City of Billings v. Smith
| Decision Date | 29 October 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 12100,12100 |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 348, 66 Lab.Cas. P 52,687 CITY OF BILLINGS, a municipal Corporation and Yellowstone County, Montana, a body politic, Plaintiffs, v. The Hon. Sidney T. SMITH, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Montana, Defendant. |
Harold F. Hanser, County Atty., argued John R. Davidson, City Atty., argued Billings, Donald Ostrem, City Atty., argued, Great Falls, Perry Moore, argued, Harlowton, J. A. Alexander, Butte, C. W. Leaphart, Jr., Helena, Ralph T. Randono, appeared, Great Falls, for plaintiffs.
Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., Helena, Lawrence D. Huss and John P. Connor, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., argued, Helena, for defendant.
D. Patrick McKittrick, argued, John C. Hall, Great Falls, amicus curiae.
John Sheehy, intervenor argued, Billings, William N. Jensen, Deputy Dir. Montana Legal Services Ass'n, and Thomas Ashton, III, appeared, Helena.
This is an original proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that House Bill No. 338, Chapter No. 417, Laws of 1971, called the Minimum Wage Act, is unconstitutional, or that certain persons are excluded from its provisions, or that in any event, certain persons can by contract waive the provisions of the Act. The City of Billings and the County of Yellowstone filed their petition, and this Court accepted original jurisdiction.
As a result of this Court's order accepting jurisdiction, other parties have been permitted to appear designated as amicus curiae or interveners. They include intervenor, John H. Bangs; amicus curiae, Montana State Firemen's Association, Montana Legal Services Association, John C. Hall, City of Helena, City of Great Falls; and intervener, John C. Sheehy.
The City of Billings, the County of Yellowstone, the City of Helena, and the City of Great Falls will all be treated as plaintiffs. Sidney T. Smith is Commissioner of Labor of the State of Montana, represented by the Attorney General and will be called defendant. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms of plaintiffs and defendant will include positions of interveners and amicus curiae.
Two general issues are presented by the petition seeking a declaratory judgment. One is an attack on constitutionality; the other seeks a determination of the legality of the defendant's decision holding that police officers, firemen and deputy sheriffs are covered by the Act in question.
The Act consists of its title; Section 1, a declaration of policy; Section 2, definitions; Section 3, compensation; Section 4, exclusions; Section 5, regulation making and administrative power to the Commissioner of Labor; Section 6, enforcement; and Section 7, provisions to be cumulative. No savings clause appears.
The title of the Act is as follows:
'AN ACT TO ESTABLISH MINIMUM WAGES AND HOURS FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE STATE OF MONTANA: DELEGATING TO THE COMMISSIONER OF LABOR THE DUTY OF ADMINISTERING THE ACT; AND PROVIDING ENFORCEMENT.'
In Section 4 are listed exclusions, among which is subdivision (j):
'Any individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity as these terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the commissioner.'
Section 5 provides:
Pursuant to Section 5, the Commissioner, defendant here, issued regulations, including a regulation further defining and delimiting the words-executive, administrative and professional, as used in the exclusion set forth above in subdivision (j) of Section 4.
The plaintiffs here are the City of Billings and the County of Yellowstone. The city has policemen and firemen employed; the county has deputy sheriffs employed. Because of the nature of both law enforcement and fire protection work, and from past custom, practice and agreement, these officers work overtime by assignment and because of the natural progression of what might be termed investigative or duty requirements. We observe parenthetically that crimes and fires do not keep regular shift hours; budgets and planning are therefore difficult.
Following the issuance of regulations defining the term 'individual employed in a bona fide professional capacity', plaintiffs sought and received an interpretation by the Commissioner of Labor. He ruled, in writing, that police officers, firemen, and deputy sheriffs were not excluded under the act.
