City of Charlotte v. Local 660, International Association of Firefighters

• Decision Date: 07 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-250,75-250
• Citation: 426 U.S. 283,48 L.Ed.2d 636,96 S.Ct. 2036
• Parties: CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al., Petitioners, v. LOCAL 660, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

426 U.S. 283

96 S.Ct. 2036

48 L.Ed.2d 636

CITY OF CHARLOTTE et al., Petitioners,

v LOCAL 660, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, et al.

No. 75-250.

Argued March 3, 1976.

Decided June 7, 1976.

Syllabus

Petitioner city's refusal to withhold from the paychecks of its firemen dues owing their union, which represents about 351 of the 543 uniformed members of the fire department, Held not to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such refusal must meet only the standard of reasonableness, and this standard is satisfied by the city's offered justification that its practice of allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or department employees is a legitimate method for avoiding the burden of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. Pp. 286-289.

4 Cir., 518 F.2d 83, reversed and remanded.

William A. Watts, Charlotte, N. C., for petitioners.

Jonathan P. Wallas, Charlotte, N. C., for respondents.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The city of Charlotte, N. C., refuses to withhold from the paychecks of its firefighters dues owing to their union, Local 660, International Association of Firefighters. We must decide whether this refusal violates the Eql Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

Local 660 represents about 351 of the 543 uniformed members of the Charlotte Fire Department. Since 1969 the union and individual members have repeatedly requested the city to withhold dues owing to the union from the paychecks of those union members who agree to a checkoff. The city has refused each request. After the union learned that it could obtain a private group life insurance policy for its membership only if it had a dues checkoff agreement with the city, the union and its officers filed suit in federal court alleging, Inter alia, that the city's refusal to withhold the dues of union members violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹ The complaint asserted that since the city withheld amoun from its employees' paychecks for payment to various other organizations, it could not arbitrarily refuse to withhold amounts for payment to the union.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina ruled against the city. The court determined that, although the city had no written guidelines, its "practice has been to allow check offs from employees' pay to organizations or programs as required by law or where the check off option is available to all City employees or where the check off option is available to all employees within a single employee unit such as the Fire Department." D.C., 381 F.Supp. 500, 502 (1974). The court further found that the city has "not allowed check off options serving only single employees or programs which are not available either to all City employees or to all employees engaged in a particular section of City employment." Ibid. Finding, however, that withholding union dues from the paychecks of union members would be no more difficult than processing any other deduction allowed by the city, the District Court concluded that the city had not offered a rational explanation for its refusal to withhold for the union. Accordingly, the District Court held that the city's refusal to withhold moneys when requested to do so by the respondents for the benefit of Local 660 "constitutes a violation of the individual (respondents') rights to equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 502-503. The court ordered that so long as the city continued "without clearly stated and fair standards, to withhold moneys from the paychecks of City employees for other purposes," it was enjoined from refusing to withhold union dues from the paychecks of the respondents. Id., at 503. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, 518 F.2d 83 (1975), and we granted certiorari. 423 U.S. 890, 96 S.Ct. 186, 46 L.Ed.2d 121 (1975). We reverse.

II

Since it is not here asserted and this Court would reject such a contention if it were made that respondents' status as union members or their interest in obtaining a dues checkoff is such as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause, the city's practice must meet only a relatively relaxed standard of reasonableness in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. ²

The city presents three justifications for its refusal to allow the dues checkoff requested by respondents. First, it argues, North Carolina law makes it illegal for the city to enter into a contract with a municipal union, N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 95-98 (1975), and an agreement with union members to provide a dues checkoff, with the union as a third-party beneficiary, would in effect be such a contract. See 40 N.C.Op.Atty.Gen. 591 (1968-1970). Thus, compliance with the state law, and with the public policy it represents of discouraging dealing with municipal unions, is said to provide a sufficient basis for refusing respondents' request. Second, it claims, a dues checkoff is a proper subject of collective bargaining, which the city asserts Congress may shortly require of state and local governments. Under this theory, the desire to preserve the checkoff as a bargaining chip in any future collective-bargaining process is in itself an adequate basis for the refusal. Lastly, the city contends, allowing withholding only when it benefits all city or departmental employees is a legitimate method for avoiding the burden of withholding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. Because we find that this explanation provides a sufficient justification for the challenged practice, we have no occasion to address the first two reasons proffered.

The city submitted affidavits to show that it would be unduly burdensome and expensive for it to withhold money for every organization or person that requested it, App. 17, 45, 55, and respondents did not contest this showing. As respondents concede, it was therefore reasonable, and permissible under the Equal Protection Clause, for the city to develop standards or restrictions to determine who would be eligible for withholding. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, at 81-84, 96 S.Ct. 1883, at 1892-1893, 48 L.Ed.2d 478. See Brief for Respondents 9. Within the limitations of the Equal Protection Clause, of course, the choice of those standards is for the city and not for the courts. Thus, our inquiry is not whether standards might be drawn that would include the union but whether the standards that were drawn were reasonable ones with "some basis in practical experience." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331, 86 S.Ct. 803, 820, 15 L.Ed.2d 769, 788 (1966). Of course, the fact that the standards were drawn and applied in practice rather than pursuant to articulated guidelines is of no import for equal protection purposes.

The city allows withholding for taxes, retirement-insurance programs, savings programs, and certain charitable organizations.³ These categories, the District Court found, are those in which e checkoff option can, or must, be availed of by all city employees, or those in an entire department. Although the District Court found that this classification did not present a rational basis for rejecting respondents' requests, 381 F.Supp., at 502, we disagree. The city has determined that it will provide withholding only for programs of general interest in which all city or departmental employees can, without more, participate. Employees can participate in the union checkoff only if they join an outside organization the union. Thus, Local 660 does not fit the category of groups for which the city will withhold. We cannot say that denying withholding to associational or special interest...