City of Chi. v. Barr
Decision Date | 29 April 2020 |
Docket Number | Nos. 18-2885,19-3290,s. 18-2885 |
Citation | 961 F.3d 882 |
Parties | CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Debo P. Adegbile, Attorney, Wilmer Hale LLP, New York, NY, Ari Holtzblatt, Attorney, David W. Ogden, Attorney, Jamie S. Gorelick, Attorney, Molly Maureen Jennings, Attorney, Tiffany Wright, Attorney, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Laura Kleinman, Attorney, Laura Kleinman, Attorney, Robinson Curley, P.C., Chicago, IL, Benna Ruth Solomon, Attorney, Justin A. Houppert, Attorney, City Of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, Matthew Charles Crowl, Ronald S. Safer, Attorney, Attorney, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff - Appellee City of Chicago.
Brian C. Haussmann, Attorney, Katherine O'Brien, Attorney, Tabet, Divito & Rothstein LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff United States Conference of Mayors.
Bradley Hinshelwood, Attorney, Daniel Tenny, Attorney, Mark B. Stern, Attorney, Katherine Twomey Allen, Attorney, Hashim M. Mooppan, Attorney, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, W. Scott Simpson, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Springfield, IL, for Defendant - Appellant.
Before BAUER, MANION, AND ROVNER, Circuit Judges.
In this appeal from two consolidated cases, we consider for a second time the legality of conditions imposed by the Attorney General on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program ("Byrne JAG"). See 34 U.S.C. § 10151 et seq. (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 3750 ). Previously, the district court granted a preliminary injunction as to two conditions—known as the notice and access conditions—imposed by the Attorney General on the FY 2017 Byrne JAG grant applicants. We upheld the preliminary injunction and its nationwide scope in City of Chicago v. Sessions , 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (" Chicago I ").
The Attorney General then took the rare step of seeking en banc review limited to only the nationwide scope of the injunction, excluding the determination that injunctive relief was proper as to the notice and access conditions, and we granted en banc review. During the pendency of that review, the district court granted a permanent injunction, and in light of that superseding relief we vacated the decision granting en banc review. City of Chicago v. Sessions , No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018). The district court again determined that the notice and access conditions imposed by the Attorney General were unlawful and unconstitutional, but also determined that a third condition—the compliance condition—was unconstitutional as well. City of Chicago v. Sessions , 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The court extended the injunction to apply to all FY 2017 grant recipients program-wide, but in light of our prior grant of en banc review regarding the scope of the injunction, stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond the City of Chicago.
The Attorney General appealed that determination, and while it was pending in this court, the district court granted a permanent injunction in a second case brought by the City of Chicago, this time challenging the Attorney General's imposition of conditions on the FY 2018 Byrne JAG grant. City of Chicago v. Barr , 405 F. Supp. 3d 748 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Those conditions included the same notice, access, and compliance conditions that the district court enjoined as to the FY 2017 grant, as well as some new conditions. The district court enjoined the imposition of all of the challenged conditions as to the FY 2018 Byrne JAG grant and all future years, and once more stayed the injunction as to grantees other than the City of Chicago. Id . at 770. The Attorney General again appealed to this court, and we consolidated the two cases for the purposes of the appeal.
The stakes in this case are high. Chicago, like many local governments, has determined that: (1) effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; (2) such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, therefore, (3) local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted by Congress to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, yet it now is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch—presenting a city such as Chicago with the stark choice of forfeiting the funds or undermining its own law enforcement effectiveness by damaging that cooperative relationship with its residents.
