City of Carbondale v. Yehling

• Decision Date: 09 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 56984,56984
• Citation: 96 Ill.2d 495,451 N.E.2d 837,71 Ill.Dec. 683
• Parties: , 71 Ill.Dec. 683 The CITY OF CARBONDALE, Appellant, v. Violet Mae YEHLING, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 837

451 N.E.2d 837

96 Ill.2d 495, 71 Ill.Dec. 683

The CITY OF CARBONDALE, Appellant, v. Violet Mae YEHLING, et al., Appellees.

No. 56984.

Supreme Court of Illinois June 9, 1983.

James R. Zimmer, Carbondale, for appellant.

Don E. Prosser, Kimmel, Huffman, Prosser & Kimmel, Ltd., Carbondale, for appellees, Jack C. Atwood, Mary Lou Atwood, and Atwood Drugs, Inc.

John Speroni, Garrison & Garrison, Marion, for appellees, W.E. Kimmel and Euline Kimmel.

William G. Schwartz, Hunter & Schwartz, Carbondale, for appellees Phoenix Cycles, Inc. and Robert Covone.

William L. Broom, III, Barrett, Morris & Broom, Carbondale, for appellees.

CLARK, Justice:

On March 18, 1982, the city of Carbondale filed several petitions for condemnation in the circuit court of Jackson County. Defendants Mary Lou Atwood and Atwood Drugs, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss and traverse asserting that the city of Carbondale lacked legislative authority to acquire the premises sought to be taken under sections 11-74.3-4 and 11-74.4-3 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 24, pars. 11-74.3-4, 11-74.4-3). Defendant Yehling and other defendants alleged that ordinances 81-105 and 82-06 were void since they constituted an improper use of home rule authority, were not authorized by State law, and were unconstitutional under both the United States and Illinois constitutions.

On May 18, the city of Carbondale moved to amend its petitions to delete reference to and reliance upon sections 11-74.3-4 and 11-74.4-3 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 24, pars. 11-74.3-4, 11-74.4-3). The motion was allowed.

The ordinances passed by the city of Carbondale are similar to the Eminent Domain Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 47, par. 1 et seq.) and division 74.4 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 24, par. 11-74.4-1 et seq.).

Motions to dismiss were filed in all cases. On June 15, 1982, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss the petitions in the eight cases before it. On June 25, 1982, the circuit court issued an amended order reaffirming the dismissals, executed a certificate of importance, and certified the following question:

"Does a Home Rule Municipality have the authority under article VII, section 6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution to enact and enforce an ordinance giving said municipality the right to acquire real property by eminent domain?"

On August 9, 1982, this court granted the city's motion for a direct appeal under Rule 302(b) (73 Ill.2d R. 302(b)).

The city of Carbondale, in enacting its eminent domain ordinances, sets forth procedures to exercise eminent domain powers within the city limits of Carbondale for the purpose of redevelopment of the business district.

We first look to the constitutional grant of home rule authority in article VII, section 6(a), of the 1970 Constitution, which provides:

"Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debts." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6(a).

Home rule units were granted broad powers of self-government, and the constitution mandates that such home rule powers be construed liberally. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 6(m).

This court has recognized that the Constitution's home rule provisions represent a significant change from our prior law, substantially and drastically altering the relationship between State and local government. (Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill.2d 161, 290 N.E.2d 240.) At the heart of the change is the Constitution's rejection of Dillon's Rule, which had held that units of local government could exercise only those powers expressly granted by State statute or necessarily and fairly implied from the legislature's expressed grants. (1 J. Dillon, Municipal Corporations 448-49 (5th ed. 1911).) In Kanellos v. County of Cook (1972), 53 Ill.2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, the court said that "the power of the General Assembly to limit the actions of home-rule units has been circumscribed and home-rule units have been constitutionally delegated greater autonomy in the determination of their government and affairs. To accomplish this independence, the constitution conferred substantial powers upon home-rule units subject only to those restrictions imposed or authorized therein."

