City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman
Decision Date | 06 March 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 45902,45902 |
Citation | 481 P.2d 950,206 Kan. 689 |
Parties | CITY OF BONNER SPRINGS, Appellant, v. James R. COLEMAN et al., Appellees. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
1. A naked statement of gross income is too uncertain and depends upon too many speculations and contingencies to safely be accepted as evidence of the usable value of property upon which a business is carried on.
2. Although an expert appraiser of real estate may use the gross income method in arriving at value of real property in an eminent domain proceeding, it is error to submit directly to the jury evidence of gross income from which the jury is to estimate the value of real property or damages to the landowners because of the taking in an eminent domain proceeding.
3. In determining whether the erroneous admission of evidence is prejudicial it is proper to examine the evidence in light of the entire record.
4. In an appeal to the district court in an eminent domain proceeding, the record is examined and it is held, the rights of the condemner were prejudicially affected by the direct submission to the jury of evidence of gross income from a business on property, part of which was being condemned.
Donald H. Corson, Jr., Kansas City, argued the cause, and James H. Barnes and Wayne H. Phillips, Kansas City, were with him on the brief, for appellant.
J. D. Lysaught, of Weeks, Thomas, Lysaught, Bingham & Johnston, Chartered, Kansas City, argued the cause, and L. D. McDonald, of Weeks, Thomas, Lysaught, Bingham & Johnston, Chartered, Kansas City, was with him on the brief, for appellees.
HATCHER, Commissioner:
This is an appeal by the condemner from a verdict in a condemnation case.
There is but a single question requiring our consideration-was it error to admit into evidence the testimony of the landowners and exhibits showing the gross income from the business operated on or about the condemned property for the purpose of showing the value of the property and the damages to the landowners?
The land was being condemned for street and highway purposes by the city of Bonner Springs, Kansas. During the years 1963 to 1967, the appellees owned and occupied the real property, a part of which was condemned in this action. The property consisted of a tract of land with a 225 foot frontage and 125 feet deep. It contained a brick and tile building 50 feet wide by 105 feet deep which had been an old silent movie theater. Prior to the time the appellees occupied the property it had stood vacant for six or seven years. Improvements were made over the course of several years including the addition of a paint and body shop. At the time of the condemnation the Colemans engaged in the business of selling farm equipment, trucks and parts, and rented and repaired farm equipment and trucks. They also sold ITCO parts, appliances and hardware. The largest dollar volume of the business consisted of the farm equipment and truck sales.
At the trial in the court below the landowners first introduced their evidence.
Mr. James R. Coleman, the owner of the land and the operator of the business thereon, testified in substance to the facts above. He further testified:
Mr. Coleman made no attempt to give an opinion as to the value of the land condemned or the damages resulting.
Mrs. Golden Coleman, wife of James R. Coleman, next took the witness stand. She testified that she was responsible for the bookkeeping and had prepared an itemization of the gross income from the business broken into different categories. She also had a final yearly total for the gross income come for the year 1967. These calculations were introduced as exhibits.
The exhibits showed the business produced for 1963 a gross income of $607,000.00, for 1964 a gross income of $706,000.00, for 1965 a gross income of $885,000.00, for 1966 a gross income of $1,229,000.00 and for 1967 a gross income of $1,229,000.00.
The exhibits also divided the gross income for 1966 into the following categories:
The exhibits further showed that the gross income of the business increased 100% between 1963 and 1967.
Golden Coleman made no attempt to adjust the gross income to reflect estimated values. Neither did she give any opinion of property values or damages to the landowners.
Although the annual gross income of $1,229,000.00 was left dangling before the jury, it does not appear that the figure was ever used to prove any point in the case.
Appellees' first expert witness testified:
* * *'
He further testified on cross-examination:
It would appear that the witness did not use the $1,000,000.00 gross income derived from the implement business, although it was shown in appellees' exhibits introduced in evidence.
Appellees' second expert witness testified that he arrived at a figure of $76,094.00 as the value of the property before the taking based on cost of replacement less depreciation. He also used the gross income approach and arrived at a comparable figure of $86,800.00. We quote his testimony in part:
'Q. Now, when you have a conflict in the two methods of approach that you used in the evaluation of this property, Mr. Vickers, how do you reconcile this?
Tell the jury what you feel are the damages to the Colemans.
(Emphasis ours.)
We are not informed of the exact amount the witness deducted from the gross profits before he attempted to arrive at this rental figure for the purpose of capitalization, but we are informed that it was a large figure. We are also informed that he discarded the value so arrived at in favor of the value arrived at by cost of replacement less depreciation.
Appellees' third expert witness testified:
He also mentioned the gross sales and stated:
'* * * Now, if I come in here with an income approach, I think it would be a little bit ridiculous; in other words, it would be lots higher than what I am using.'
He did not use an income approach.
The appellant contends it was error to admit into evidence the landowners' testimony and exhibits showing gross sales where gross sales are not competent evidence and particularly wher the evidence is not necessary to support an appraisal value or used by experts in arriving at their value of the land.
We are forced to agree.
The narrow limits of appellant's objection must be understood. No objection is made to expert witnesses ascertaining the gross...
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...testing the witness' credibility.’ " Pope v. Ransdell , 251 Kan. 112, 123, 833 P.2d 965 (1992) (quoting City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman , 206 Kan. 689, 695, 481 P.2d 950 [1971] ).In Schlaikjer v. Kaplan , 296 Kan. 456, 469, 293 P.3d 155 (2013), the trial court granted a motion in limine t......
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...in proceedings for the determination of the compensation which the owner of the land shall receive.’ ” City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 206 Kan. 689, 694, 481 P.2d 950 (1971) (quoting 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 19.3(1), p. 19–48). Despite this general rule, the City of Bonner Springs ......
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Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 51217
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Coping With Ed (eminent Domain)
...(evidence of lost home sale profits admissible when linked by expert evidence to fair market value); City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 206 Kan. 689, 694-95, 481 P.2d 950 (1971). [118] City of Wichita v. Denton, 2013 WL 50250 (Kan. Sup. Ct. Jan. 4, 2013) (evaluating rental income from billb......
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