The Attorney General repeatedly expresses frustration that Chicago, or any other jurisdiction, can "simultaneously accept federal law enforcement grants, yet maintain local policies that frustrate federal immigration enforcement." Appellant's Brief 1-3-20 at 1. It is a sentiment echoed by the only circuit—of the five that have considered it—to uphold the challenged conditions thus far. See State of New York v. Dept. of Justice , 951 F.3d 84, 107 (2d Cir. 2020) () But states do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. And the Attorney General's perception of the urgency of immigration enforcement does not corral for the executive branch the powers entrusted to the legislative branch. The executive branch has significant powers over immigration matters; the power of the purse is not one of them. This tendency to overlook the formalities of the separation of powers to address the issue-of-the-day has been seen many times by the courts, and it is no more persuasive now than it was in those cases. As the Supreme Court has stated, repeatedly:
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The result may appear ‘formalistic’ in a given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the product of the era's perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.
Printz v. United States , 521 U.S. 898, 933, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), quoting New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 144, 187, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).
We conclude again today, as we did when presented with the preliminary injunction, that the Attorney General cannot pursue the policy objectives of the executive branch through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement; that is not within its delegation. It is the prerogative of the legislative branch and the local governments, and the Attorney General's assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes cannot withstand scrutiny.
In Chicago I , we discussed at length the Byrne JAG program and Chicago's Welcoming Ordinance, as well as their respective purposes. See Chicago I , 888 F.3d at 276–82. In short, the Byrne JAG grants are awarded annually to address the needs of state and local law enforcement. They are the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. This lawsuit stemmed initially from the Attorney General's decision to attach three conditions to those grants—the notice, access and compliance conditions, which as set forth by the district court provide respectively:
City of Chicago v. Sessions , 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 937–38 (N.D. Ill. 2017). In short:
All of those conditions were imposed on...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Martínez v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-01206-WGY
...of such injunctions, has spawned a veritable cottage industry of scholarly articles in the past few years." City of Chicago, v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 912 (7th Cir. 2020) (collecting authorities). The Supreme Court, at any rate, has approved injunctions that extend beyond the parties, even whe......
-
Saint Anthony Hosp. v. Eagleson
...or unable to ascertain what is expected of it, and therefore we insist that Congress must speak with a clear voice." City of Chi. v. Barr , 961 F.3d 882, 907 (7th Cir. 2020). We have described this requirement, which is rooted in federalism concerns, as "rigorous." Planned Parenthood of Ind......
-
Finch v. Treto
...extends beyond the plaintiff—is also called a "universal" or "nationwide" (here, statewide) injunction. See City of Chicago v. Barr , 961 F.3d 882, 913 n.7 (7th Cir. 2020).To support its argument that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a universal injunction, the Department relies primarily o......
-
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Garland
...Circuit. See Barr II , 965 F.3d at 761. They were also consistent with the decisions of our sister Circuits. See City of Chicago v. Barr , 961 F.3d 882, 892–909 (7th Cir. 2020) ; City of Providence v. Barr , 954 F.3d 23, 31–45 (1st Cir. 2020) ; City of Philadelphia v. Att'y Gen. of U.S. , 9......
-
THE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EMERGENCY STAYS.
...PROCEDURE [section] 2947 (3d ed. 2013)). (167.) Id. at 2088. (168.) 947 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2020). (169.) Id. at 232. (170.) Id. (171.) 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. (172.) Id. at 916 (emphasis omitted). (173.) 915 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). (174.) Id. at 1327-29. (175.) Id. at 1327. (176.) See Wi......
-
Intellectual property
...in the public interest, that sweep more broadly than the specific parties before it. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr (7th Cir. 2020) 961 F.3d 882, 918; Midway Venture v. Cnty. of San Diego, 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 82 (2021). See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §14245(b)(5)(3) (limitations on inju......
-
THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REMEDIES.
...traditional equitable limitation of relief to the parties before the court."). (5) For cases on this topic, see City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 912-13 (7th Cir. 2020); California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 584 (9th Cir. 2018); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec, 9......
-
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION: IMMIGRATION, RACISM, AND COVID-19.
...406 F. Supp. 3d at 974. (392) Id. at 975 (quoting City of Phila., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 341-42). (393) See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2020) ("The Attorney General cannot rely on a provision encouraging communications as to criminal justice matters as authority to ......