City of Chicago v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 17 April 1935
• Docket Number: No. 22812.,22812.
• Citation: 195 N.E. 636,360 Ill. 177
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. PETERSON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

360 Ill. 177

195 N.E. 636

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.PETERSON.

No. 22812.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 17, 1935.

Charles Peterson was found guilty and fined for failure to have a secondhand dealer's license, and he appeals.

Cause transferred to Appellate Court.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; Eugene J. Holland, judge.

Russell, Murphy, Curran & Pearson, of Chicago (Walter Wm. Pearson, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

William H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (Otto F. Weiner and William V. Daly, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

ORR, Justice.

Charles Peterson, a dealer in used tires, was found guilty and fined in the municipal court of Chicago for failure to have a secondhand dealer's license, as required by ordinance. The case was appealed here on the certificate of the trial judge that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved, and that in his opinion the public interest required a direct appeal to this court.

A motion was made in this court by appellee that the appeal be dismissed because written assignments of error were not attached to the record on review, or, in the alternative, that a rule be entered upon appellant to assign errors, and that the cause be transferred to the Appellate Court. These motions were taken with the case. The motion to dismiss is denied, as we find certain ‘errors relied on for reversal’ stated in appellant's brief. While this statement of errors relied on is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court, as we shall hereafter show, it nevertheless is an attempt to comply with rule 39 of this court, and, as such, is sufficient to prevent a dismissal of the appeal.

The motion to transfer the cause to the Appellate Court will be allowed, as the so-called assignment of errors in appellant's brief contains no question which invokes the jurisdiction of this court. It is alleged that the ordinance is ‘invalid, void and unconstitutional’; that the trial court ‘erred in not allowing the defendant's motion for a new trial on the same grounds'; that the city council ‘had no legislative authority to pass the ordinance in question, and that the ordinance deprives defendant of the use of property without due powers of law and is unreasonable and confiscatory.’ We have repeatedly held that a mere allegation in a pleading or an assignment of error that a law is unconstitutional is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court by direct appeal unless it can be seen that the question may be fairly regarded as debatable. People v. Jiras, 340 Ill. 208, 172 N. E. 47;Wilson v. Prochnow, 354 Ill. 98, 187 N. E. 914;People v. Allen, 352 Ill. 262, 185 N. E. 605. It is not enough to give us jurisdiction to simply declare that an ordinance deprives one of property without due process of law, for, if that were the law, every conviction for violation of an ordinance mught be appealed directly to this court upon the simple statement of counsel, however absurd that assertion might be. Dean v. Northern Trust Co., 259 Ill. 148, 102 N. E. 244. Due process of law has repeatedly been held to be an orderly proceeding wherein a person is served with notice and has an opportunity to be heard and to enforce and protect his rights before a tribunal having power to hear and determine the case. The fact that the judgment is distasteful to one party, or that the court may have erred in entering it, is not a denial of due process of law if the requirements above stated have been met. Valerius v. Perry, 342 Ill. 147, 174 N. E. 29;Boylan v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 240 Ill. 413, 88 N. E. 981;Rabbitt v. Frank C. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 130 N. E. 787. We...