City of Birmingham v. Blount County

Citation533 So.2d 534
PartiesCITY OF BIRMINGHAM v. BLOUNT COUNTY, et al. 86-1436.
Decision Date05 August 1988
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

David J. Vann and Ronald L. Stichweh of Carlton, Vann & Stichweh, and James K. Baker, City Atty., Birmingham, for appellant.

Wayman G. Sherrer, B.J. McPherson, Oneonta, for appellees.

ALMON, Justice.

The single issue in this appeal is whether the decision of this Court in City of Fultondale v. City of Birmingham, 507 So.2d 489 (Ala.1987), will be retroactively applied in this case. After the Court's decision in City of Tuskegee v. Lacey, 486 So.2d 393 (Ala.1985), the City of Birmingham annexed the Inland Lake property in Blount County via the rights-of-way of State Highway 75, Old State Highway 75, and Inland Lake Road. Blount County and others filed this suit to have the annexation declared invalid.

While this case was pending, this Court overruled City of Tuskegee in City of Fultondale, and the trial court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The City of Birmingham concedes that the "long lasso" annexation in the instant case would be invalid under the holding in City of Fultondale; however, it argues that this annexation was in accordance with the decision in City of Tuskegee v. Lacey, which was the law at the time of the annexation and that, therefore, the annexation should be upheld.

This case was pending in the trial court when City of Fultondale was decided; in fact, this Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering a change of venue in this case shortly before it decided City of Fultondale. Ex parte City of Birmingham, 507 So.2d 471 (Ala.1987). Birmingham enacted the ordinances of annexation at issue in City of Fultondale in April and May 1986; the City of Fultondale filed its complaint on May 14, 1986. Birmingham enacted the ordinance of annexation at issue here on June 10, 1986; Blount County filed its complaint in this case on June 17, 1986. Thus, the Fultondale annexation was prior to the Blount County annexation; the Fultondale lawsuit was filed before the Blount County suit was filed; and the Fultondale suit was tried on the merits and reversed on appeal before the Blount County case moved beyond the pleading stage.

In this case, there had been no ruling on the reasonableness of the Blount County annexation or on the applicability of the long-lasso doctrine before this Court abandoned that doctrine in City of Fultondale. The opinion in City of Fultondale shows that the parties therein did not argue that City of Tuskegee v. Lacey should be overruled, only that the annexations at issue were unreasonable. Blount County's suit, challenging Birmingham's annexation into that county as unreasonable, was pending at the time City of Fultondale was announced, and the Jefferson County Circuit Court ruled shortly after the change of venue that summary judgment for Blount County was due to be granted.

This Court has resolved the question of retroactive application in a number of ways. In overruling the longstanding doctrine of municipal immunity, this Court held that the new rule of liability would apply in the appellant's case and in cases of injury occurring after the date the new rule was announced. See Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975); Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Commissioners of the City of Mobile, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So.2d 624 (1975); Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, 294 Ala. 614, 320 So.2d 631 (1975); Wilson v. Dothan City Bd. of Education, 295 Ala. 61, 322 So.2d 708 (1975).

In Walker v. City of Birmingham, 342 So.2d 321 (Ala.1976), this Court overturned a ruling that had made Birmingham immune from suit for injuries arising on sidewalks in its public parks. Then, in City of Birmingham v. Brasher, 359 So.2d 1153, 1155 (Ala.1978), this Court held that the Walker decision applied to Brasher's injury suffered two years before the Walker decision, because

"Walker was not limited to prospective application at the time of its issuance, and we are not now presented with a contract right or vested right which would compel such application. Cf. Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So.2d 68 (1975); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194b."

In a series of cases overturning gender-based property laws, this Court held that the new rulings would apply in cases where no rights had vested prior to the new ruling. Ransom v. Ransom, 401 So.2d 746 (Ala.1981); Stallworth v. Hicks, 434 So.2d 229 (Ala.1983); Hall v. McBride, 416 So.2d 986 (Ala.1982); Land v. Bowyer, 437 So.2d 524 (Ala.1983); Prine v. Wood, 447 So.2d 725 (Ala.1984).

In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Atkins, 435 So.2d 1275 (Ala.1983), this Court was presented with the applicability, in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, of a decision, Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir.1982), changing the rule on evidence of future inflationary trends. This Court stated, in response to the argument for retroactive application:

"Nor can we agree with plaintiff that Culver authorizes retroactive operation in this case by way of a new trial. The Culver court expressly applied its holding to 'cases (i) now being tried, (ii) tried hereafter and (iii) those heretofore tried and now on, or subject to appeal in which the issue has been properly and adequately raised.' (Emphasis added [in Atkins ].) As we have shown above, the issue of future inflation was not properly raised in the court below, and thus the retroactivity aspect of Culver has no application here."

Atkins, supra, at 1278-79. Of course, Culver was concerned with an evidentiary issue regarding damages, and we are here concerned with the rule of law that disposes of the substantive merits of the case. Even so, the above-quoted rule is applicable to indicate that a retroactive application of City of Fultondale is appropriate at least if it comes in a case where a challenge to an annexation was pending when City of Fultondale was released, where no dispositive ruling on the long-lasso doctrine had been made, and where the case was at a preliminary stage where the validity or applicability of the long-lasso doctrine could still be raised. In any such case the issue could have been raised even if City of Fultondale had not overruled City of Tuskegee v. Lacey.

The City of Fultondale ruling should be applied to this case. "The determination of retroactive or prospective application of a decision overruling a former decision is a matter of judicial discretion which must be exercised on a case by case basis." State v. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 487 So.2d 898, 903 (Ala.1986). The Court overturned the long-lasso annexations at issue in City of Fultondale, and the opinion did not expressly limit its holding to quasi-prospective relief. See Jackson v. City of Florence and Lorence v. Hospital Board of Morgan County, supra. The long-lasso doctrine was not a well-established rule of long standing, so the usual reason for giving only prospective operation to a new ruling is not present here.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, J., concurs.

TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., concur specially.

JONES, SHORES, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., dissent.

TORBERT, Chief Justice (concurring specially).

I believe that the decision in City of Fultondale v. City of Birmingham, 507 So.2d 489 (Ala.1987), was correctly held by the trial court to control the decision in this case.

The outcome of City of Fultondale and the outcome of this case depended upon the viability of the "long-lasso doctrine." The parties in City of Fultondale had relied on City of Tuskegee just as much as, if not more than, the parties in this case. When we decided City of Fultondale, we did not limit our decision to a prospective application; I would not now attempt to so limit it.

STEAGALL, J., concurs.

MADDOX, Justice (concurring specially).

The City of Birmingham makes a...

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