City Of Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 May 1944 |
| Citation | 131 Conn. 50,37 A.2d 693 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF BRIDGEPORT v. SCHWARZ BROS. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from City Court of Bridgeport; Miller, Judge.
Action by the City of Bridgeport against the Schwarz Brothers Company to recover the amount of a sewer assessment, brought to the City Court of Bridgeport and tried to the court. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Error and case remanded with directions.
John V. Donnelly, of Bridgeport (Harry Schwartz, of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellant (plaintiff).
Israel J. Cohn, of Bridgeport (William Cohn and Milton L. Cohn, both of Bridgeport, on the brief), for appellee (defendant).
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, DICKENSON, and WYNNE, JJ. (Judge KENNETH WYNNE of the Superior Court sat for Judge ELLS.)
The allegations in the plaintiff's complaint may be summarized as follows: The defendant owned land with a frontage of fifty feet on a street in Bridgeport; March 3, 1930, the plaintiff's common council accepted the report of its board of appraisal of benefits and damages determining the benefits to the defendant as owner of this land by reason of the construction of a storm water sewer to be $37.50; March 6, 1930, this acceptance was approved by the mayor; due notice of the assessment of these benefits was given as called for by the city charter; by virtue of the foregoing an assessment in the amount of $37.50 was legally levied against the defendant, became due and payable to the tax collector of the city, is still unpaid, and is owed by the defendant to the city. All of these allegations were admitted by the defendant's answer except that the defendant owed this $37.50 to the plaintiff which was denied. The answer further set up, as a special defense, that the assessment alleged became due and payable March 11, 1930, and therefore the right of action for the cause stated did not accrue within six years next before the commencement of this action. The allegations of this special defense were admitted by the plaintiff's amended reply. The court rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the Statute of Limitations, § 6005 of the General Statutes, having been brought more than six years after the debt accrued. The issue raised by the plaintiff's appeal is whether the court erred in holding that § 6005 constitutes a bar to the plaintiff's recovery.
No question is raised as to the propriety of the cause of action alleged in the complaint for recovery of the amount claimed as a debt. In arriving at its judgment, however, the court concluded that this assessment, conferring special benefits, was not a tax in the general acceptance of the term and that the plaintiff, having relied upon an action in debt, must be subject to the legal defense of the Statute of Limitations, that is, § 6005. The pertinent provision of this statute reads: ‘No action for an account, or for a debt due * * * on any simple or implied contract * * * shall be brought but within six years next after the right of action shall accrue * * *.’ It is manifest from the language of the statute that ‘implied contract’ is the only expression within its terms which could fairly be claimed applicable to such an obligation. Accordingly, the defendant's contention is that this is a debt which arose out of an implied contract. The claim of the plaintiff is that the obligation is one arising solely by virtue of an exercise of the state's taxing power delegated to it as a municipality. The precise question for determination then is whether this action to recover an assessment of special benefits is an action on simple or implied contract. The steps taken by the plaintiff, as set forth in the complaint, pursuant to which this assessment became due and payable from the defendants, comprise the usual procedure utilized in such an exercise of...
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State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., Nos. 18462
...capacity), overruled in part on other grounds by Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 56 A.2d 650 (1947); Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. Co., 131 Conn. 50, 54, 37 A.2d 693 (1944) (same); In re Title & Guaranty Co., 109 Conn. 45, 55, 145 A. 151 (1929) (“a sovereign [s]tate cannot be barred of......
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R.A. Civitello Co. v. City of New Haven, 3310
... ... Counsel, New Haven, with whom, on brief, was Carolyn W. Kone, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Bridgeport, for appellant (named defendant) ... Robert B. Cohen, with whom, on brief, were ... Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 204, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); Bridgeport v ... Page 545 ... Schwarz Bros. Co., 131 Conn. 50, 54, 37 A.2d 693 (1944)." (Emphasis added.) Department of Transportation ... ...
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State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors
...455 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 269, 56 A.2d 650 (1947); Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. Co., 131 Conn. 50, 54, 37 A.2d 693 (1944). Ordinary is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1951) as "regular; usual; normal; common; reasonable." In t......
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State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc.
...capacity), overruled in part on other grounds by Anderson v. Bridgeport, 134 Conn. 260, 56 A.2d 560 (1947); Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. Co., 131 Conn. 50, 54, 37 A.2d 693 (1944) (same); In re Title & Guaranty Co., 109 Conn. 45, 55, 145 A. 151 (1929) ("a sovereign [s]tate cannot be barred of......