City of Burien v. Kiga
| Decision Date | 20 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 70830-4.,70830-4. |
| Citation | 144 Wn.2d 819,31 P.3d 659,144 Wash.2d 819 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | CITY OF BURIEN, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Pasco, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Carnation, a Washington municipal corporation, Southwest Youth and Family Services, Inc., William P. Mallow, City of Bainbridge Island, a Washington municipal corporation, Dwight Sutton, Gilbert Bailey, Janet Bailey, Housing Resources Board, City of Richland, a Washington municipal corporation, Pierce County, City of Des Moines, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Newcastle, a Washington municipal corporation, King County Fire Protection District, a Washington municipal corporation, Skamania County, City of Duvall, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Kenmore, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Maple Valley, a Washington municipal corporation, City of North Bend, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Pacific, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Renton, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Tukwila, a Washington municipal corporation, Town of Hunts Point, a Washington municipal corporation, City of Olympia, a Washington municipal corporation, Clark County, City of Spokane, a Washington municipal corporation, Scott Noble, King County Assessor, King County, Kitsap County, Spokane County, Stevens County, Whitman County, Lewis County, Thurston County, Ports Association, Respondents, v. Frederick C. KIGA, Director, Washington State Department of Revenue, and State of Washington, Appellants. |
Pacific Legal Foundation, Russell C. Brooks, Robin Rivett, Bellevue, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation, et al.
Garvey, Schubert & Barer, William C. Severson, Michael C. Subit, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Association of Wash. Business.
Christine Gregoire, Atty. Gen., James Pharris, Asst., Cameron Comfort, Asst., Olympia, for Appellant State, et al.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Margaret Pahl, Deputy, Jeffery A. Richard, Deputy, Seattle, Russell Hauge, Kitsap County Prosecutor, Sue A. Tanner, Deputy, Port Orchard, Evans & Kerr, Leland Kerr, Kennewick, William Mallow, Thomas Ahearne, Seattle, Michael Weight, Burien City Atty., Burien, Greg Rubstello, Mark Sidran, Seattle City Atty., Quentin Yerxa, Asst., Cynthia Seu, Asst., Sandra Cohen, Asst., Michele Radosevich, Seattle, Michael Ruark, Bellevue, Gary McLean, Des Moines City Atty., Des Moines, Rod Kaseguma, Bellevue, Mark Erickson, Olympia City Atty., Olympia, James H. Kaufman, Whitman County Prosecutor, Ronald D. Shirley, Deputy, Colfax, Jeremy Randolph, Lewis County Prosecutor, Chehalis, Ed Holm, Thurston County Prosecutor, Jane D. Futterman, Deputy, Clark Snure, Brian Snure, Des Moines, Michael Kenyon, Issaquah, Robert Beaumier, Asst. Spokane City Atty., Steven Tucker, Spokane County Prosecutor, James P. Emacio, Deputy, John G. Wetle, Stevens County Prosecutor, Lloyd Nickel, Deputy, Colville, Preston, Gates & Ellis, Paul J. Lawrence, Seattle, for Respondents.
This case concerns the constitutionality of Initiative 722 (I-722). We hold I-722 violates the single subject clause of Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 and, therefore, must be voided in its entirety. We affirm the Thurston County Superior Court.
I-722 was presented to the people of Washington State on November 7, 2000, under the following ballot title:
Shall certain 1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?
Clerk's Papers at 25. I-722 purported to grant tax relief by nullifying various 1999 tax increases and authorizing a onetime refund, and by changing the method of assessing property taxes, including imposing a 2 percent cap on property tax increases. I-722 passed, receiving 58 percent approval of the voters.
On November 9, 2000, the first lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of I-722 was filed in Thurston County Superior Court. Within the next few weeks, several additional lawsuits were filed in Thurston County and other counties. Most of the suits filed elsewhere were transferred to Thurston County Superior Court. On November 30, 2000, Judge Christine A. Pomeroy entered an order consolidating all of the I-722 cases before her. On the same day, Judge Pomeroy also entered an order granting a preliminary injunction against the implementation or enforcement of I-722 (preliminary injunction).
