City of Auburn v. Gauntt

• Decision Date: 19 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 85892–6.,85892–6.
• Citation: 274 P.3d 1033
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF AUBURN, Petitioner, v. Dustin B. GAUNTT, Respondent.

274 P.3d 1033

CITY OF AUBURN, Petitioner,

v.Dustin B. GAUNTT, Respondent.

No. 85892–6.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 17, 2012.Decided April 19, 2012.

Daniel Brian Heid, City of Auburn, Auburn, WA, for Petitioner.

David Richard Kirshenbaum, Attorney at Law, Kent, WA, for Respondent.

CHAMBERS, J.

¶ 1 An Auburn city police officer arrested Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against Gauntt in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. Gauntt contends that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. We agree, affirm the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remand to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal.

FACTS

¶ 2 Officer Byers was patrolling Auburn's city streets on a marked police motorcycle. The officer's attention was caught by a driver approaching him with “both hands near his mouth.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 15. As the officer drew near, he saw that the driver was attempting to light a shiny, multicolored pipe, “consistent with ... controlled substances.” Id. Officer Byers stopped the car, inspected the pipe, and noticed that it smelled of burnt marijuana. He arrested the driver, Gauntt, for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

¶ 3 Gauntt was charged with possession of 40 grams or less of marijuana, “Contrary to RCW 69.50.4014 and the Auburn City Code,” CP at 88, and unlawful use of drug paraphernalia “Contrary to RCW 69.50.412(1) or (2) charged pursuant to the authority vested by RCW 39.34.180 and the Auburn City Code 9.22.020 A.” CP at 89. At the time, the Auburn City Code prohibited possession of both marijuana and drug paraphernalia but did not set forth a penalty. See former ch. 9.22 Auburn City Code (ACC) (2002). Since there was no penalty attached, these city ordinances did not criminalize possession under Washington law.¹ Auburn could have, but at the time had not, adopted relevant state statutes by reference. RCW 35.21.180.²

¶ 4 Gauntt moved to dismiss both charges on the theory that since the city of Auburn had never adopted either state statute, it lacked the authority to enforce them through misdemeanor prosecutions. The municipal judge denied the motion, and Gauntt was convicted and sentenced to 90 days in jail, 89 days suspended. He appealed, and King County Superior Court Judge Michael Trickey reversed, concluding that

[t]he City may not enforce a state law without having first adopted the state law by reference or having adopted a compatible ordinance. Since the defendant was prosecuted for a crime not adopted by the City, the findings of guilty is hereby set aside and this case remanded to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal.

CP at 160. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, City of Auburn v. Gauntt, 160 Wash.App. 567, 249 P.3d 657 (2011), and we granted review, City of Auburn v. Gauntt, 172 Wash.2d 1004, 258 P.3d 685 (2011).

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Whether a municipality has the power to prosecute is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004) (citing Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 123 Wash.2d 573, 578, 870 P.2d 299 (1994)).

History of Municipal Prosecutions in Washington

¶ 6 This case asks us to examine the prosecutorial authority of counties and municipalities. During the American colonial period, “the county became the primary unit” of most local government. Sho Sato & Arvo Van Alstyne, State and Local Government Law 2 (1970). While our nation is not uniform, counties generally “ ‘handle such state-directed functions as the administration of justice.’ ” Id. at 6 (quoting Comm. for Econ. Dev., Modernizing Local Government 28–29 (1966)). Our Washington State Constitution vests superior courts at the county level with general jurisdiction over most conflicts involving state law. Wash. Const. art. IV, §§ 5, 6. Our statutes explicitly authorize county prosecuting attorneys to “appear for and represent the state and the counties” in judicial proceedings. RCW 36.27.005. Our constitution also vests the legislature with the power to establish inferior courts, such as municipal courts. Wash. Const. art. IV, § 12; see also Titles 3, 35, 35A RCW (establishing inferior courts). “The jurisdiction of the municipal courts is generally restricted to matters arising under penal ordinances and local police regulations.” 9A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 27:2, at 370 (3d rev. ed.2007).

