City of Centralia v. Krouse

• Citation: 1872 WL 8250,64 Ill. 19
• Parties: CITY OF CENTRALIAv.JOSEPH KROUSE.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1872
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

64 Ill. 19

1872 WL 8250 (Ill.)

CITY OF CENTRALIA

v.JOSEPH KROUSE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1872.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Clinton county; the Hon. SILAS L. BRYAN, Judge, presiding.

This action was brought by appellee in the circuit court of Marion county. A change of venue was taken, and the cause sent to the circuit court of Clinton county, where the appellee recovered judgment against appellant for $300.

Mr. GEO. F. O'MELVENY and Mr. D. C. JONES, for the appellant.

Messrs. CASEY & DWIGHT, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case brought to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned to the appellee by reason of a defective sidewalk in the city of Centralia.

The only error assigned that we deem material to be considered is the second in the series, viz: that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.

There had been a disastrous fire in the city of Centralia on the 14th or 15th of December, 1870, which destroyed eleven buildings, one of which was owned by the appellee. The sidewalk that had previously been in front of the buildings consumed was made of plank, and was very much damaged and rendered almost impassable by the fire. It was only a few days after the fire, certainly not more than eight or ten days, and whilst the appellee was endeavoring to reach his own premises over the damaged walk, for the purpose of taking from thence some fuel, that he fell and sustained the injuries complained of.

The principal questions that arise in the case are whether the city was guilty of negligence in not repairing the walk in the brief period that intervened between the fire and the happening of the injury to appellee, and whether he was not himself guilty of that degree of contributory negligence that would bar a recovery.

After a most careful consideration of the evidence in the record, we are of opinion that there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the city in making repairs to the damaged walk. Indeed, the evidence shows that the city officers were solicitous in regard to the public safety, and had, before the injury to appellee, erected temporary guards. The law only requires that they should exercise, under all the circumstances, what would be deemed reasonable diligence. A municipal corporation is not liable for every accident that may occur within its limits. It would be a most ruinous rule to adopt. Its officers are not required or expected to do every possible thing that human energy or ingenuity can do to prevent the happening of accidents or injury to the citizen. When they have exercised a reasonable care in that regard, they have discharged their duty to the public. The citizen himself must exercise due care and caution for his own safety, and if for the want of such a degree of care and caution he sustains an injury, he must bear the consequences, however grievous.

The evidence shows that within two or three days after the fire there was quite a fall of snow and sleet, and the weather suddenly became so very cold that it was difficult to procure persons to do work on the streets. It does not appear that there was any suitable weather in which the city authorities could have made the repairs to the walk. The officers, however, with commendable energy, did erect a temporary fence to prevent persons who...