City of Baraboo v. Dwyer

• Decision Date: 04 December 1917
• Citation: 165 N.W. 297,166 Wis. 372
• Parties: CITY OF BARABOO v. DWYER.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

166 Wis. 372

165 N.W. 297

CITY OF BARABOO

v.DWYER.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 4, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sauk County; James O'Neill, Judge.

Emmet Dwyer was convicted of speeding in violation of an ordinance of the City of Baraboo, and he appealed. From a judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment, the City appeals. Affirmed.

Prosecution in police court for violation of an ordinance of the city of Baraboo, prohibiting fast driving of automobiles on city bridges. Section 1 of the ordinance provides:

“From and after the first day of January, 1917, following the passage and publication of this ordinance, it shall be and hereby is declared unlawful for any person to drive or operate any automobile on, over and across any bridge spanning the Baraboo river within the limits of the city of Baraboo, at a rate of speed exceeding ten miles per hour, a rate of speed in excess of ten miles per hour subjecting such bridge structure to misuse and abuse, and being deemed and declared fast driving thereon; the speed limit thus established being enacted for public safety and the preservation of city property.”

Section 2 fixes the penalty. Defendant was convicted and fined in the police court, and in the circuit court the judgment was reversed. The case is here on appeal.Virgil H. Cady, City Atty., of Baraboo, for appellant.

Grotophorst, Thomas, Rieser & Quale, of Baraboo, for respondent.

KERWIN, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The vital question on this appeal is whether the ordinance is valid. Sections 1636--47 to 1636--57, Stats., make provision regarding speed regulations applicable to the public highways of the state. Section 1636--49, Stats., provides:

“* * * And no person shall operate or drive any automobile, motorcycle or other similar motor vehicle, along any public highway, within the corporate limits of any city or village at a speed exceeding fifteen miles per hour, nor on any of the public highways outside of the corporate limits of any city or village at a speed exceeding twenty-five miles per hour; and provided further, that no person shall operate or drive any automobile, motorcycle or other similar motor vehicle through any cemetery or through any county or state hospital or poor farm grounds or through any park or in passing any school ground where persons are or may be in said highway at a speed exceeding eight miles per hour. * * *”

Section 1636--49a, subd. 1, provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate an automobile, motorcycle, or other similar motor vehicle upon and along any public highway of this state at a rate of speed exceeding ten miles per hour while within one hundred and fifty feet and passing upon the same traveled track of said highway any other automobile, * * * going in an opposite direction; and it shall likewise be unlawful in passing to go within three feet of any other automobile, * * * going in the same direction upon any single track of any such highway at a greater rate of speed than ten miles per hour.”

“2. * * * Nor shall any person driving or operating any automobile, * * * upon any public highway containing more than one traveled track pass within four feet of any vehicle, motor or otherwise, at a greater rate of speed than ten miles per hour when passing any other vehicle, motor or otherwise, which is traveling in the same direction and to the right of the center line of the traveled portion of said highway.”

In order to meet other cases which could not be regulated by specific speed limits, the Legislature made provision in section 1636--49 as follows:

“No person shall operate or drive any automobile, * * * recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to the width, traffic and use of the highways and the general and usual rules of the road, or so as to endanger the property, life or limb of any person, * * * and provided further, that in turning corners, in going around curves at sharp declines, at the intersection of any street or cross road, and where, for any cause, the view in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding, shall be obstructed, the speed shall be reduced to such a rate as will tend to avoid danger of accidents.”

[1] It is manifest from the foregoing that the Legislature had in mind that in certain cases the speed limit must depend upon the particular facts of the case, and that in such cases the speed limit should not be fixed by local authority, but be determined upon the facts of each case where the Legislature made no specific limitation as to speed. The object of the Legislature clearly was to establish a uniform regulation applicable to all localities, and thus avoid the confusion and uncertainty which would result to the traveling public by different speed limits in different localities. Ayres v. Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, 87 N. E. 1073;Buffalo v. Lewis, 192 N. Y. 193, 84 N. E. 809; Ex parte Shaw (Okl.) 157 Pac. 900. In Buffalo v. Lewis, supra, the court said:

“Automobiles have but recently come into common use. Within the last few years their use has not only greatly increased, but tours therewith have been extended through many municipalities. Good judgment has not always been exercised in their use, and the rights of others have sometimes been overlooked by their owners or drivers, and, principally in consequence thereof, more or less opposition has arisen to their unrestricted use upon the public streets and highways. The opposition to use has frequently found expression in local restrictive rules and ordinances. Such local rules and ordinances existing...