¶ 7 Until this case, the principle that, absent explicit legislative direction, municipalities could charge and municipal courts could hear only violations of the local municipal code seemed nearly unquestioned. At least, we could find no case directly on point and the parties have brought none to our attention.³ However, since the 1980s some municipalities have tried to avoid the costs associated with criminal justice by either declining to adopt, or by repealing, criminal ordinances. E.g., City of Medina v. Primm, 160 Wash.2d 268, 278, 157 P.3d 379 (2007). For example in 1980, the city of Bellingham repealed almost all of its criminal ordinances, changed the penalties on most of those remaining from jail time to fines, closed its jail, and directed its agents to charge those they arrested with violating state law. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 540–42, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996). This effectively transferred responsibility for prosecution and the other costs associated with criminal justice from the city to Whatcom County. Id. at 551, 909 P.2d 1303. The county attempted to recoup the increased costs from the city. Id. at 542, 909 P.2d 1303. After the city sought declaratory judgment that it was not liable for those costs, the city and county negotiated a deal and agreed to dismiss the case. Id.

¶ 8 The legislature responded by passing the court improvement act of 1984. Laws of 1984, ch. 258, codified in part as former RCW 3.50.800 (1984). ⁴ See 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2, at 1–3. Among other things, this act required municipalities repealing their criminal codes (which come with the expenses of enforcement, such as maintaining police departments and jails) but keeping their traffic codes (which tend to generate income through fines) to pay their counties a reasonable amount for the associated increased costs. Former RCW 3.50.800; Whatcom County, 128 Wash.2d at 542–43, 909 P.2d 1303; see also Gerhard O.W. Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern Legislators and Traffic Courts, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 944, 947 & n. 3 (1960) (citing Morgantown Post (W.Va.), Dec. 15, 1955, at 12; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1955, at 35). RCW 3.50.800 also requires cities and counties to arbitrate the amount due, if they cannot come to an agreement, and to review the terms periodically.

¶ 9 In 1993, Whatcom County sued the city of Bellingham over the city's 1980 repeal of most of its criminal code, contending that it had improperly shifted the cost of municipal criminal justice to the county. Whatcom County, 128 Wash.2d at 542–43, 909 P.2d 1303. We concluded the legislature intended “to prevent cities from freely imposing the costs of their criminal justice activities on counties by repealing municipal criminal codes or terminating municipal courts,” especially when keeping the comparatively, financially remunerative traffic codes and courts. Id. at 545–46, 909 P.2d 1303.

¶ 10 The same year Whatcom County was decided, the legislature amended the Interlocal Cooperation Act, chapter 39.34 RCW, in two relevant ways. First, and for the first time in Washington State, the act explicitly declared that “[e]ach county, city, and town is responsible for the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration of misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses committed by adults in their respective jurisdictions, and referred from their respective law enforcement agencies, whether filed under state law or city ordinance,” RCW 39.34.180(1), thus, clarifying that cities and towns had criminal justice obligations. Second, RCW 39.34.180(1) established that each local government must “carry out these responsibilities through the use of their own courts ... or by entering into contracts or interlocal agreements under this chapter to provide these services.” Effectively, the legislature gave local governments a choice: provide criminal justice services locally or by contract with another local government. Id.; see also Primm, 160 Wash.2d at 278–79, 157 P.3d 379. Either way, cities bore “the financial responsibility for the prosecution of all criminal misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses occurring within the city limits.” Primm, 160 Wash.2d at 278–79, 157 P.3d 379.

Statutory Construction

¶ 11 This case largely turns on the meaning of RCW 39.34.180, and thus our first task is to divine the intent of the legislature. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)). We begin with the plain meaning of the statute, considered in its broader statutory context. Id. at 11, 43 P.3d 4 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48A:16, at 809–10 (6th ed.2000)). RCW 39.34.180(1) provides:

Each county, city, and town is responsible for the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration of misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses committed by adults in their respective jurisdictions, and referred from their respective law enforcement agencies, whether filed under state law or city ordinance, and must carry out these responsibilities through the use of their own courts, staff, and facilities, or by entering into contracts or interlocal agreements under this chapter to provide these services. Nothing in this section is intended to alter the statutory responsibilities of each county for the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and incarceration for...