City of Brownsville v. Reid

Decision Date16 March 1929
Citation14 S.W.2d 730,158 Tenn. 445
PartiesCITY OF BROWNSVILLE v. REID et al. [a1]
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Haywood County; V. H. Holmes Chancellor.

Suit by the City of Brownsville against Frank A. Reid, trustee, and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Kinney & Wills and A. M. Carlton, all of Brownsville, for appellant.

J. T Gray, Jr., and Bond & Bond, all of Brownsville, and W. G Timberlake, of Jackson, for appellees.

COOK J.

The bill was filed to recover taxes alleged to be delinquent amounting to $2,580, and also to recover interest and penalties.

Complainant's right to maintain the bill was challenged by a demurrer containing several grounds, among them that chapter 92, Private Acts of 1925, incorporating the city of Brownsville, is void because two distinct subjects are embraced in the caption and the body of the act, contrary to article 2,§ 17, of the Constitution. The chancellor sustained this ground of demurrer and another to the effect that complainant had no corporate existence on January 10, 1925, and could not for that reason impose taxes.

Complainant appealed and has assigned errors. The determinative question presented by the assignments of error is whether or not the act violates article 2, § 17, of the Constitution, which provides: "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title."

This provision of the Constitution, requiring that the caption of an act disclose the subject of legislation expressed in the body, was designed to prevent surprise, and also to confine the act to a single subject of legislation, to avoid the evils attending omnibus legislation. Railroad v. Crider, 91 Tenn. 494, 19 S.W. 618; Palmer v. Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 S.W. 236.

The requirement that legislative acts deal with but one subject refers to the body, not the caption, and an act dealing with a single subject, properly expressed in a caption that is broader than the act, will not render the act nugatory, provided the caption does not conceal and cover up incongruous legislation, or, to otherwise express it, if the real subject of legislation is not obscured by the subject-matter stated in the caption. This proposition is illustrated by the cases of Green v. State, 15 Lea, 711; State v. Whitworth, 8 Lea, 596; Luehrman v. Taxing District, 2 Lea, 429; Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 519; State v. Hamby, 114 Tenn. 361, 84 S.W. 622; Knoxville v. Gass, 119 Tenn. 451, 104 S.W. 1084; Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 50 S.W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303; Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 480, 95 S.W. 1012, 115 Am. St. Rep. 805.

It is said by defendants that in both its body and caption the act of incorporation contains two subjects of legislation: (1) The incorporation of Brownsville; and (2) the establishment of a special school district.

In the comprehensive caption, the object to incorporate Brownsville and clothe it with essential powers is expressed, and the caption concludes, "and to create a special school district in said city and to appoint the school board."

While the caption apparently expresses the intention of creating a municipal corporation and a school district, the body of the act carries no such implication, and is not susceptible of any such construction.

By section 24 of the act it is declared:

"That the city of Brownsville is hereby created a special school district, and that the public or common schools of said town shall be managed and controlled by a board of school directors, composed of six directors or persons, who shall be bona fide citizens and residents of said town, whose term of office shall be six years. * * *"

The board of directors thus provided for are declared to be-

"A body corporate in like manner as district school directors now are under the general public school laws and with the same powers and duties.

Said directors and especially the chairman and clerk shall be under the general public school laws of this state. Said board of school directors may take and hold real and personal property for public school purposes and may sell and convey the same when for the best interests and advantages of the public schools of the city. The general laws of this state in regard to common or public schools shall apply to the said city of Brownsville, as far...

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1 cases
  • Elliott v. Fuqua
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 18 October 1947
    ... ... title.' See, also, Patterson et al. v. Town of Tracy ... City et al., 183 Tenn. 160, 191 S.W.2d 432; Wilson ... v. State, 143 Tenn. 55, 224 S.W. 168; Mayor & ... 387; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 154 ... Tenn. 208, 285 S.W. 582; City of Brownsville v ... Reid, 158 Tenn. 445, 14 S.W.2d 730; and State ex ... rel. Melton v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293, ... ...

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