City of Boise City v. Gabica, 14104

• Decision Date: 17 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 14104,14104
• Citation: 106 Idaho 94,675 P.2d 354
• Parties: CITY OF BOISE CITY, A municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vincent and Sylvia L. GABICA, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 354

675 P.2d 354

106 Idaho 94

CITY OF BOISE CITY, A municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Vincent and Sylvia L. GABICA, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14104.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Jan. 17, 1984.

Paris Martin, Boise, for defendants-appellants.

W.H. Fawcett, Deputy City Atty., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BURNETT, Judge.

We are asked to review a district court decision containing an injunction against certain business activities in a residential zone. The City of Boise brought this action against Vincent and Sylvia Gabica, seeking to enjoin the operation of a rug and carpet cleaning business from their home. The Gabicas answered, in part, that the business constituted a permissible "accessory use" of the residence. The district court declined to enjoin bookkeeping and telephone communications inside the house. The court also refused to interfere with the Gabicas' practice of parking one or two commercially marked vans on their property. However, the court did enjoin two activities connected with the business: the cleaning of business equipment on the property, and the dispatching of employees who would come to the house, pick up the vans and equipment, and go to their assigned jobs. The Gabicas have appealed that part of the injunction which prohibits the dispatching of employees. We affirm.

Despite the narrowness of the Gabicas' attack upon the injunction, the dispositive question is whether their business is an accessory use, as they contend. This question is one of ordinance interpretation. Most American zoning ordinances divide land uses into major categories such as residential, commercial and industrial. In order to separate these uses geographically, and to control them functionally, the ordinances typically classify the principal types of land uses and impose restrictive definitions upon any related, secondary uses. The Boise City Code follows this pattern. It specifies single-family dwellings as a principal land use in the Gabicas' neighborhood, which is zoned R-1C. The Code also permits, but restrictively defines, accessory uses and home occupations. Because there is no contention in this appeal that the rug and carpet cleaning business is a home occupation, we focus upon the Code's treatment of accessory uses.

Section 11-2-4.2 of the Code allows "[a]ccessory uses relating to single-family dwelling[s]" in R-1C districts. Section 11-1-3 defines "use, accessory" as "[a] use incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the premises which does not alter the essential characteristics of the use considered as a whole and as related to other uses permitted in the same district." Thus, the Code imposes three requirements. (1) The accessory use must "relate" to a single-family dwelling and be "incidental and subordinate" to it. (2) The accessory use must not alter the essential characteristics of the single-family dwelling. (3) The accessory use must not alter the relationship between the single-family dwelling and other uses permitted in the residential district. The first requirement contains a threshold definitional test. The latter two requirements set forth limiting conditions.

The trial court's decision contains no ruling on whether the Gabicas' business, as a whole, is an accessory use. Neither has the court made an express finding as to whether the specific activity of dispatching employees satisfies the ordinance requirements. However, in refusing to disturb such other activities as bookkeeping and telephone communications, the court has noted that they do "not impair the general character of the neighborhood." By implication, then, the trial court has found that employee dispatching does affect the neighborhood and therefore fails to meet one of the limiting conditions upon accessory uses. The Gabicas now argue that the evidence does not show any impact upon the neighborhood from employee dispatching.

However, we need not apply a limiting condition to a particular aspect of the business unless the business itself satisfies the threshold definitional test--that an accessory use must "relate" to the single-family dwelling and be "incidental and subordinate" to it. The district court made sufficient findings, not challenged on appeal, to determine the outcome of this test. The court found...