City of Chi. v. Sessions

• Decision Date: 27 July 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 17 C 5720
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.3d 855
• Parties: The CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff, v. Jefferson Beauregard SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

321 F.Supp.3d 855

The CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff,

v.Jefferson Beauregard SESSIONS III, Attorney General of the United States, Defendant.

Case No. 17 C 5720

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed July 27, 2018

Harnaik Singh Kahlon, Laura A Kleinman, Matthew Charles Crowl, Ronald S. Safer, Tal Cohen Chaiken, Riley Safer Holmes & Cancila, LLP, Andrew W. Worseck, Edward N. Siskel, Justin Anthony Houppert, City of Chicago, Department of Law, Chicago, IL, Ari Holtzblatt, Pro Hac Vice, Ari J. Savitzky, Pro Hac Vice David W. Ogden, Jack E. Starcher, Pro Hac Vice, Jamie S. Gorelick, Pro Hac Vice, Molly Jennings, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Bridget Fahey, Pro Hac Vice, Washington, DC, Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux, Pro Hac Vice, Debo P. Adegbile, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Stephen Joseph Buckingham, Arjun Garg, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, W. Scott Simpson, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Springfield, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Harry D. Leinenweber, JudgeThis case involves the overlap, and potential conflict, between core areas of state and federal power: the state's traditional police powers and the federal government's broad, undoubted power over immigration. In order to advance federal immigration policies, the Attorney General attached several new immigration-related conditions to a longstanding federal grant which provides funds to local and state police departments. Those immigration-related conditions conflict with Chicago's policy goals of promoting cooperation between local law enforcement and immigrant communities and ensuring access to essential city services for all city residents regardless of citizenship status. Chicago brought suit to enjoin the Attorney General from attaching those conditions to the grant funds.

Before the Court is the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in its entirety and the City of Chicago's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, II, and V. The Court addresses both below.

I. BACKGROUND

In addition to reciting here the most relevant facts, the Court also incorporates those facts previously described in its earlier ruling. See City of Chicago v. Sessions , 264 F.Supp.3d 933, 937-40 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff'd, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018), en banc reh'g granted and vacated in part by Order, No. 17-2991 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018), Dkt. No. 128.

The dispute centers around the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (the "Byrne JAG grant"), a federal grant named after a fallen New York City police officer which awards funds to states and local jurisdictions to support criminal justice initiatives for personnel, equipment, training, and other community services. See 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a). The Byrne JAG program distributes grant funds by a statutorily-defined formula based on a state's population and the number of violent crimes reported within that jurisdiction in the past year. See 34 U.S.C. § 10156. To receive funds under the program, the would-be grantee must submit an application and comply with all conditions outlined in the Solicitation document provided by the Attorney General. (See 34 U.S.C. § 10153 ; see, e.g. , FY 2017 Local Solicitation, Ex. T to Pl.'s Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 157-20.) The City of Chicago and its neighboring localities have received Byrne JAG funds every year since 2005. In 2016, Chicago used those funds to buy police vehicles and to support the efforts of non-profit organizations working in its high crime communities. (See Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Facts") ¶ 14, Dkt. No. 168; Sachs Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 154.) The funds at issue now were originally earmarked to be distributed in 2017, but this litigation ensued. Should Chicago receive those 2017 funds, the City intends to expand its use of "SpotShotter" acoustic surveillance technology, which allows officers to pinpoint the location of gun shots across the City and thus respond more quickly. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Facts ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 168.)

The grant conditions causing Chicago umbrage are related to federal immigration enforcement. In 2016, the Attorney General determined that various state and local policies of withholding information and other cooperation from federal immigration authorities were frustrating the federal government's immigration-related goals. (See May 31, 2016 Office of Inspector General Mem., Ex. H to Def.'s Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 140-8.) Citing public safety concerns, the Attorney General announced that the Department of Justice ("DOJ") would award Byrne JAG grants only to localities that: share certain immigration-related information with federal immigration agencies, allow immigration agents access to local detention facilities, and provide notice before releasing certain undocumented individuals. (See DOJ Press Release, Ex. B to Compl., Dkt. No. 1-2.) In this suit, Chicago challenges all three of these new conditions (hereafter, "the Conditions"):

1. The "Access Condition" requires that Byrne JAG recipients permit personnel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") to access any detention facility to meet with undocumented immigrants and inquire as to their right to be or remain in the United States.