The question we are faced with then is twofold: (1) Does the subject matter pertain to the city's government and affairs? and if so, (2) Is the ordinance preempted by State regulation of the subject matter? ¹

Does the exercise of the home rule unit's eminent domain power to condemn private property within the city of Carbondale for public use pertain to the city's government and affairs?

The city of Carbondale passed the ordinances in question for the express purpose of urban redevelopment of Carbondale's business district and sought to accomplish redevelopment and eradication of blight by exercising the power of eminent domain. The defendants assert that the language of the Committee on Local Government of the constitutional convention supports their position that any exercise of eminent domain powers, whether within the boundaries of Carbondale's city limits or not, does not pertain to Carbondale's government and affairs. The Committee on Local Government of the constitutional convention said:

"[T]he powers of home-rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the state or the nation. Their powers should not extend to such matters as divorce, real property law, trusts, contracts, etc. which are generally recognized as falling within the competence of state rather than local authorities. * * * The intent of this draft as in the Committee's proposal is to give broad powers to deal with local problems to local authorities." 7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1621-22 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings).

Certain powers are of a State or regional nature and do not therefore pertain to a home rule unit's affairs. We do not believe that the inclusion of real property law in the comments as to the matters to which home rule powers should not extend proscribe a home rule eminent domain ordinance. It is apparent that the language quoted in the context of the comments was a further clarification in leaving to the State those traditional areas of the law that are of statewide concern. Those comments reflect an intention that a divorce decree entered in Chicago will be honored in Waukegan, a contract signed in Evanston will not require additional consideration to constitute a valid contract in Peoria, and what is essential for a valid conveyance of a parcel of land in Joliet is also essential if the land is to be conveyed in Kankakee.

The city of Carbondale seeks to utilize eminent domain powers to stimulate its economic development in constructing a hotel, convention center and parking garage in Carbondale's business district. The land to be taken is all within the limits of Carbondale.

In our prior case law since the adoption of the 1970 Constitution the "pertaining to government and affairs question" has been raised on a number of occasions and most often answered in the negative when the interests affected extended well beyond those confined to home rule units of government. For instance, this court rejected the validity of a home rule environmental ordinance which would have affected a regional sanitary district and its member units of government in Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill.2d 256, 261, 347 N.E.2d 716. The court found that because of its effect the ordinance was beyond the enacting unit's home rule powers and functions and not pertaining to the unit's government and affairs. 63 Ill.2d 256, 260, 347 N.E.2d 716.

Another case where a home rule ordinance was struck down as not pertaining to local government and affairs was McLorn v. City of East St. Louis (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 148, 61 Ill.Dec. 107, 434 N.E.2d 44. The city ordinance in that case prohibited non-wage garnishment of city funds deposited in financial institutions in East St. Louis. The appellate court held that the institution of banking is statewide and of such a nature that the ordinance could not qualify as one that addressed local government and affairs.

In County of Cook v. John Sexton Contractors Co. (1979), 75 Ill.2d 494, 27 Ill.Dec. 489, 389 N.E.2d 553, this court gave its most comprehensive analysis of the "pertaining to local government and affairs" clause. The court said that a matter may be of both statewide and local concern but only if it is sufficiently local in character is it subject to home rule powers. (75 Ill.2d 494, 509, 27 Ill.Dec. 489, 389 N.E.2d 553.) In Sexton the court balanced the potential impact on persons and property not within Cook County against the home rule unit's interest in local regulation and concluded that while the county must comply with the environmental regulations of the State Environmental Protection Agency in zoning land for sanitary landfill sites, the State agency must also comply with the home rule unit's valid zoning ordinances when issuing permits for landfill sites. 75 Ill.2d 494, 516, 27 Ill.Dec. 489, 389 N.E.2d 553.

While we view the concerns of Carbondale in the instant case to be sufficiently local in character that the city's purpose "pertain[s] to the local government and affairs," we next have to determine whether enforcement of the city's eminent domain power as outlined in the city ordinance impermissibly interferes with the State judiciary system. We find that in imposing duties upon county and judicial officials and prescribing the order of certain court proceedings, the ordinance is no longer local in character. Although Carbondale's purpose in enacting the...