The action was brought. Defendant, as well as some of amicus curiae, attack the action by motion to dismiss on procedural grounds (1) that no emergency exists and this Court should not accept original jurisdiction, (2) that administrative remedies have not been exhausted, and (3) that there are fact issues which should be tried in the trial court. The latter two grounds are tied together in that further administrative hearings might be needed to determine whether individual officers have enough training, experience, and scientific know-how to qualify for 'professional' status and thereby be exempt from provisions of the Act.
In this opinion, we shall neither go into nor determine the facts. We deny the motion to dismiss as to the ground of our acceptance of original jurisdiction. The emergency nature clearly appears sufficient for this Court to determine the legality of the Act since its effect is broad upon all the citizens of Montana. See Rule 17, M.R.App.Civ.P.; State ex rel. Schultz-Lindsay Construction Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 145 Mont. 380, 403 P.2d 635.
Plaintiffs' first contention is that the Act is unconstitutional in:
(a) The title is defective in contravention of Article V, Section 23 of the Montana Constitution.
(b) It is an invalid delegation of legislative power in that it delegates power of definition of terms as well as power to administer and enforce the Act without standards or guidelines.
(c) The Act is so vague, Section 4(j) in particular, that by providing criminal penalties the Constitution is violated.
(d) No savings clause, so if the Act is defective in one part the entire Act fails.
(e) It is also urged that the classifications are arbitrary and result in a lack of uniformity.
Article V, Section 23 of the Montana Constitution provides:
'No bill, except general appropriation bills, and bills for the codification and general revision of the laws, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.' (Emphasis added)
This Court in City of Helena v. Omholt, 155 Mont. 212, 219-221, 468 P.2d 764, discussed the application of Article V, Section 23 to an appropriation bill, H.B. 557, Laws of 1969:
'The title of the appropriation bill, House Bill No. 557, contains this language:
"An Act Appropriating Money to the State Auditor From the Police Account of the Earmarked Revenue Fund for the Biennium Ending June 30, 1969, for the Purposes Enumerated in Chapter 261, Laws of 1965; and Providing the Method of Disbursement.'
'This title indicates that the purpose of the appropriation bill is to appropriate money to carry out the purposes enumerated in Chapter 261, Laws of 1965 (codified as sections 11-1834 through 11-1837, R.C.M.1947). The enumerated purposes of Chapter 261, Laws of 1965, are expressed in its title:
"An Act to Provide for Annual Payments From the Premium Tax Collected on Motor Vehicle Insurance to Every City or Town Having a Police Department; Providing How Such Payments Shall be Expended by The Cities or Towns.'
'The provision for annual payment to every city or town is mandatory. Section 1 of Chapter 261, Laws of 1965 (codified as section 11-1834), provides in pertinent part:
"At the end of each fiscal year the state auditor shall issue and deliver to the treasurer of each city and town in Montana, having a police department, his warrant in an amount * * * (determined by the formula used for fire departments)'. (Emphasis added; bracketed material paraphrased.)
'This mandatory annual payment of state funds to every city and town having a police department is not effectuated by Section 2 of House Bill No. 557. On the contrary, such purpose is defeated thereby. Section 2 prohibits disbursement of state funds appropriated to make these mandatory annual payments to those cities and towns not meeting certain qualifications and requirements, principally those cities not making a mill levy for payment of reserve police officer's salaries and those cities not withholding 5% of the salaries of its active police officers.
'In addition the title of House Bill No. 557 contains the concluding phrase 'and Providing the Method of Disbursement'. Nowhere in the body of the act is any mention made of any 'Method of Disbursement', unless the prohibitions and restrictions on any disbursements to nonqualifying cities falls within the ambit of that term. We conclude that such interpretation requires an active and fertile imagination, and decline to so construe it.
'For the foregoing reasons, House Bill No. 557 contains a false and deceptive title. Art. V, Sec. 23 of the Montana Constitution is designed to prevent legislators and the people from being misled by false or deceptive titles. This Court succinctly summarized this purpose in Johnson...
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