City of Chicago v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 October 1899
• Citation: 182 Ill. 135,55 N.E. 123
• Parties: CITY OF CHICAGO v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

182 Ill. 135

55 N.E. 123

CITY OF CHICAGO

v.WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 19, 1899.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Assumpsit by George H. Williams against the city of Chicago. A judgment in favor of plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court (80 Ill. App. 33), and defendant appeals. Reversed.Charles S. Thornton, Corp. Counsel, and Thomas J. Sutherland, for appellant.

Judd & Hawley, for appellee.

This is an action in assumpsit, brought by the appellee against the appellant to recover the sum of $677.30, alleged to be due him upon an oral contract with the city, made in 1897, to do stenographic and typewriting work to that amount in a certain action tried in the superior court of Cook county, brought by one Ella C. Quinlan against John J. Badenoch and John E. Fitzpatrick, which work is alleged to have been done under said agreement. The declaraction contains the common counts only. The bill of particulars recites that the claim upon which the present suit is brought is for services rendered to the city of Chicago by the appellee as court steographer in a cause entitled ‘Quinlan v. Badenoch,’ tried in 1897, ‘the said Badenoch being at one time chief of police of the city of Chicago, and the plaintiff therein having been employed in behalf of the city through the office of the corporation counsel of said city of Chicago.’ At the close of the plaintiff's evidence in the case, the defendant, the city of Chicago, made a written motion to exclude from the jury all evidence on the part of the plaintiff, and to give to the jury the following written instruction: ‘The court instructs the jury to find the verdict for the defendant.’ The court refused to so instruct the jury, and marked the word ‘Refused’ on the instruction, to which the defendant excepted. The defendant, by its counsel, then offered in evidence the court files in said case of Quinlan against Badenoch, which were admitted in evidence. The defendant then again asked the court to give the jury the following written instruction, to wit: ‘The jury are instructed by the court to find a verdict for the defendant.’ The court refused to give such instruction, and marked the same ‘Refused,’ to which the defendant excepted. Thereupon the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the appellee, the plaintiff below, for the above amount. Motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment was rendered upon the verdict. An appeal was taken from this judgment to the appellate court, where the same has been affirmed. The appellate court has granted a certificate of importance.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The first consideration presented by the record relates to the character of the suit in which the services are alleged to have been rendered. The suit was brought by Ella C. Quinlan against John J. Badenoch and John E. Fitzpatrick to recover damages for false imprisonment. John J. Badenoch was superintendent of police in the city of Chicago in 1895, and John E. Fitzpatrick was a police officer in that city at that time. These officers caused the arrest and forcible detention of Ella C. Quinlan, because they suspected her of complicity in certain crimes. She thereupon brought suit, claiming damages against them personally because of her arrest and detention. Badenoch and Fitzpatrick were defended in that suit by an attorney occupying the position of assistant corporation counsel to the city of Chicago, and by another attorney not connected with the law department of the city. Appellee claims that he acted as stenographer on behalf of Badenoch and Fitzpatrick in the trial of that case, and that he performed services therein as such stenographer to the amount in value of the claim here sued upon. Appellee contends that he did not work for the city of Chicago, and that the city is liable to him for fees charged by him for his work as stenographer. He also claims that the city made a contract with him to do this work for it, or, in other words, that he was ‘employed in behalf of the city through the office of the corporation counsel of said city.’ It is to be noted that the suit brought by Quinlan was not brought against the city of Chicago, but was brought against two of the city's police officers, who had improperly and wrongfully made an arrest. The city was not liable to Ella C. Quinlan because of the arrest so made by two of its police officers. If the charge against them of making an illegal arrest was true, they alone were liable as individuals. Police officers are not agents or servants of the city appointing them, within the rule making the corporation answerable for their acts, nor is a municipal corporation liable for the nonfeasance or misfeasance of the officers of its police. There is an implied or common-law liability for the negligence of municipal officers in the performance of corporate acts which have relation to the management of the corporate or private concerns of the municipality from which it derives special or immediate profit or advantage as a corporation. But where acts are done by the officers of towns and cities in their public capacity in the discharge of duties imposed by the law for the public benefit, and for the promotion and preservation of the public welfare, no private action lies unless the right to bring it is expressly conferred. In President, etc., v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353, where a party was charged before a justice of the peace with the violation of a town ordinance by committing an assault and battery, and was arrested therefor, and confined in the town prison, it was held that a municipal corporation is not liable for the illegal and unauthorized acts of its officers in administering an ordinance; and that, although trustees and other officers of the town may, by the illegal and unwarranted exercise of power, render themselves individually liable, the town is not thereby rendered liable. In Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334, where suit was brought to recover damages for an injury sustained through the alleged neglect of a driver of a hook and ladder wagon belonging to the city fire department, while such driver was engaged in the service of the city in saving property from destruction by fire, it was held that the members of the fire department, although appointed by the city corporation, are not servants and agents of the city, for whose conduct the city is liable, but that they act rather as officers of the city charged with a public service, for whose negligence in the discharge of official duty no action lies against the city, unless it is expressly given, and that the maxim respondeat superior has no application to such a...