City of Chicago v. Lawrence, 41216

• Citation: 42 Ill.2d 461,248 N.E.2d 71
• Decision Date: 28 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41216,41216
• Parties: The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. Richard LAWRENCE et al., Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 71

248 N.E.2d 71

42 Ill.2d 461

The CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee, v. Richard LAWRENCE et al., Appellants.

No. 41216.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 28, 1969.

John M. Bowlus and Sheli Z. Rosenberg, Chicago (Cotton, Watt, Jones & King, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Raymond F. Simon, Chicago (Marvin E. Aspen and Ronald S. Cope, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

After trial by jury in the circuit court of Cook County, Richard Lawrence and James Orange were found guilty of interfering with a police officer in the performance of his duties. Each was fined $100. Claiming violations of constitutional rights as well as errors at the trial, they appeal directly to this court.

The record discloses that on November 12, 1966, the Chicago Police Department was notified that a large group intended to stage a 'demonstration' outside the home of officer Burleigh Ginkle, a member of the police department. The plan was to congregate at 2:00 P.M. the next day and proceed in automobiles along 63rd Street to a designated parking area from which they would then march to Officer Ginkle's residence. Sergeant O'Malley, a 20-year member of the police department, was given orders to protect Officer Ginkle and his family from undue harassment by these people, and an assistant corporation counsel of the city was assigned to act as a legal advisor to the police. Officer Ginkle had requested that he and his family be given such protection.

On the day of the anticipated demonstration the defendants and a third individual appeared at the officer's home. They walked up on the porch of the house and began knocking on the door. No one opened it. Sergeant O'Malley and the legal advisor were parked across the street, and when they saw what was going on they walked over and told defendant that they had been assigned to keep demonstrators from disturbing Officer Ginkle and his family, and that defendants were not to pound on the door or ring the bell. The three persons came down the steps and Sergeant O'Malley and his companion began to walk back to the squad car. Before they reached it, however, the defendants and their companion went back up the steps and resumed their pounding on the door. Once again Officer O'Malley went to them. He warned them that if they continued their behavior he would have to place them under arrest. The third intruder went to the corner, where the group was assembled, but the defendants once again began pounding on the door. Sergeant O'Malley thereupon walked back up the steps of the house, escorted defendants away and told them they were under arrest.

The ordinance under which the defendants were charged provides that 'Any person who shall resist any officer of the police department in the discharge of his duties, or shall in any way interfere with or hinder or prevent him from discharging his duty as such officer, or shall offer or endeavor to do so, and whoever shall in any manner assist any person in the custody of any member of the police force to escape or attempt to escape from such custody, or attempt to rescue any person in custody, shall be fined not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense.' It is contended that the provisions are invalid for vagueness and for failing to expressly include scienter as an element of the offense. Defendants object that terms like 'interfere with' are not defined, and hypothetical situations are pictured in which they suggest a person could violate the ordinance by engaging in 'constitutionally-protected' conduct. They urge that the ordinance must fall for not, in terms requiring that the offense be committed 'knowingly' and with knowledge that the officer was engaged in the performance of his duties.

As for the vagueness objection it is true that conduct prohibited by ordinance or statute must be described in terms definite enough to serve as a guide to those to whom it applies. But 'interfere with' and 'hinder' are not under all circumstances terms too indefinite to be applied. An ordinance may describe conduct by their use where the meaning is clear enough to people contemplating such behavior, the test being whether they convey sufficient definite warning as to proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. (Cf. Jaffe v. Cruttenden, 412 Ill. 606, 107 N.E.2d 715.) We do not think that under a reasonable construction the ordinance in the case at bar can be said to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. An ordinance or statute must be read in a sensible way, without giving necessarily general terms like 'interference' such a literal application as would lead to undue restrictions on speech or some other constitutionally protected conduct. No rule of construction requires the ordinance before us to be given an absurd effect which, although within its letter, is contrary to its spirit.

Nor is it necessary to consider at length the objection that the ordinance does not in terms require the offense to have been committed 'knowingly.' Even if a construction could be given which would render it void because of such an absence, defendants are in no position to raise the question. It is an established rule that courts will not entertain objections to an allegedly unconstitutional feature where the objecting party is not in any way aggrieved thereby. One who would attack an ordinance or statute as unconstitutional must bring himself within the class as to whom the law is unconstitutional. (City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N.E.2d 278; Liberty National Bank of Chicago v. Collins, 388 Ill. 549, 559, 58 N.E.2d 610.) In the case at bar there was nothing inadvertent or unknowing about defendants' interference. It is clear that they acted with full scienter, the officer having in fact advised them of his assignment when he first spoke to them. Nevertheless they disregarded his explanations and went back to their pounding on the door. Their conduct was a plain interference with the officer's efforts to maintain order at the scene of the demonstration. They deliberately ignored his repeated directions, distracting his attention from the crowd on the corner and making it necessary for him to return and physically escort them from the premises. They are not in a position to raise a constitutional question based on lack of scienter.

Defendants argue next that the complaints failed to provide them...