City of Casper v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 904, 85-136

• Citation: 713 P.2d 1187
• Decision Date: 11 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-136,85-136
• Parties: The CITY OF CASPER, Wyoming, a Municipal Corporation; Ken Erickson, City Manager; Joe Corrigan, Mayor; Frank Ellis, Bob Johnson, Larry Clapp, Robert Heizer, Mary Behrens, Kaye McCrary, Kenneth Post and Terry Wingerter, Casper City Council Members; Kevin Burt, Personnel Director of Casper; and Ron Baum, Chief of Fire Department of City of Casper, Appellants (Defendants), v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 904, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1187

713 P.2d 1187

The CITY OF CASPER, Wyoming, a Municipal Corporation; Ken Erickson, City Manager; Joe Corrigan, Mayor; Frank Ellis, Bob Johnson, Larry Clapp, Robert Heizer, Mary Behrens, Kaye McCrary, Kenneth Post and Terry Wingerter, Casper City Council Members; Kevin Burt, Personnel Director of Casper; and Ron Baum, Chief of Fire Department of City of Casper, Appellants (Defendants), v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 904, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 85-136.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 11, 1986.

H.B. Harden, Jr., City Atty., and James R. Bell, Deputy City Atty., Casper, for appellants.

Rodger McDaniel of Southeast Wyoming Law Offices, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY ^*, BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action in which the district court held that a binding and valid contract was made between the City of Casper and appellee as a result of negotiations for a 1984-1985 fiscal year labor agreement.

We reverse and remand.

Negotiations have been annually carried on between the City of Casper and appellee for a number of years pursuant to §§ 27-10-101 through 27-10-109, W.S.1977 (June 1983 Replacement). ¹ Appellee was selected as bargaining agent for the Casper fire fighters pursuant to §§ 27-10-102 and 27-10-103. Timely request for a meeting was made pursuant to §§ 27-10-104 and 27-10-109, and discussions relative to a 1984-1985 contract began within the ten-day period set by § 27-10-104 between representatives of appellee and three employees of the City of Casper: Kevin Burt, personnel director; Ron Baum, fire chief; and Rebecca Gunther, administrative analyst. Kevin Burt had represented the City in negotiations with appellee for agreements covering the two previous years.

At the outset of negotiations, the union and the City agreed to ten "Ground Rules and Negotiations." These rules covered such things as time and places for meetings, keeping of minutes, caucuses, press releases, etc. Rules 6 and 7 provided:

"6. Any agreement reached by the parties is tentative until ratified by the City Council of the City of Casper and by the Membership of Local No. 904.

"7. Principal negotiators for both parties may tentatively accept contract clauses by having both sides initial the clause, thereby removing it from the list of items to be resolved. However, all such agreements reached by the parties are tentative. Nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed to."

After several meetings, agreement was reached on April 6, 1984, by these negotiators on all issues of a contract. Mr. Burt said, " 'We have a contract,' " but he contends that such statement was meant to be conditioned on ground rules 6 and 7, supra. The city manager of the City of Casper did not approve items in the contract relating to paid holidays on "Casper Day" and on the employee's birthday. A written contract presented to appellee reflected these changes in the understanding reached by the negotiators. The membership of the appellee approved a contract without the changes made by the city manager. The arbitration deadline set forth in § 27-10-106 had passed when the written contract was presented to appellee.

Appellee contends that a valid and binding oral contract was made at the close of the April 6, 1984, meeting. Appellants contend that a contract could not exist until approved by the city council as required by the ground rules for negotiations and by law.

A labor contract may be an oral one. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 158(d)) provides for "the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party." ² Section 27-10-104, supra note 1, places an obligation on the City "to cause any agreement resulting from negotiations to be reduced to a written contract." In this case, if there was a proper oral agreement between appellee and the City at the close of the April 6, 1984, meeting, we should affirm the district court. The question, however, is whether or not Kevin Burt, Ron Baum or Rebecca Gunther had authority to make such agreement in light of (1) rules 6 and 7 of the "Ground Rules and Negotiations," supra, which provide that any agreement is tentative until ratified by the city council; and (2) § 27-10-108, supra note 1, which provides that a collective bargaining agreement must be "actually negotiated" by the "corporate authorities."

Although rules 6 and 7 of the "Ground Rules and Negotiations" would seem to reflect a recognition by appellee that it was not within the scope of the powers of Kevin Burt, Ron Baum and Rebecca Gunther to enter into a binding agreement with appellee, we need not give further attention to this aspect of the case inasmuch as the fact that the negotiations were not conducted by the "corporate authorities" of the City necessitates a reversal of this case.

The issue was resolved over ten years ago by this Court in Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., Wyo., 518 P.2d 931 (1974), in which we held that the fire fighters properly refused to bargain with four persons appointed by the mayor ³ for such purpose since they were not "corporate authorities" as defined by the statute. We there referred to the definition of "corporate authorities" set out in § 27-10-101(a)(ii), supra note 1, and we said:

" * * * [T]he term 'corporate authorities,' as used in statutes such as we are concerned with, means those municipal officers who are either directly elected by the inhabitants of the municipality or are appointed in some mode to which they [the inhabitants] have given their consent. * * * " (Emphasis and bracketed material in original. Footnote omitted.) Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., supra at 933.

It may be time consuming and perhaps distasteful for a mayor, councilman, city manager or county commissioner to be present and direct negotiations with the bargaining agent of the fire fighters. Nevertheless, such has been mandated by the legislature. The requirements and procedure for negotiation between fire fighters and the city, town or county are set forth in § 27-10-101 et seq., supra note 1. Section 27-10-104 provides that "[i]t shall be the obligation of the city, * * * through its corporate authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with" the representative of the bargaining agent of the fire fighters. The term "corporate authorities" is defined in § 27-10-101(a)(ii), supra note 1, and neither Kevin Burt, Ron Baum nor Rebecca Gunther qualify as a corporate authority under that definition. Such definition provides that a corporate authority status exists for a person only if he has the duty "to establish wages, salaries, rates of pay, working conditions, and other conditions of employment of fire fighters." (Emphasis added.) Only the city manager and the city council have authority to take action relative to salaries of all employees of the City of Casper except for the city manager, attorney and municipal judges. ⁴

The legislature has mandated that negotiations with representatives of the bargaining agent of the fire fighters be by the "corporate authorities" of the city, town or county; i.e., by the mayor, city manager, or members of the council of a city or town, and by the county commissioners of a county.

" * * * Mandatory statutes must be obeyed, and courts have no right to make law contrary to that prescribed by the legislature. * * * " Thompson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778, 787 (1982).

Courts will not usurp or encroach upon the legislative function. Kennedy v. State, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1014 (1977); Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo., 598 P.2d 432 (1979).

Neither party can enforce an agreement made other than as empowered by the legislature to be made. This fact was made plain in Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F. in 1974, and both parties are presumed to have knowledge thereof. Thus, a valid agreement was not made in this instance.

Both parties having moved for a summary judgment, the summary judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and the cause is remanded with instructions to enter a summary judgment in favor of appellants.

* Retired November 30, 1985.

1 Section 27-10-101 provides:

"(a) As used in this act [ §§ 27-10-101 through 27-10-109] the following terms shall, unless the context requires a different interpretation, have the following meanings:

"(i) The term 'fire fighters' shall mean the paid members of any regularly constituted fire department in any city, town or county within the state;

"(ii) The...