City of Belleville v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 20 April 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10522.,10522.
• Parties: CITY OF BELLEVILLE v. MITCHELL.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

273 Ill. 136

112 N.E. 368

CITY OF BELLEVILLE

v.MITCHELL.

No. 10522.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1916.

Appeal from St. Clair County Court; Jos. B. Messick, Judge.

Petition by the City of Belleville for the confirmation of a special assessment. Opposed by William Mitchell and others. From a judgment of confirmation, the named objector appeals. Affirmed.Keefe & Sullivan and John E. Hamlin, both of East St. Louis, for appellant.

L. N. Perrin, City Atty., of Belleville (A. H. Baer, of Belleville, of counsel), for appellee.

DUNN, J.

The city of Belleville filed its petition in the county court of St. Clair county for the confirmation of a special assessment to pay the cost of the improvement of Main street (formerly known as the St. Clair county turnpike or rock road) from the north line of the right of way of the Southern Railway to the northwestern limits of the city, by grading, curbing, and paving the roadway. A commissioner was appointed, who filed an assessment roll, estimating the sum of $48,427.26 as the amount of public benefits which was apportioned to the city of Belleville, and $240,666.74 which was apportioned to the property benefited. The appellant, together with numerous other property owners, filed objections. A hearing was had on the legal objections, and they were overruled. Afterward a trial of the objections to the amount of benefits and the proportionate share of the cost of the improvement was had by a jury. The verdict returned on the first trial was set aside by agreement, and on the application of the objectors a change of venue was granted from the judge. A second trial was had before another judge, a verdict was returned, and after overruling a motion for a new trial judgment of confirmation was entered, from which William Mitchell, one of the objectors, has appealed.

The first question argued by the appellant is the reasonableness of the ordinance, but in the condition of the record we are unable to consider that question. The power of the city council to pass ordinances must be reasonably exercised, and the reasonableness of the ordinance is a question for the decision of the court in view of all the circumstances and conditions. Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 Ill. 653, 42 N. E. 373,30 L. R. A. 225. The present ordinance does not indicate, on its face, that it is arbitrarily unjust or oppressive. It is only by the introduction of evidence showing the existing situation and conditions that the alleged unreasonableness of the ordinance can be made to appear, and the burden of showing such conditions rests upon the objectors. The objection that the ordinance is unreasonable is a legal objection, and section 48 of the Local Improvement Act provides that all objections, except the objections that the property will not be benefited to the amount assessed against it and that it is assessed more than its proportionate share of the cost of the improvement, may be set down for a separate hearing. This was done, and all legal objections were disposed of before the trial of the objections as to the amount of the assessment and the proportionate share. Upon the hearing of these objections no bill of exceptions was taken preserving the evidence which was heard. In the middle of the common-law record containing copies of various papers filed in the cause is contained what appears to be the testimony of two witnesses, together with a stipulation of counsel, but these are not authenticated by the certificate of the judge, as a bill of exceptions or otherwise. We cannot look to them as indicating the proceedings which occurred on the hearing of these objections, and we are therefore unable to determine whether or not the court, in...