City of Charleston v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 4-12-0810WC
| Decision Date | 12 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-12-0810WC,4-12-0810WC |
| Parties | CITY OF CHARLESTON, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, et al., (John Philpott and State of Illinois Treasurer as custodian of the Rate Adjustment Fund, Appellees). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles County.
¶ 1 Held: (1) Doctrine of judicial estoppel did not bar claimant from recovering benefits under
the Workers' Compensation Act; (2) election of remedies doctrine did not bar award
of workers' compensation benefits; and (3) Commission's decision that claimant's
injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.¶ 2 Claimant, John Philpott, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)) alleging that he sustained a spinal cord injury resulting in paralysis while employed as a firefighter for respondent, the City of Charleston, Illinois. Noting that claimant filed for and was granted a not-in-duty disability pension and that claimant filed a civil suit against it, respondent disputed claimant's entitlement to benefits under the Act, citing the doctrines of estoppel and election of remedies. The arbitrator rejected these arguments and awarded claimant benefits. The Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) corrected some clerical errors, but otherwise affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. On judicial review, the circuit court of Coles County affirmed the decision of the Commission. On appeal before this court, respondent invokes the equitable doctrines of judicial estoppel and election of remedies in support of its position that claimant is precluded from pursuing his claim for benefits under the Act. Alternatively, respondent argues that claimant failed to carry his burden of proof before the Commission that his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶ 4 The facts leading to claimant's injury are undisputed. Claimant was hired by respondent as a firefighter/paramedic in April 1997. On April 5, 2004, claimant and Patrick Goodwin, a fellow firefighter, discussed going to a firefighter and police training facility respondent was building to assist with construction. On April 6, 2004, claimant went home after his shift ended at 7 a.m., and changed out of his uniform. Later that morning, claimant borrowed a flatbed trailer from a neighbor and drove in his pick-up truck with Goodwin to Coles Station, Illinois, to pick up some steel railroadrails which had been donated to respondent for use at the training facility. After picking up the rails, claimant and Goodwin proceeded to the training facility to unload the rails using a backhoe. To that end, claimant and Goodwin placed a chain around the rails. Goodwin then used the backhoe to lift the rails off of the flatbed trailer. During the unloading process, the backhoe lowered suddenly and pinned claimant against the flatbed trailer. As a result of the accident, claimant suffered a severe spinal cord injury resulting in paralysis. Following the accident, and until August 2005, respondent voluntarily paid claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and medical benefits. See 820 ILCS 305/8(a), 8(b) (West 2004).
¶ 6 In March 2005, claimant filed a three-count complaint against respondent in the circuit court of Coles County (case No. 05 L 16). Relevant here, counts II and III of the complaint alleged that claimant's injuries were the result of respondent's negligence. In July 2005, respondent filed a motion to dismiss counts II and III of the complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2004)). Respondent argued in its motion that claimant's lawsuit was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2004) (); see also 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2004)). On May 26, 2006, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to claimant's employment status at the time of theaccident.
¶ 7 In June 2007, claimant filed a motion to amend his complaint in case No. 05 L 16. In the motion, claimant stated that he was seeking to amend the complaint "to make clear that [he] is alleging that at the time of his injury he was not within the scope and course of his employment." Counts II and III of the amended complaint again alleged negligence on the part of respondent related to the injuries claimant sustained on April 6, 2004.1 In addition, both counts stated that at the time of the accident, claimant "was off duty and was not within the scope or course of his employment."
¶ 8 Following extensive discovery, including the taking of numerous depositions, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on two grounds. First, respondent reasserted that the Act's exclusivity provisions (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2004)) barred claimant's suit because claimant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Second, respondent argued that it is immune from liability under sections 2-109, 2-201 and 3-108 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201, 3-108 (West 2004)). On August 12, 2008, the trial court denied respondent's motion as to the Act's exclusive-remedy provision, again finding that issues of material fact existed as to whether claimant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his injuries. However, the court granted summary judgment in respondent's favor based on the Tort Immunity Act. The trial court's ruling was affirmed on appeal (see Philpott v. City of Charleston, No. 4-08-0609 (June 3, 2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and the Illinois SupremeCourt denied leave to appeal. (Philpott v. City of Charleston, 233 Ill. 2d 599 (2009)).
¶ 10 Meanwhile, in February 2005, claimant, without the assistance of legal counsel, filed an application with the Board of Trustees of the Charleston Firefighters' Pension Fund (Board) for a line-of-duty disability pension (see 40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2004)) arising out of the events of April 6, 2004. On August 9, 2006, after retaining counsel, claimant moved to withdraw his application for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Board granted claimant's request on August 29, 2006.
¶ 11 In February 2008, claimant filed an application for a not-in-duty disability pension pursuant to section 4-111 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (see 40 ILCS 5/4-111 (West 2004)) also based on the event of April 6, 2004. The matter proceeded to a hearing before the Board on June 17, 2008. On September 3, 2008, the Board issued a decision and order granting claimant a not-in-duty disability pension with a commencement date of February 1, 2008. Claimant sought administrative review of the Board's decision in the circuit court of Coles County, challenging the commencement date of the pension benefits. Claimant argued that the benefits should be retroactive to the date he filed his application for a line-of-duty disability pension in 2005. On April 3, 2009, the circuit court entered an order affirming the decision of the Board. The appellate court affirmed the Board's determination as to the commencement date of claimant's pension benefits (Philpott v. Board of Trustees of City of Charleston Firefighters' Pension Fund, 397 Ill. App. 3d 397 (2010)) and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal (Philpott v. Board of Trustees of City of Charleston Firefighters' Pension Fund, 236 Ill. 2d 573 (2010)).
¶ 12 On August 31, 2009, during the pendency of the foregoing appeals, claimant submitted anapplication for a line-of-duty disability pension arising out of the accident of April 6, 2004. See 40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2004). On February 3, 2010, claimant filed a petition for mandamus in the circuit court of Coles County. According to that petition, the Board refused to rule on his application for a line-of-duty disability pension on the basis that it does not have "jurisdiction" to grant the relief requested. Claimant requested the issuance of an order directing the Board "to consider and vote upon the [claimant's] 'In Line of Duty' disability pension [a]pplication."
¶ 14 On January 19, 2007, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Act, seeking benefits for the injuries he sustained on April 6, 2004. An arbitration hearing on claimant's application was held on June 24, 2010. Prior to taking evidence, the arbitrator allowed each party to make an opening statement. In his opening statement, claimant's counsel advised that the evidence would show that claimant was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the injury on April 6, 2004. Respondent's attorney asserted that the evidence would show that by the actions of claimant himself through his allegations in the civil case, his deposition in the civil case, and his...
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