The plaintiffs (Respondents in the present action and hereinafter referred to as such in this opinion) were comprised of several counties, cities, and other municipal corporations, as well as several individuals and nonprofit organizations. The State of Washington and Frederick C. Kiga, director of the Department of Revenue, were named as defendants (Appellants in the present action and hereinafter referred to as such in this opinion), as well as certain other counties and county officers. Because it was unclear which local governments would be bound by the preliminary injunction, numerous additional requests for joinder were made. On January 9, 2001, Judge Pomeroy entered an order consolidating an additional lawsuit with the main case and creating two plaintiff classes: (1) all Washington taxing districts; and (2) all Washington counties that wished to join in the litigation. The sponsors of I-722 intervened in the action and participated fully in the superior court proceedings.
The parties filed motions and cross-motions for summary judgment on the class claims and certain interpretive issues, raising issues as to the "facial" constitutionality of I-722. On February 23, 2001, the motions were argued. That same day, Judge Pomeroy entered an order granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment on the class claims (Ruling). Judge Pomeroy ruled I-722 unconstitutional on four separate constitutional grounds and further ordered a permanent injunction against implementation and enforcement of I-722. On two other constitutional challenges, Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 and art. XI, § 12, Judge Pomeroy upheld I-722's constitutionality; however, that determination had no effect on the I-722 Ruling under the first four constitutional infirmities.
Appellants sought review of Judge Pomeroy's Ruling. The sponsors of I-722 initially filed but later withdrew their appeal, citing financial hardship; the sponsors rely on the State to defend I-722. We granted review of the issues raised by remaining Appellants, Respondents, and amici curiae of both parties.
We begin our analysis by determining whether I-722 violates the single subject clause of Wash. Const. art. II, § 19. In approving an initiative measure, the people exercise the same power of sovereignty as the Legislature when enacting a statute. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995). This power is subject to the same constitutional restraints placed upon the Legislature when making laws. State ex rel. Heavey v. Murphy, 138 Wash.2d 800, 808, 982 P.2d 611 (1999). Consequently, even though an initiative passes by the majority of the voters, it will be struck down if it runs afoul of Washington's constitution.
In analyzing whether an initiative violates the Washington constitution, we must determine whether the initiative embodies two unrelated subjects in violation of the single subject clause. Article II, section 19 provides: "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Article II, section 19 applies to initiatives as well as bills. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees,127 Wash.2d at 551-54,901 P.2d 1028. The purpose of the single subject clause is to prohibit the enactment of an unpopular provision pertaining to one subject by attaching it to a more popular provision whose subject is unrelated. Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash.2d 191, 198, 235 P.2d 173 (1951). When an initiative embodies two unrelated subjects, it is impossible for the court to assess whether either subject would have received majority support if voted on separately. Consequently, the entire initiative must be voided. Power, Inc.,39 Wash.2d at 200,235 P.2d 173.
In making the determination of whether an initiative violates the single subject clause, we first look to the ballot title to determine whether it is general or restrictive. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 207-10, 11 P.3d 762 (2000). The type of title determines the type of analysis we undertake when reviewing an initiative under article II, section 19. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 205-06, 11 P.3d 762. A general title is broad, comprehensive, and generic as opposed to a restrictive title that is specific and narrow. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 207-08, 210, 11 P.3d 762. In assessing whether a title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the subject or subjects of an act. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 209, 11 P.3d 762. A few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general topic stated, are all that is necessary. Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 209, 11 P.3d 762 (citing State ex rel. Scofield v. Easterday, 182 Wash. 209, 212, 46 P.2d 1052 (1935)).
I-722 contains a general title. As stated previously, the ballot title given to I-722 reads:
Shall certain 1999 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?
Clerk's Papers at 25. While there are some parts of the title that may appear restrictive, when read in its entirety the title broadly encompasses the topic of tax relief.
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