rates of multi-family residences in College Park, it appears that the City's decision initially to purchase only single-family homes was reasonable and not arbitrary.

The record shows that the City's Program estimated that the relocation of all families living within non-compatible airport noise level areas (an estimated 81,183 people, residing in 16,000 single-family residences and 8,000 apartment complexes), would cost the City in excess of $900 million, as measured in 1984. ¹⁵ At the time that Appellees filed their lawsuit, the City only had sufficient funds to enable it to purchase single-family homes that were non-compatible with the airport noise. Thus, the decision was made that, in the initial phase of the Program, only owner occupied, single-family residences would be purchased, although the Program provided that thereafter, the purchase of other types of residences located in unacceptable airport noise areas would be considered. ¹⁶ This decision appears to have been reasonable, given...