City of Brownsville v. Wheeler, 11889.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1948
• Docket Number: No. 11889.,11889.
• Citation: 220 S.W.2d 452
• Parties: CITY OF BROWNSVILLE v. WHEELER et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

220 S.W.2d 452

CITY OF BROWNSVILLE v.WHEELER et al.

No. 11889.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

November 10, 1948.

Rehearing Denied November 24, 1948.

Appeal from 103rd District Court, Cameron County; Jas. S. Graham, Judge.

Suit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act by the City of Brownsville

against Joe Wheeler and others for a decree holding a statute, requiring the city to assume the bonded indebtedness of and flat rates due Cameron County Water Control and Improvement DistrictNo. 7 on territory thereof annexed to the city, and a city ordinance and annexation election proceedings and requirements thereunder, invalid, or declaring the parties' rights and other legal relations in specified particulars, if the statute be held valid.From a judgment upholding the validity of the statute, ordinance, and election proceedings and requirements and declaring the parties' rights in the particulars specified, the city appeals.

Reversed and rendered.

Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed and set aside and trial court's judgment affirmed in part by the Supreme Court, 220 S.W.2d 457.

Jack Weich and R. A. Hightower, both of Brownsville, for appellant.

E. T. Yates, of Brownsville, for appellees.

MURRAY, Justice.

This suit was instituted by the City of Brownsville, a home rule city under Art. XI, § 5, Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St., against Cameron County Water Control and Improvement DistrictNo. 7, organized under Art. XVI, § 59, Constitution of Texas, and against several individuals as representatives of a larger class of persons, seeking under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Art. 2524 — 1, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., to obtain a court decree holding Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., and City OrdinanceNo. 218 and the election proceedings and requirements thereunder, to be invalid.And, in the alternative, the city prayed that in the event the court should hold Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a to be valid, then that the court declare the rights and other legal relations between the parties in certain specified particulars.

The water district answered taking the position that it was immaterial to it whether the court held Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a void or not, and also whether the court upheld ordinance 218 and the election proceedings and the requirements thereunder.

The individual defendants answered contending that Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a, ordinance 218, and the election proceedings had thereunder, were all valid and further prayed for a declaratory judgment in certain specified particulars.

The case was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury upon an agreed statement of facts and resulted in judgment upholding the validity of Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a, city ordinance No. 218 and the election proceedings and the requirements thereunder, and also rendering a declaratory judgment upon the particulars specified.From which judgment the City of Brownsville has prosecuted this appeal.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in holding Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a, city ordinance 218, and the election proceedings and the requirements thereunder, constitutional, because such violate Art. 1, § 17 of the Constitution of Texas, in that it confers on the property owners in the annexed territory irrevocable and uncontrollable grants of special privilege and immunities, to-wit: (1)They are thereby relieved from paying their bond taxes to the water district, (2)they are given free of charge all the benefits and privileges accruing from property ownership in a water control and improvement district, and (3)they are given two valuable and distinct benefits for the price of one, i. e., they have all their municipal rights and privileges for which they pay the prevailing city taxes, and they have the water district rights and benefits for which they pay nothing.

In November, 1930, the City of Brownsville, by the enactment of ordinance No. 218, called an election under the provisions of Art. 1182a, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., for the purpose of annexing about 268 acres of land adjacent to the city and lying in Water DistrictNo. 7.In December, 1930, the election was held and the annexation was favored both by the legally qualified property tax-paying voters living in the city and those living in the territory to be annexed, and on January 9, 1931, the City Commission passed a resolution declaring the result of the election and annexing the territory.The city has since that date exercised municipal powers and functions over the territory and it has continuously been treated by the city as a part of the City of Brownsville.From 1931, and each year thereafter, the City of Brownsville has calculated, levied and assessed ad valorem taxes for city purposes against all property within the annexed territory subject to taxation, at the same rate and on an equal basis with all other property within the city.

After such annexation the city again annexed such lands under its charter amendment provisions.

The Water District has continued to exercise the powers and functions of a water control and improvement district over the annexed territory.For the year 1931, and for each year thereafter, the Water District has calculated, levied and assessed ad valorem taxes and flat rate assessments for water district purposes against all property within said territory subject to such taxation and flat rate at the same rate and on an equal basis with all other property within said water district.

At the time of the annexation, the City of Brownsville had a bonded indebtedness of some $2,000,000.00 and the Water District had a bonded indebtedness of some $175,000.00.

The City of Brownsville operated under the provisions of Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a for some six years after such annexation.The system used was for the water district to designate a city employee to accept payment of its taxes.The city would collect the city tax, turn over to such agent the amount of the water district tax and retain the difference.The taxpayer was given receipts both for his city tax and his water district tax.After following this system for some six years the city discontinued the practice and would collect and retain the city tax without paying the water district tax.Some of the land owners in the annexed territory paid both taxes and some have not.The city here gives as its reasons for not paying the water district tax that Sec. 3 of Art. 1182a is unconstitutional and void as being in violation of many provisions of our State Constitution.

Sec. 3, Art. 1182a, reads in part as follows:

"If, at any election to be held under the provisions hereof, a majority of the legally qualified tax paying voters residing within the territorial limits of such city, and those residing within the territorial limits proposed to be annexed, shall each vote in favor of the annexation of such additional territory, said city shall thereby assume all of said bonded indebtedness and flat rates on the territory thus annexed and due such Irrigation District, Water Improvement District or Water Control and Improvement District, or either of them, and shall from thence forth out of the taxes collected on the territory thus annexed pay to said Irrigation District, Water Improvement District or Water Control and Improvement District, said bonded indebtedness and flat rates, owing to such district, or either of them, as same become due and payable, and no city thus annexing such territory shall be entitled to collect any taxes due it from the property owners within the territory annexed until said City shall pay such bonded indebtedness and flat rates, for the current year same become due and payable, and present to said property owner a receipt showing that said City has paid the same."

It is contended by appellees that Sec. 3 is valid because it is a tax-equalization statute.In support of this contention they cite City of Fort Worth v. State, Tex. Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 323, andCity of Houston v. Tod, Tex.Civ.App., 258 S.W. 839.The Fort Worth case simply holds, insofar as it affects the questions here raised, that the method of annexing territory by a home rule city provided for in Art. 1182a is not exclusive, but cumulative of annexation by charter amendment.In that opinion the court did say obiter dictum :

"When the caption and the emergency clause, as well as the second and third sections, of Article 1182a are examined, it seems reasonable to believe that the chief purpose of the act is to provide a method of equalizing taxes in cases where a city annexes territory lying within a water improvement district, or a district of like nature.When we consider the entire act, together with the caption and the emergency clause, we cannot believe that the Legislature intended by its enactment to abolish the established method of annexing territory by charter amendment."

We will discuss this statement later.In the Houston case the City had extended its boundaries for school purposes and had taken a part of another school district, and the court...