2. The "Notice Condition" requires that Byrne JAG recipients provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of the scheduled release date and time of an alien in the jurisdiction's custody whenever DHS requests such notice in order to take custody of the alien upon release. The Attorney General later amended this Condition to clarify that "[i]n the event that ...the scheduled release date and time for an alien are such as not to permit the advance notice [of scheduled release]...it shall not be a violation of this condition to provide only as much advance notice as practicable."

3. The "Compliance Condition" requires that Byrne JAG recipients certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a federal statute that bars local governments from restricting the sharing of immigration status information with federal law enforcement.

(See FY 2017 Local Solicitation, Ex. T to Pl.'s Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 157-20; Example Byrne JAG award documents, Exs. F, G to Jennings Decl., Dkt. No. 158.) The Attorney General added the Notice and Access Conditions for the first time in FY 2017, but the Compliance Condition also applied the previous year. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Facts ¶¶ 17-18.)

According to Chicago, these Conditions conflict with longstanding City policy of ensuring access to essential city services regardless of a resident's citizenship status and of promoting cooperation between local law enforcement and immigrant communities. (See Compl. ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Chicago's local policies protecting immigrant rights date back to 1985, when they were first embodied in executive orders and then eventually codified. (Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Facts ¶¶ 4-8, Dkt. No. 168.) The City's Welcoming City Ordinance, enacted in 2012, encapsulates its current policy. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Though Chicago's policy and others like it are commonly referred to as "sanctuary city policies," the Seventh Circuit has recognized the inaptness of that term. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d at 281 (noting the term is "commonly misunderstood" and does not accurately describe the effect of such policies).)

The Welcoming City Ordinance reflects both the City's determination that effective police work relies on willing community assistance and its belief that the "cooperation of the city's immigrant communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety and security in the entire city." Chicago, Ill. Muni. Code § 2-173-005. The City intended the Welcoming City Ordinance to clarify both the communications and enforcement relationship between the City and the federal government as well as the specific conduct City employees are prohibited from undertaking, given the City's view that such prohibited conduct would "significantly harm[ ] the city's relationship with immigrant communities." Id.

Specifically, the Ordinance prohibits all City agents and agencies from: requesting or disclosing information about an individual's immigration status, id. §§ 2-173-020, -030; detaining anyone based solely on their immigration status or an ICE detainer, id. § 2-173-042(a); and spending on-duty time "responding to ICE inquiries or communicating with ICE regarding a person's custody status or release date," unless the responding City employee is "acting pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement purpose that is unrelated to the enforcement of a civil immigration law," id. § 2-173-042(b). Notably, these prohibitions do not apply to certain classes of potentially dangerous individuals, including known gang members and those with outstanding criminal warrants, felony convictions, or pending felony charges. Id. § 2-173-042(c); see also Chicago Police Department ("CPD")'s Special Order S06-14-03, Ex. F to Pl.'s Request for Judicial Notice, Dkt. No. 157 (reiterating the policies of the Welcoming City Ordinance and establishing rules for CPD officers in conformance therewith).

Chicago contends that the new Conditions put it in an untenable position, forcing the City either to accept the grant funds with the attached Conditions and—the City believes—lose the trust and cooperation of its immigrant communities or decline the grant and forgo much-needed funding for critical police resources and community services. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Chicago argues that the Constitution protects it from making this Hobson's choice.

To that end, Chicago brings a seven-count Complaint, alleging constitutional infirmities and unlawful agency action. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Counts I and II allege the Conditions are unconstitutional because the Byrne JAG statute does not provide the Attorney General...