City of Brighton v. Gibson
| Citation | 501 So.2d 1239 |
| Parties | CITY OF BRIGHTON, a municipal corporation, et al. v. Queen E. GIBSON. Civ. 5423. |
| Decision Date | 16 January 1987 |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
William A. Short, Jr., Bessemer, and David A. Hassinger of Porter, Porter and Hassinger, Birmingham, for appellants.
W. Lewis Garrison, Jr., of Corley, Moncus, Bynum & De Buys, Birmingham, for appellee.
This is a case in which an employee of the City of Brighton, Alabama, sued the City for the payment of back wages and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981), claimed damages for the violation of certain constitutional rights.
Following ore tenus proceedings, the trial court held that the employee was entitled to her back wages, or salary, and it entered a judgment in her favor in the amount of $2,880. The trial court further found that the employee's constitutional rights had been violated, and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its companion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981), it awarded the employee attorney fees in the amount of $4,814.34, plus $116.34 for expenses.
The City appeals. We affirm.
The record reveals that the City's mayor hired the employee on April 5, 1985, as her personal secretary. Under the terms of her employment, the employee was to work forty hours per week at $3.35 an hour, the federal minimum wage. It was stipulated that the employee worked for the City for twenty weeks. She was not paid for any of her work during that time.
The City Council did not approve the hiring of the employee by the mayor. Approximately one week after April 5, 1985, the City Council issued a memorandum which stated that all persons who had not been hired by or under the authority of the City Council would receive no compensation. Thereafter, each time a payroll check was prepared for the employee it was apparently voided by members of the City Council. In June 1985 the City Council passed an ordinance which gave it the exclusive authority to employ and discharge City employees.
On appeal the City contends that the trial court erred in holding that the mayor had the power to hire the employee without the consent of the City Council. We disagree.
The powers and duties of the mayor and City Council in towns and cities in this state are governed primarily by Ala.Code (1975), §§ 11-43-1 through -163. Section 11-43-81 provides in pertinent part: "The mayor shall be the chief executive officer, and shall have general supervision and control of all other officers and the affairs of the city or town...." (Emphasis supplied.)
In our opinion § 11-43-81, in the absence of any contrary statute or other contrary appropriate authority, gave the mayor the authority to hire the employee as her personal secretary without obtaining the consent of the City Council. Such authority is implicit in and merely part of the broad power granted to the mayor by § 11-43-81 to supervise and control the affairs of the City.
The City's reliance upon Ala.Code (1975), §§ 11-43-4 and 11-43-7, is misplaced. Section 11-43-4 gives the City Council the power to determine the City's officers, their salary, the manner of their election, and their terms of office. That statute has nothing to do with the hiring of administrative personnel by the mayor to carry on the functions of her office. Section 11-43-7 gives the City Council the authority to prescribe by ordinance the salaries of City employees whose compensation is not fixed by law. That statute does not address the question presented on appeal of who is authorized to hire City employees.
The evidence presented to the trial court provides further support for the conclusion that the mayor had the authority to hire the employee without the approval of the City Council. As already noted, the City Council did not take steps to claim the exclusive authority to hire City employees until after the employee was hired by the mayor.
Moreover, although the City Council voided the employee's paychecks, the record does not indicate that the City Council ever took steps to discharge the employee from her job. She was apparently still working for the City when she initiated this case.
We note that the evidence was presented to the trial court ore tenus. Under such circumstances we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Roden v. Roden, 466 So.2d 142 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). Its judgment is presumed to be correct and will not be reversed unless it is so unsupported by the evidence that it is plainly and palpably wrong. Threadgill v. Threadgill, 487 So.2d 935 (Ala.Civ.App.1986).
Clearly, the trial court's judgment is not plainly and palpably wrong. The evidence, as well as the...
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Wallace v. City of Montgomery
...Specifically, the Mayor's instructions as to personnel matters could be deemed to be city policy. See, e.g., City of Brighton v. Gibson, 501 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App.1987). Moreover, the plaintiff has presented evidence that the investigations were supervised by the plaintiff's superiors who......
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Bryant v. Nichols, Civ. A. No. 88-T-623-N.
...matters. 1975 Ala.Code § 11-43-81 (1977). A plausible reading of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals' decision in City of Brighton v. Gibson, 501 So.2d 1239 (Ala.Civ.App. 1987), in which the appellate court held that the mayor had authority to hire a personal secretary without obtaining the ......
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Scott v. Coachman
...is the appointing authority. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals seemingly recognized this possibility in City of Brighton v. Gibson, 501 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Ala.Civ.App.1987), stating: “In our opinion § 11–43–81, in the absence of any contrary statute or other contrary appropriate authority, ......