City of Canton v. State

Decision Date08 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. 2000-2130.,2000-2130.
PartiesCITY OF CANTON ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Joseph Martuccio, Canton Law Director, Craig E. Chessler and Robert G. Rubin, Assistant Law Directors, for appellants.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Michael R. Gladman and Elizabeth Luper Schuster, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Municipal League.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

{¶ 1} For many years, the city of Canton has prohibited the placement or use of mobile homes as principal or accessory structures for residential use. Canton Codified Ordinances 1129.11. On March 16, 1998, the city of Canton amended its code to include "manufactured homes" within the definition of "mobile homes." Ordinance No. 49/98, amending Canton Codified Ordinances 1123.57(b). As a result, manufactured homes became prohibited within the city limits as principal or accessory structures for residential use.

{¶ 2} In 1998, the Ohio General Assembly enacted R.C. 3781.184, as part of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 142, relating to manufactured homes. 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7986 (effective March 30, 1999). Subsections (A) and (B) relate to federal construction and safety standards. Subsection (C) of the statute forbids political subdivisions from prohibiting or restricting the location of permanently sited manufactured homes in any zone or district in which a single-family home is permitted. Subsection (D) operates as an exception to subsection (C) and permits private landowners to incorporate restrictive covenants in deeds to prohibit the inclusion of, among other things, manufactured homes.

{¶ 3} On March 29, 1999, the city of Canton filed an action in the Stark County Common Pleas Court, seeking a declaration that R.C. 3781.184 was an unconstitutional infringement of municipal home-rule powers of the city of Canton under Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the uniformity requirements of Section 26, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and the equal protection and due process requirements of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.

{¶ 4} The trial court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, granting Canton's motion and denying the state's motion, and finding that R.C. 3781.184, in its entirety, violated Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution (the "Home-Rule Amendment") in that it was an improper attempt to limit the home-rule powers of the city. The state appealed, and the Stark County Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

{¶ 6} As a threshold matter, we note that although the trial and appellate courts referred to R.C. 3781.184 in its entirety, only (C) and (D) are challenged in this court. {¶ 7} Municipalities derive their powers of self-government directly from Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, which provides:

{¶ 8} "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." See, also, W. Jefferson v. Robinson (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 30 O.O.2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 382, paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶ 9} The court of appeals correctly set forth the three-part test to determine whether a provision of a state statute takes precedence over a municipal ordinance. A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute is a general law. See Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 244-245, 602 N.E.2d 1147, citing Auxter v. Toledo (1962), 173 Ohio St. 444, 20 O.O.2d 71, 183 N.E.2d 920.

{¶ 10} The parties in this matter acknowledge that the first two prongs of the three-part test are met, i.e., that the statute and the ordinance are in conflict, and that the ordinance is an exercise of police power rather than local self-government. Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) are general laws. If R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) are general laws, they take precedence over the city of Canton's zoning ordinance in this conflict. If, however, R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) are not general laws, then they are an unconstitutional attempt to limit the legislative home-rule powers of the city of Canton.

{¶ 11} Because we hold that R.C. 3781.184(C) and (D) are not general laws, we conclude that they violate the Home-Rule Amendment, Section 3, Article XVIII, Ohio Constitution and, as such, must be struck down as unconstitutional. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

{¶ 12} The court of appeals noted that this court has not set forth a bright-line test for determining whether a law is a general law. However, we have enunciated some steadfast parameters in making this determination.

{¶ 13} In 1929, we held that general laws are enacted by the General Assembly "to safeguard the peace, health, morals, and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the state." Schneiderman v. Sesanstein (1929), 121 Ohio St. 80, 82-83, 167 N.E. 158. Moreover, general laws "apply to all parts of the state alike." Id. at 83, 167 N.E. 158. In Schneiderman, this court held that a statute setting speed limits throughout Ohio was a general law. {¶ 14} In a landmark home-rule case in 1965, this court considered a municipal ordinance prohibiting uninvited solicitation of orders for the sale of goods in private homes and a state statute that barred municipalities from enacting such ordinances. See W. Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 30 O.O.2d 474, 205 N.E.2d 382. We held that the statutes in question, R.C. 715.63 and 715.64, which prohibited municipal corporations from requiring licenses to sell certain products, purport only to grant and to limit legislative power of municipal corporations to adopt or enforce police regulations. We concluded that, as such, the statutes were not "general" laws.

{¶ 15} As a rule of law, we held that "[t]he words `general laws' as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution means [sic] statutes setting forth police, sanitary or similar regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar regulations." Id., paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 16} In Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Assn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369, this court considered whether a state statute regulating licensing of residential facilities for mentally retarded individuals was a general law. In concluding that it was not, we repeated the W. Jefferson definition and added that "[t]hese `general laws' are laws operating uniformly throughout the state, * * * which prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate with general uniform application throughout the state under the same circumstances and conditions." Id., 63 Ohio St.2d at 271, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 1369.

{¶ 17} Then, in Clermont Environmental Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 44, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278, this court began to examine statutes in pari materia with other sections of the same chapter rather than in isolation to determine whether they were general laws. Id. at 48, 2 OBR 587, 442 N.E.2d 1278. We held that a statute that was a part of a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the state's control of the disposal of hazardous wastes was a general law. Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.

{¶ 18} In Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 602 N.E.2d 1147, the court struck down an ordinance attempting to exact a fee for the registration or licensure of private investigators because it conflicted with a statewide regulatory program, R.C. Chapter 4749. Id. at syllabus. The statutes contained in that chapter were held to be general laws because they provided for statewide uniformity in the regulation of private investigators. In settling the question of generality, the court continued to view statutory schemes in their entirety, rather than a single statute in isolation, and continued to determine whether the statutes promoted "statewide uniformity." Id. at 244-245, 602 N.E.2d 1147.

{¶ 19} Finally, in Linndale v. State (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 52, 706 N.E.2d 1227, this court summarized the above definitions of "general law" and looked to whether the statute in question was part of a system of uniform statewide regulation on the subject matter, and whether the legislative enactment prescribed a rule of conduct upon citizens generally. Id. at 54-55, 706 N.E.2d 1227. The statute in Linndale, R.C. 4549.17, prohibits local law enforcement officers from issuing speeding and excess weight citations on interstate freeways where, among other things, less than a certain length of freeway is within the jurisdiction of the local government in question. We held that the statute was not part of a system of uniform statewide regulation on the subject of traffic law enforcement, nor did it impose a rule of conduct on citizens generally. As such, it was not a general law, and it was required to yield to the municipal ordinance.

{¶ 20} Against this backdrop of definitions, the court of appeals held that in construing R.C. 3781.184 in its entirety, the statute "is an attempt to provide statewide uniformity of the definition of a manufactured home, and to recognize housing which complies with certain standards as a single-family residence,...

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