City of Chattanooga v Davis

Decision Date04 September 2001
Docket Number00-00664
PartiesCITY OF CHATTANOOGA v. KEVIN DAVIS AND FRANK BARRETT v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTYIN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
CITY OF CHATTANOOGA

v.

KEVIN DAVIS

AND

FRANK BARRETT

v.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY

No. E2000-00664-SC-R11-CV

No. M1999-01130-SC-R11-CV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

June 13, 2001 Session

Filed September 4, 2001

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Criminal Court for Hamilton County, No. 225103

Hon. Douglas A. Meyer, Judge

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Circuit Court for Davidson County, No. 98C-1095

Hon. Walter C. Kurtz, Judge

The primary issue presented by these consolidated cases is whether Article VI, section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution, which prohibits the laying of fines in excess of fifty dollars unless assessed by a jury, applies to proceedings for the violation of a municipal ordinance. We hold that Article VI, section 14 does apply to such proceedings when either the intended purpose or the actual purpose or effect of the monetary assessment is to serve as a punitive measure. To the extent that O'Dell v. City of Knoxville, 54 Tenn. App. 59, 388 S.W.2d 150 (1964), would compel a contrary conclusion, it is expressly overruled.

We further hold that the assessment imposed by the Chattanooga City Court in City of Chattanooga v. Davis was punitive in its intended purpose and therefore subject to constitutional limitation. As for the assessments imposed in Barrett v. Metropolitan Government, we hold that the actual purpose and effect of all these sanctions were to impose punishment for ordinance violations. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified and explained below in Davis's case, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in Barrett's case. Because no court, other than one of general jurisdiction, has been granted the authority to empanel a jury to determine facts or to impose punishment, we reduce each of the unlawful fines imposed in these cases to fifty dollars, the maximum assessment allowed under such circumstances by Article VI, section 14.

With regard to the additional issues raised in City of Chattanooga v. Davis, we hold that Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306 does not facially violate Article VI, section 14. With regard to the allegations that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-54-306 and 55-10-307 violate the Class Legislation Clause of Article XI, section 8, we dismiss the challenge to section 6-54-306 as moot. As to section 55-10-307, we hold that this statute does not violate Article XI, section 8 for the sole reasons that a distinction is made between municipalities and unincorporated areas of the state or that different punishments may be imposed by substantially similar or identical offenses. Finally, we hold that Davis lacks legal standing to challenge the policies and practices of the City of Chattanooga that arguably infringe upon the District Attorney General's constitutional and statutory authority in Hamilton County. The judgment of the Court of Appeals on these issues is affirmed as modified herein.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Application for Permission to Appeal;

Judgment of the Court of Appeals Affirmed in Part, and Affirmed in Part as Modified in City of Chattanooga v. Davis; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed in Barrett v. Metropolitan Government William M. Barker, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. Riley Anderson, C.J., and Frank F. Drowota, III, Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., and Janice M. Holder, JJ., joined.

Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kevin Davis.

Kenneth O. Fritz, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, City of Chattanooga.

John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Frank Barrett.

Karl F. Dean and John L. Kennedy, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Peter M. Coughlan, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

James W. Kirby, Nashville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference.

OPINION

The primary issue in these consolidated cases is whether a monetary assessment imposed for the violation of a municipal ordinance is subject to the provisions of Article VI, section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution. This section, also commonly known as the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause, reads as follows:

No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers, who shall assess the fine at the time they find the fact, if they think the fine should be more than fifty dollars.

The appellant in City of Chattanooga v. Davis also raises three additional issues: (1) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306 violates Article VI, section 14, either on its face or as applied to this case; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-54-306 and 55-10-307 violate Article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, either on their face or as applied to this case; and (3) whether the City of Chattanooga has used section 55-10-307 to infringe upon the District Attorney General's constitutional and statutory authority as set forth in Article VI, section 5 and Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-7-103. A brief review of the relevant facts of each of these cases will serve to place these issues in their proper context.

City of Chattanooga v. Davis

On December 6, 1998, a Chattanooga City police officer cited the appellant, Kevin Davis, for reckless driving in violation of Chattanooga City Code section 24-13(a).1 The appellant was ordered to appear before the Chattanooga City Court, and on January 12, 1999, he pleaded guilty and received a three-hundred dollar fine. The record contains no evidence that the court advised the appellant of any rights under Article VI, section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution or that he waived any such rights before entering his plea.

The appellant then filed a timely petition before the Hamilton County Criminal Court, requesting dismissal of the charges against him on three primary grounds: (1) that the three-hundred dollar penalty imposed by the City Court violated Article VI, section 14; (2) that Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-3062 and Chattanooga City Code section 1-8(a),3 which both permit the City to impose "monetary penalties" in amounts up to five hundred dollars, violate Article VI, section 14; and (3) that section 6-54-306 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Class Legislation Clause of Article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.4 After holding a hearing on these issues on June 21, the criminal court held that the city court's three-hundred dollar assessment violated Article VI, section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution, and it reduced the appellant's penalty to fifty dollars. The criminal court also upheld the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306 and Chattanooga City Code section 1-8(a).

On July 14, 1999, the criminal court issued an order enjoining the City from imposing monetary penalties in excess of fifty dollars.5 When the City moved to dissolve or modify the injunction, the appellant asked the court to "clarify" its position concerning the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306.6 The appellant also formally challenged the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-307,7 which permits municipalities to adopt by reference certain state offenses as city ordinances, as violative of the Class Legislation Clause and of the District Attorney General's authority under Article VI, section 5.8 The court postponed the hearing on the matters, and it permitted the Attorney General to defend the constitutionality of these statutes.

After holding hearings on August 13 and September 17, the criminal court issued an opinion in favor of the appellant, concluding as follows: (1) that the appellant did not execute a written waiver of his right to trial by jury, and therefore, the fine imposed could not exceed fifty dollars; (2) that as applied, Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306 violates the Fourteenth Amendment and Article XI, section 8, because "[t]here is no reasonable basis or criteria by which [home rule municipalities] can be considered as a class different from other municipalities or unincorporated areas of the State"; (3) that as applied, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-307 denies citizens the equal protection of the law and infringes upon the constitutional and statutory authority of the District Attorney General to prosecute violations of state law; and (4) that as enacted, City Code section 1-8(a) violates Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-306 because it fails to set maximum penalties of thirty days imprisonment, because it states that violations of municipal ordinances "shall be punished by a monetary penalty," (emphasis in original), and because it does not limit any penalties to those necessary to recover administrative expenses.

The City of Chattanooga appealed these findings to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the criminal court and dissolved the injunction. As to the proper amount of the fine, a majority of the intermediate court found that the city court did not violate Article VI, section 14 by imposing a three-hundred dollar fine. In a thorough examination of the nature of municipal court proceedings, the court concluded that assessments imposed for a municipal ordinance violation are not "fines" within the meaning of Article VI, section 14. Interestingly, however, while the majority held that the three-hundred dollar sanction imposed by the city court was not in violation of Article VI, section 14, it nevertheless affirmed the criminal court's reduction of the fine as being within the penalty range of City Code section 1-8(a). Although the majority had misgivings about its holding on this issue,...

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